本书首先介绍了一个关于关系的八维度的研究，这是本书的核心。接下来详细讨论关系这种现象在心理学与社会学中是如何被对待的。书中提出了“渴往的男人（女人）”模型，与弗洛伊德的“内疚的人”模型形成对比。作者在随后章节中逐一介绍每一个维度，每一章都整合了一些相关的研究与理论，包括这一维度在人们的生活中是如何被表达出来的。在本书结尾，作者探索了男女在建立关系途径方面的差异，并用关于爱的整合性章节来结束全书。
　　在本书中，朱瑟林·乔塞尔森博士不仅就如何改善婚姻关系或其他浪漫依恋给出了有益的建议，还提出了一个在情感上对与他人建立紧密联系非常重要的八维度关系模型：、抱持、依恋、激情体验、坦诚相见的确认、理想化与认同、共同性与共鸣、嵌入、照料。
　　本书特色
　　非常重视人际之间相互的联系与共生共存。
　　对女性的心理世界进行了非常细腻的探索、研究和分析。
　　书中所有的案例都来自实际生活，作者及其学生对67个经历不同、生活各异的人进行了现场访谈。一些受访者在深度访谈中倾诉出很多他们自己从未对他人讲述或难以对他人讲述的往事与情感，但却令人难以置信地很自然地都对作者“坦白”了。

　　一部以全新的视角剖析当下生活的令人震撼之作。《纽约时报》称："对于揭示掩藏在这个时代背后的社会真相而言，《小趋势》无疑是一部完美的圣经。"与托夫勒的《未来的冲击》和奈斯比特的《大趋势》相比，《小趋势》是新世纪商业社会预言中最摩登的话题。

　　三合会、黑手党、卡巴拉教、共济会、骷髅会、光明会、郇山隐修会、圣殿骑士团、光明会、共济会、德鲁伊教、诺斯替教、玫瑰十字会……从中东炙热的河道流浪而来，后到加拿大魁北克乡村一座与世隔绝的农舍，再到美国贝弗利山人头攒动的精品小店，约翰•劳伦斯•雷诺兹是位善讲故事的大师级作家，并多次获得过奖项，他审视了历史上最为人知的秘密团体，探究它们的来龙去脉和活动过程，揭示了几百年来一直被人们传承并曲解的秘密。

　　本书从部落偶像、身体、名字、语言、宗教、民族、历史起源、新多元主义8种角度，探讨群体认同在政治变迁压力下的自我塑造，对于民族主义方兴未艾，终将改变世界的政治面貌，率先发出警讯。作者返回源头，从人性的基本面，考察群体认同的各种因素，如何以不同的方式、在不同的环境，纠缠扭结，以致我们以各自的形态变成今天这副模样。

　　一个现代化的国家和社会，建立在人民对法治的信念上，暴戾之气只是“人治”社会才有的产物。法院好象严父，（注意，不是法官像严父，已经有警察先生当我们小民的爹啦，法官先生再出来当爹，怎么受得了乎？）小民内心有一种信念，那就是，人世间有最高的天秤，不必诉诸诅咒、神仙、革命、贿赂，就可以得到公正的裁判。想当年德皇菲特列大帝，在波茨坦宫后面，修建一个御花园，就在东南角上，有一个既破又烂的磨房在焉，如果不把它除掉，不但御花园成不了四四方方的，而且和金碧辉煌的亭台楼阁一对比，简直成何体统。

　　作者： CCTV《对话》栏目组
　　医疗，社保，教育，就业，新农村，绿色GDP，知识产权海外角力；什么是人民群众最关心、最直接、最现实的利益问题？这里的《对话》节目，一个个为您打开了这些问号。《对话》坚持与时俱进，努力成为对社会责任有所承担、对民族命运有所担当的精神殿堂。我们不能不把这些难忘的回忆镌刻在这本书里，因为我们始终倔强地相信：对话，对变化中的中国来说，她就是一部心灵的史诗。

　　帮助穷人仅仅是送点口粮已远远不够，要实现可持续发展，更需要精神食粮，并且是激发他们转变观念的精神食粮。穷人天生一副好胃口，从不惧怕任何辛辣的食物。因而这本直面现实、一针见血、敲醒穷人的书，能得到如此广泛的喜爱和包容，这也是时代的进步……

　　本书分析了社会财富的创造和分配方式，指出贫富不均是一种客观现实，是一种必然的社会历史现象。在此基础上，从社会环境和个人素质等方面入手，指出了穷人的艰难处境，分析了穷人为什么穷的原因，让穷人认清自己的现状，找到摆脱命运的途径。本书还分析了穷人、富人各自的优势和烦恼，让穷人看到希望，为富人敲响警钟。看起来像白领的中产阶级，其实不是并不是真正意义上的富人，穷人缺的不是钱、房、车，而是缺富人的思维。

　　二十世纪中国最有影响力的处世学：厚黑学
　　本书以“台北图书馆”的镇馆精品《厚黑学》为底本，首次将李宗吾的完整手稿整理出版，从字里行间可以真正感悟李宗吾原版《厚黑学》的精髓。本书增加了林语堂、柏杨、南怀谨所写的序言，查阅了大量三四十年代的报刊，收录了李宗吾先生有关“厚黑学”的全部经典文章，使人们不但可以了解“厚黑学”的精髓，还可以看到李宗吾先生运用他所创立的学说对社会、政治问题所进行的深刻精辟的论述。本书将一部分文言文译成了现代文，并对一些典故加以注释，让读者在阅读中更加深入、全面地理解这一在海内外影响深远的学说。

　　利用幽默的方法来教授组织学习的理论，大卫·哈彻斯热衷于研究组织中各种新的可能性及组织中的人，他的著作和演讲内容主要在组织学习和组织变革等领域。

　　本书通过阅读历史、点评史料阐析为官之道，一般官场类书都从黑厚之学看待官场，总结出众多对潜规则，给为官者鉴，但是本书反其道而行之，认为做官之人一定要提高自己的修养，提升领导的境界，才能成为一个好官。当然，要想成为一个好官并不容易，在官场中混也非易事，本书从“知书知理”、“养生养性”、“位尊位卑”、“识人识世”、“戒奢戒贪”、“官箴官德”几个方面展开，作者深厚的历史功底在点评中表现得淋漓尽致

　　Manifesto of the Communist Party (German: Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei), often referred to as The Communist Manifesto, was published on February 21, 1848, and is one of the world's most influential political manuscripts. Commissioned by the Communist League and written by communist theorists Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, it laid out the League's purposes and program. It presents an analytical approach to the class struggle (historical and present) and the problems of capitalism, rather than a prediction of communism's potential future forms.
　　
　　Friedrich Engels has often been credited in composing the first drafts, which led to The Communist Manifesto. In July 1847, Engels was elected into the Communist League, where he was assigned to draw up a catechism. This became the Draft of a Communist Confession of Faith. The draft contained almost two dozen questions that helped express the ideas of both Engels and Karl Marx at the time. In October 1847, Engels composed his second draft for the Communist League entitled, The Principles of Communism. The text remained unpublished until 1914, despite its basis for The Manifesto. From Engels's drafts Marx was able to write, once commissioned by the Communist League, The Communist Manifesto, where he combined more of his ideas along with Engels's drafts and work, The Condition of the Working Class in England.
　　
　　Although the names of both Engels and Karl Marx appear on the title page alongside the "persistent assumption of joint-authorship", Engels, in the preface introduction to the 1883 German edition of the Manifesto, said that the Manifesto was "essentially Marx's work" and that "the basic thought... belongs solely and exclusively to Marx."
　　
　　Engels wrote after Marx's death,
　　
　　 "I cannot deny that both before and during my forty years' collaboration with Marx I had a certain independent share in laying the foundations of the theory, but the greater part of its leading basic principles belong to Marx....Marx was a genius; we others were at best talented. Without him the theory would not be by far what it is today. It therefore rightly bears his name."
　　
　　Textual history
　　
　　The Communist Manifesto was first published (in German) in London by a group of German political refugees in 1848. It was also serialised at around the same time in a German-language London newspaper, the Deutsche Londoner Zeitung. The first English translation was produced by Helen Macfarlane in 1850. The Manifesto went through a number of editions from 1872 to 1890; notable new prefaces were written by Marx and Engels for the 1872 German edition, the 1882 Russian edition, the 1883 French edition, and the 1888 English edition. This edition, translated by Samuel Moore with the assistance of Engels, has been the most commonly used English text since.
　　
　　However, some recent English editions, such as Phil Gasper's annotated "road map" (Haymarket Books, 2006), have used a slightly modified text in response to criticisms of the Moore translation made by Hal Draper in his 1994 history of the Manifesto, The Adventures of the "Communist Manifesto" (Center for Socialist History, 1994).
　　Contents
　　
　　The Manifesto is divided into an introduction, three substantive sections, and a conclusion.
　　Preamble
　　
　　The introduction begins with the notable comparison of communism to a "spectre", claiming that across Europe communism is feared, but not understood, and thus communists ought to make their views known with a manifesto:
　　
　　 A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism. All the Powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies.
　　 Where is the opposition party that has not been decried as Communist by its opponents in power? Where is the opposition party that has not hurled back the branding reproach of Communism, against the more advanced opposition parties, as well as against its reactionary adversaries?
　　
　　I. Bourgeois and Proletarians
　　
　　The first section, "Bourgeois and Proletarians", puts forward Marx's neo-Hegelian version of history, historical materialism, claiming that
　　
　　 The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.
　　
　　 Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, have stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.
　　
　　The section goes on to argue that the class struggle under capitalism is between those who own the means of production, the ruling class or bourgeoisie, and those who labour for a wage, the working class or proletariat.
　　
　　 The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It ... has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “payment in cash” ... for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation ... Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones ... All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.
　　
　　However:
　　
　　 The essential condition for the existence and rule of the bourgeois class is the accumulation of wealth in private hands, the formation and increase of capital; the essential condition of capital is wage-labour. Wage-labour rests entirely on the competition among the workers.
　　
　　This section further explains that the proletarians will eventually rise to power through class struggle: the bourgeoisie constantly exploits the proletariat for its manual labour and cheap wages, ultimately to create profit for the bourgeois; the proletariat rise to power through revolution against the bourgeoisie such as riots or creation of unions. The Communist Manifesto states that while there is still class struggle amongst society, capitalism will be overthrown by the proletariat only to start again in the near future; ultimately communism is the key to class equality amongst the citizens of Europe.
　　II. Proletarians and Communists
　　
　　The second section, "Proletarians and Communists," starts by outlining the relationship of conscious communists to the rest of the working class:
　　
　　 The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working-class parties.
　　 They have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole.
　　 They do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement.
　　 The Communists are distinguished from the other working-class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. 2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.
　　
　　It goes on to defend communism from various objections, such as the claim that communists advocate "free love", and the claim that people will not perform labor in a communist society because they have no incentive to work.
　　
　　The section ends by outlining a set of short-term demands. These included, among others, the abolition of both private land ownership and of the right to inheritance, a progressive income tax, universal education, centralization of the means of communication and transport under state management, and the expansion of the means of production owned by the state. The implementation of these policies, would, the authors believed, be a precursor to the stateless and classless society.
　　
　　One particularly controversial passage deals with this transitional period:
　　
　　 When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.
　　
　　It is this concept of the transition from socialism to communism which many critics of the Manifesto, particularly during and after the Soviet era, have highlighted. Anarchists, liberals, and conservatives have all asked how an organization such as the revolutionary state could ever (as Engels put it elsewhere) "wither away."
　　
　　In a related dispute, later Marxists make a separation between "socialism", a society ruled by workers, and "communism", a classless society. Engels wrote little and Marx wrote less on the specifics of the transition to communism, so the authenticity of this distinction remains a matter of dispute.
　　10 point program of Communism
　　
　　 1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.
　　 2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
　　 3. Abolition of all right of inheritance.
　　 4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.
　　 5. Centralisation of credit in the hands of the State, by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly.
　　 6. Centralisation of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State.
　　 7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State; the bringing into cultivation of waste-lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.
　　 8. Equal liability of all to labour. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.
　　 9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a more equitable distribution of the population over the country.
　　 10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labour in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production.
　　
　　According to the Communist Manifesto, all these were prior conditions for a transition from capitalism to communism, but Marx and Engels later expressed a desire to modernize this passage.
　　III. Socialist and Communist Literature
　　
　　The third section, "Socialist and Communist Literature," distinguishes communism from other socialist doctrines prevalent at the time the Manifesto was written. While the degree of reproach of Marx and Engels toward rival perspectives varies, all are eventually dismissed for advocating reformism and failing to recognize the preeminent role of the working class. Partly because of Marx's critique, most of the specific ideologies described in this section became politically negligible by the end of the nineteenth century.
　　IV. Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Opposition Parties
　　
　　The concluding section, "Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Opposition Parties," briefly discusses the communist position on struggles in specific countries in the mid-nineteenth century such as France, Switzerland, Poland, and Germany. It then ends with a declaration of support for other communist revolutions and a call to action:
　　
　　 In short, the Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things.
　　 The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.
　　
　　Workers of the world, unite!

　　Social contract describes a broad class of theories that try to explain the ways in which people form states to maintain social order. The notion of the social contract implies that the people give up sovereignty to a government or other authority in order to receive or maintain social order through the rule of law. It can also be thought of as an agreement by the governed on a set of rules by which they are governed.
　　
　　Social contract theory formed a central pillar in the historically important notion that legitimate state authority must be derived from the consent of the governed. The starting point for most of these theories is a heuristic examination of the human condition absent from any structured social order, usually termed the “state of nature”. In this condition, an individual’s actions are bound only by his or her personal power, constrained by conscience. From this common starting point, the various proponents of social contract theory attempt to explain, in different ways, why it is in an individual’s rational self-interest to voluntarily give up the freedom one has in the state of nature in order to obtain the benefits of political order.
　　
　　Thomas Hobbes (1651), John Locke (1689) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) are the most famous philosophers of contractarianism. However, they drew quite different conclusions from this starting-point. Hobbes advocated an authoritarian monarchy, Locke advocated a liberal monarchy, while Rousseau advocated liberal republicanism. Their work provided theoretical groundwork of constitutional monarchy, liberal democracy and republicanism. The Social Contract was used in the Declaration of Independence as a sign of enforcing Democracy, and more recently has been revived by thinkers such as John Rawls.
　　
　　Overview
　　
　　According to Thomas Hobbes, human life would be "nasty, brutish, and short" without political authority. In its absence, we would live in a state of nature, where we each have unlimited natural freedoms, including the "right to all things" and thus the freedom to harm all who threaten our own self-preservation; there would be an endless "war of all against all" (Bellum omnium contra omnes). To avoid this, free men establish political community i.e. civil society through a social contract in which each gain civil rights in return for subjecting himself to civil law or to political authority.
　　
　　Alternatively, some have argued that we gain civil rights in return for accepting the obligation to respect and defend the rights of others, giving up some freedoms to do so; this alternative formulation of the duty arising from the social contract is often identified with arguments about military service.
　　Violations of the contract
　　
　　The social contract and the civil rights it gives us are neither "natural rights" nor permanently fixed. Rather, the contract itself is the means towards an end — the benefit of all — and (according to some philosophers such as Locke or Rousseau), is only legitimate to the extent that it meets the general interest ("general will" in Rousseau). Therefore, when failings are found in the contract, we renegotiate to change the terms, using methods such as elections and legislature. Locke theorized the right of rebellion in case of the contract leading to tyranny.
　　
　　Since civil rights come from agreeing to the contract, those who choose to violate their contractual obligations, such as by committing crimes, abdicate their rights, and the rest of society can be expected to protect itself against the actions of such outlaws. To be a member of society is to accept responsibility for following its rules, along with the threat of punishment for violating them. In this way, society works by "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" (Hardin 1968).
　　History
　　Classical thought
　　
　　Many have argued that Plato's dialog Crito expresses a Greek version of social contract theory. In this dialog, Socrates refuses to escape from jail to avoid being put to death. He argues that since he has willingly remained in Athens all of his life despite opportunities to go elsewhere, he has accepted the social contract i.e. the burden of the local laws, and he cannot violate these laws even when they are against his self-interest.
　　
　　Epicurus seems to have had a strong sense of social contract, with justice and law being rooted in mutual agreement and advantage, as evidenced by these lines, among others, from his Principal Doctrines:
　　
　　 31. Natural justice is a pledge of reciprocal benefit, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another. 32. Those animals which are incapable of making binding agreements with one another not to inflict nor suffer harm are without either justice or injustice; and likewise for those peoples who either could not or would not form binding agreements not to inflict nor suffer harm. 33. There never was such a thing as absolute justice, but only agreements made in mutual dealings among men in whatever places at various times providing against the infliction or suffering of harm. 34. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which is associated with the apprehension of being discovered by those appointed to punish such actions.
　　
　　Also see Epicurean ethics
　　Renaissance developments
　　
　　Quentin Skinner has argued that several critical modern innovations in contract theory are found in the writings from French Calvinists and Huguenots, whose work in turn was invoked by writers in the Low Countries who objected to their subjection to Spain and, later still, by Catholics in England. Among these, Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), from the School of Salamanca, might be considered as an early theorist of the social contract, theorizing natural law in an attempt to limit the divine right of absolute monarchy. All of these groups were led to articulate notions of popular sovereignty by means of a social covenant or contract: all of these arguments began with proto-“state of nature” arguments, to the effect that the basis of politics is that everyone is by nature free of subjection to any government.
　　
　　However, these arguments relied on a corporatist theory found in Roman Law, according to which "a populus" can exist as a distinct legal entity. Therefore these arguments held that a community of people can join a government because they have the capacity to exercise a single will and make decisions with a single voice in the absence of sovereign authority — a notion rejected by Hobbes and later contract theorists.
　　Philosophers
　　Hugo Grotius
　　
　　In the early 17th century, Grotius (1583–1645) introduced the modern idea of natural rights of individuals. Grotius says that we each have natural rights which we have in order to preserve ourselves. He uses this idea to try to establish a basis for moral consensus in the face of religious diversity and the rise of natural science and to find a minimal basis for a moral beginning for society, a kind of natural law that everyone could potentially accept. He goes so far as to say even if we were to concede what we cannot concede without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, these laws would still hold. The idea was considered incendiary, since it suggests that power can ultimately go back to the individuals if the political society that they have set up forfeits the purpose for which it was originally established, which is to preserve themselves. In other words, the people i.e. the individual people, are sovereign. Grotius says that the people are sui juris - under their own jurisdiction. People have rights as human beings but there is a delineation of those rights because of what is possible for everyone to accept morally - everyone has to accept that each person is entitled to try to preserve themselves and therefore they shouldn't try to do harm to others or to interfere with them and they should punish any breach of someone else's rights that arises.
　　Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan (1651)
　　
　　The first modern philosopher to articulate a detailed contract theory was Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). According to Hobbes, the lives of individuals in the state of nature were "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short", a state where self-interest and the absence of rights and contracts prevented the 'social', or society. Life was 'anarchic' (without leadership/ the concept of sovereignty). Individuals in the state of nature were apolitical and asocial. This state of nature is followed by the social contract.
　　
　　The social contract was an 'occurrence' during which individuals came together and ceded some of their individual rights so that others would cede theirs (e.g. person A gives up his/her right to kill person B if person B does the same). This resulted in the establishment of society, and by extension, the state, a sovereign entity (like the individuals, now under its rule, used to be) which was to protect these new rights which were now to regulate societal interactions. Society was thus no longer anarchic.
　　
　　But the state system, which grew out of the social contract, was anarchic (without leadership). Just as the individuals in the state of nature had been sovereigns and thus guided by self-interest and the absence of rights, so states now acted in their self-interest in competition with each other. Just like the state of nature, states were thus bound to be in conflict because there was no sovereign over and above the state (i.e. more powerful) capable of imposing social-contract laws. Indeed, Hobbes' work helped to serve as a basis for the realism theories of international relations, advanced by E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau.
　　John Locke's Second Treatise of Government (1689)
　　
　　John Locke's conception of the social contract differed from Hobbes' in several ways, but retained the central notion that persons in a state of nature would willingly come together to form a state. Locke believed that individuals in a state of nature would have stronger moral limits on their action than accepted by Hobbes, but recognized that people would still live in fear of one another. Locke argued that individuals would agree to form a state that would provide a "neutral judge", and that could therefore protect the lives, liberty, and property of those who lived within it. While Hobbes argued for near-absolute authority, Locke argued that laws could only be legitimate if they sought to achieve the common good. Locke also believed that people will do the right thing as a group, and that all people have natural rights.
　　Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Du contrat social (1762)
　　
　　Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), in his influential 1762 treatise The Social Contract, outlined a different version of social contract theory, based on popular sovereignty. Although Rousseau wrote that the British were perhaps at the time the freest people on earth, he did not approve of their representative government. Rousseau believed that liberty was possible only where there was direct rule by the people as a whole in lawmaking, where popular sovereignty was indivisible and inalienable. Citizens must, in at least some circumstances, be able to choose together the fundamental rules by which they would live, and be able to revise those rules on later occasions if they choose to do so - something the British people as a whole were unable to do.
　　
　　Rousseau's political theory has some points in common with Locke's individualism, but departs from it in his development of the "luminous conception" (which he credited to Diderot) of the general will. Rousseau argues a citizen can be an egoist and decide that his personal interest should override the collective interest. However, as part of a collective body, the individual citizen puts aside his egoism to create a "general will", which is popular sovereignty itself. Popular sovereignty (i.e., the rule of law), thus decides what is good for society as a whole, and the individual (including the administrative head of state, who could be a monarch) must bow to it, or be forced to bow to it:
　　
　　 [The social contract] can be reduced to the following terms: Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.
　　
　　Rousseau's striking phrase that man must "be forced to be free" should be understood this way: since the indivisible and inalienable popular sovereignty decides what is good for the whole, then if an individual lapses back into his ordinary egoism and breaks the law, he will be forced to listen to what they decided as a member of the collectivity (i.e. as citizens). Thus, the law, inasmuch as it is voted by the people's representatives, is not a limitation of individual freedom, but its expression; and enforcement of law, including criminal law, is not a restriction on individual liberty, as the individual, as a citizen, explicitly agreed to be constrained if, as a private individual, he did not respect his own will as formulated in the general will. Because laws represent the restraints of civil freedom, they represent the leap made from humans in the state of nature into civil society. In this sense, the law is a civilizing force, and therefore Rousseau believed that the laws that govern a people helped to mold their character.
　　Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's individualist social contract (1851)
　　
　　While Rousseau's social contract is based on popular sovereignty and not on individual sovereignty, there are other theories espoused by individualists, libertarians and anarchists, which do not involve agreeing to anything more than negative rights and creates only a limited state, if any.
　　
　　Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865) advocated a conception of social contract which didn't involve an individual surrendering sovereignty to others. According to him, the social contract was not between individuals and the state, but rather between individuals themselves refraining from coercing or governing each other, each one maintaining complete sovereignty upon oneself:
　　
　　 What really is the Social Contract? An agreement of the citizen with the government? No, that would mean but the continuation of [Rousseau’s] idea. The social contract is an agreement of man with man; an agreement from which must result what we call society. In this, the notion of commutative justice, first brought forward by the primitive fact of exchange, …is substituted for that of distributive justice … Translating these words, contract, commutative justice, which are the language of the law, into the language of business, and you have commerce, that is to say, in its highest significance, the act by which man and man declare themselves essentially producers, and abdicate all pretension to govern each other.
　　 —Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century (1851)
　　
　　John Rawls' Theory of Justice (1971)
　　
　　John Rawls (1921–2002) proposed a contractarian approach that has a decidedly Kantian flavour, in A Theory of Justice (1971), whereby rational people in a hypothetical "original position", setting aside their individual preferences and capacities under a "veil of ignorance", would agree to certain general principles of justice. This idea is also used as a game-theoretical formalization of the notion of fairness.
　　Philip Pettit's Republicanism (1997)
　　
　　Philip Pettit (b. 1945) has argued, in Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1997), that the theory of social contract, classically based on the consent of the governed (as it is assumed that the contract is valid as long as the people consent to being governed by its representatives, who exercise sovereignty), should be modified, in order to avoid dispute. Instead of arguing that an explicit consent, which can always be manufactured, should justify the validity of social contract, Philip Pettit argues that the absence of an effective rebellion against the contract is the only legitimacy of it.
　　Criticism
　　David Hume
　　
　　An early critic of social contract theory was Rousseau's friend, the philosopher David Hume, who in 1742 published an essay "On Civil Liberty", in whose second part, entitled, "Of the Original Contract ", he stressed that the concept of a "social contract" was a convenient fiction:
　　
　　 AS no party, in the present age can well support itself without a philosophical or speculative system of principles annexed to its political or practical one; we accordingly find that each of the factions into which this nation is divided has reared up a fabric of the former kind, in order to protect and cover that scheme of actions which it pursues. . . . The one party [defenders of the absolute and divine right of kings, or Tories], by tracing up government to the DEITY, endeavor to render it so sacred and inviolate that it must be little less than sacrilege, however tyrannical it may become, to touch or invade it in the smallest article. The other party [the Whigs, or believers in constitutional monarchy], by founding government altogether on the consent of the PEOPLE suppose that there is a kind of original contract by which the subjects have tacitly reserved the power of resisting their sovereign, whenever they find themselves aggrieved by that authority with which they have for certain purposes voluntarily entrusted him. --David Hume, "On Civil Liberty" [II.XII.1]
　　
　　However, Hume did agree that, no matter how a government is founded, the consent of the governed is the only legitimate foundation on which a government can rest.
　　
　　 My intention here is not to exclude the consent of the people from being one just foundation of government where it has place. It is surely the best and most sacred of any. I only pretend that it has very seldom had place in any degree and never almost in its full extent. And that therefore some other foundation of government must also be admitted. --Ibid II.XII.20
　　
　　Logic of contracting
　　
　　According to the will theory of contract, which was dominant in the 19th century and still exerts a strong influence, a contract is not presumed valid unless all parties agree to it voluntarily, either tacitly or explicitly, without coercion. Lysander Spooner, a 19th century lawyer and staunch supporter of a right of contract between individuals, in his essay No Treason, argues that a supposed social contract cannot be used to justify governmental actions such as taxation, because government will initiate force against anyone who does not wish to enter into such a contract. As a result, he maintains that such an agreement is not voluntary and therefore cannot be considered a legitimate contract at all.
　　
　　Modern Anglo-American law, like European civil law, is based on a will theory of contract, according to which all terms of a contract are binding on the parties because they chose those terms for themselves. This was less true when Hobbes wrote Leviathan; then, more importance was attached to consideration, meaning a mutual exchange of benefits necessary to the formation of a valid contract, and most contracts had implicit terms that arose from the nature of the contractual relationship rather than from the choices made by the parties. Accordingly, it has been argued that social contract theory is more consistent with the contract law of the time of Hobbes and Locke than with the contract law of our time, and that features in the social contract which seem anomalous to us, such as the belief that we are bound by a contract formulated by our distant ancestors, would not have seemed as strange to Hobbes' contemporaries as they do to us.
　　Multiple contracts
　　
　　Legal scholar Randy Barnett has argued, that, while presence in the territory of a society may be necessary for consent, it is not consent to any rules the society might make regardless of their content. A second condition of consent is that the rules be consistent with underlying principles of justice and the protection of natural and social rights, and have procedures for effective protection of those rights (or liberties). This has also been discussed by O.A. Brownson, who argued that there are, in a sense, three "constitutions" involved: The first the constitution of nature that includes all of what the Founders called "natural law". The second would be the constitution of society, an unwritten and commonly understood set of rules for the society formed by a social contract before it establishes a government, by which it does establish the third, a constitution of government. To consent, a necessary condition is that the rules be constitutional in that sense.
　　Tacit consent
　　
　　The theory of an implicit social contract holds that by remaining in the territory controlled by some government, people give consent to be governed. This consent is what gives legitimacy to the government. Philosopher Roderick Long argues that this is a case of question begging, because the argument has to presuppose its conclusion:
　　
　　 I think that the person who makes this argument is already assuming that the government has some legitimate jurisdiction over this territory. And then they say, well, now, anyone who is in the territory is therefore agreeing to the prevailing rules. But they’re assuming the very thing they're trying to prove – namely that this jurisdiction over the territory is legitimate. If it's not, then the government is just one more group of people living in this broad general geographical territory. But I've got my property, and exactly what their arrangements are I don't know, but here I am in my property and they don't own it – at least they haven't given me any argument that they do – and so, the fact that I am living in "this country" means I am living in a certain geographical region that they have certain pretensions over – but the question is whether those pretensions are legitimate. You can’t assume it as a means to proving it.
　　
　　Criticisms of natural rights
　　
　　Contractualism is based on the notion that rights are agreed upon in order to further our interests: each individual subject is accorded individual rights, which may or may not be inalienable, and form the basis of civil rights, as in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. It must be underlined, however, as Hannah Arendt did on her book on imperialism, that the 1789 Declarations, in this agreeing with the social contract theory, bases the natural rights of the human-being on the civil rights of the citizen, instead of the reverse as the contractualist theory does. This criticism derives from a long tradition going back to St. Augustine of Hippo, who in The City of God (book) envisioned a unified Christian society presided over by a king who was responsible for the welfare of his subjects. Political Augustinianism with its insistence on divine sovereignty and on the two separate spheres of a heavenly and an earthly community, has indeed been regarded as incompatible with social contract theories. This raises the question of whether social contractarianism, as a central plank of liberal thought, is reconcilable with the Christian religion, and particularly with Catholicism and Catholic social teaching. The individualist and liberal approach has also been criticized since the 19th century by thinkers such as Marx, Nietzsche & Freud, and afterward by structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers, such as Lacan, Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze or Derrida

　　I heartily accept the motto, -- "That government is best which governs least"; and I should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts to this, which also I believe, -- "That government is best which governs not at all"; and when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government which they will have. Government is at best but an expedient; but most governments are usually, and all governments are sometimes, inexpedient. The objections which have been brought against a standing army, and they are many and weighty, and deserve to prevail, may also at last be brought against a standing government. The standing army is only an arm of the standing government. The government itself, which is only the mode which the people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable to be abused and perverted before the people can act through it. Witness the present Mexican war, the work of comparatively a few individuals using the standing government as their tool; for, in the outset, the people would not have consented to this measure.
　　
　　This American government -- what is it but a tradition, though a recent one, endeavoring to transmit itself unimpaired to posterity, but each instant losing some of its integrity? It has not the vitality and force of a single living man; for a single man can bend it to his will. It is a sort of wooden gun to the people themselves. But it is not the less necessary for this; for the people must have some complicated machinery or other, and hear its din, to satisfy that idea of government which they have. Governments show thus how successfully men can be imposed on, even impose on themselves, for their own advantage. It is excellent, we must all allow. Yet this government never of itself furthered any enterprise, but by the alacrity with which it got out of its way. It does not keep the country free. It does not settle the West. It does not educate. The character inherent in the American people has done all that has been accomplished; and it would have done somewhat more, if the government had not sometimes got in its way. For government is an expedient by which men would fain succeed in letting one another alone; and, as has been said, when it is most expedient, the governed are most let alone by it. Trade and commerce, if they were not made of India rubber, would never manage to bounce over the obstacles which legislators are continually putting in their way; and, if one were to judge these men wholly by the effects of their actions, and not partly by their intentions, they would deserve to be classed and punished with those mischievous persons who put obstructions on the railroads.
　　
　　But, to speak practically and as a citizen, unlike those who call themselves no-government men, I ask for, not at once no government, but at once a better government. Let every man make known what kind of government would command his respect, and that will be one step toward obtaining it.
　　
　　After all, the practical reason why, when the power is once in the hands of the people, a majority are permitted, and for a long period continue, to rule, is not because they are most likely to be in the right, nor because this seems fairest to the minority, but because they are physically the strongest. But a government in which the majority rule in all cases cannot be based on justice, even as far as men understand it. Can there not be a government in which majorities do not virtually decide right and wrong, but conscience? -- in which majorities decide only those questions to which the rule of expediency is applicable? Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience to the legislator? Why has every man a conscience, then? I think that we should be men first, and subjects afterward. It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right. The only obligation which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think right. It is truly enough said that a corporation has no conscience; but a corporation of conscientious men is a corporation with a conscience. Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for it, even the well-disposed are daily made the agents of injustice. A common and natural result of an undue respect for law is, that you may see a file of soldiers, colonel, captain, corporal, privates, powder-monkeys, and all, marching in admirable order over hill and dale to the wars, against their wills, ay, against their common sense and consciences, which makes it very steep marching indeed, and produces a palpitation of the heart. They have no doubt that it is a damnable business in which they are concerned; they are all peaceably inclined. Now, what are they? Men at all? or small movable forts and magazines, at the service of some unscrupulous man in power? Visit the Navy Yard, and behold a marine, such a man as an American government can make, or such as it can make a man with its black arts -- a mere shadow and reminiscence of humanity, a man laid out alive and standing, and already, as one may say, buried under arms with funeral accompaniments, though it may be
　　
　　"Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note,
　　
　　As his corse to the rampart we hurried;
　　
　　Not a soldier discharged his farewell shot
　　
　　O'er the grave where our hero we buried."
　　
　　The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies. They are the standing army, and the militia, jailers, constables, posse comitatus, etc. In most cases there is no free exercise whatever of the judgment or of the moral sense; but they put themselves on a level with wood and earth and stones; and wooden men can perhaps be manufactured that will serve the purpose as well. Such command no more respect than men of straw or a lump of dirt. They have the same sort of worth only as horses and dogs. Yet such as these even are commonly esteemed good citizens. Others, as most legislators, politicians, lawyers, ministers, and office-holders, serve the state chiefly with their heads; and, as they rarely make any moral distinctions, they are as likely to serve the devil, without intending it, as God. A very few, as heroes, patriots, martyrs, reformers in the great sense, and men, serve the state with their consciences also, and so necessarily resist it for the most part; and they are commonly treated as enemies by it. A wise man will only be useful as a man, and will not submit to be "clay," and "stop a hole to keep the wind away," but leave that office to his dust at least:--
　　
　　"I am too high-born to be propertied,
　　
　　To be a secondary at control,
　　
　　Or useful serving-man and instrument
　　
　　To any sovereign state throughout the world."
　　
　　He who gives himself entirely to his fellow-men appears to them useless and selfish; but he who gives himself partially to them is pronounced a benefactor and philanthropist.
　　
　　How does it become a man to behave toward this American government to-day? I answer, that he cannot without disgrace be associated with it. I cannot for an instant recognize that political organization as my government which is the slave's government also.
　　
　　All men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to, and to resist, the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable. But almost all say that such is not the case now. But such was the case, they think, in the Revolution of '75. If one were to tell me that this was a bad government because it taxed certain foreign commodities brought to its ports, it is most probable that I should not make an ado about it, for I can do without them. All machines have their friction; and possibly this does enough good to counterbalance the evil. At any rate, it is a great evil to make a stir about it. But when the friction comes to have its machine, and oppression and robbery are organized, I say, let us not have such a machine any longer. In other words, when a sixth of the population of a nation which has undertaken to be the refuge of liberty are slaves, and a whole country is unjustly overrun and conquered by a foreign army, and subjected to military law, I think that it is not too soon for honest men to rebel and revolutionize. What makes this duty the more urgent is the fact that the country so overrun is not our own, but ours is the invading army.
　　
　　Paley, a common authority with many on moral questions, in his chapter on the "Duty of Submission to Civil Government," resolves all civil obligation into expediency; and he proceeds to say that "so long as the interest of the whole society requires it, that is, so long as the established government cannot be resisted or changed without public inconveniency, it is the will of God... that the established government be obeyed, and no longer.... This principle being admitted, the justice of every particular case of resistance is reduced to a computation of the quantity of the danger and grievance on the one side, and of the probability and expense of redressing it on the other." Of this, he says, every man shall judge for himself. But Paley appears never to have contemplated those cases to which the rule of expediency does not apply, in which a people, as well as an individual, must do justice, cost what it may. If I have unjustly wrested a plank from a drowning man, I must restore it to him though I drown myself. This, according to Paley, would be inconvenient. But he that would save his life, in such a case, shall lose it. This people must cease to hold slaves, and to make war on Mexico, though it cost them their existence as a people.
　　
　　In their practice, nations agree with Paley; but does any one think that Massachusetts does exactly what is right at the present crisis?
　　
　　"A drab of state, a cloth-o'-silver slut, To have her train borne up, and her soul trail in the dirt."
　　
　　Practically speaking, the opponents to a reform in Massachusetts are not a hundred thousand politicians at the South, but a hundred thousand merchants and farmers here, who are more interested in commerce and agriculture than they are in humanity, and are not prepared to do justice to the slave and to Mexico, cost what it may. I quarrel not with far-off foes, but with those who, near at home, co-operate with, and do the bidding of those far away, and without whom the latter would be harmless. We are accustomed to say, that the mass of men are unprepared; but improvement is slow, because the few are not materially wiser or better than the many. It is not so important that many should be as good as you, as that there be some absolute goodness somewhere; for that will leaven the whole lump. There are thousands who are in opinion opposed to slavery and to the war, who yet in effect do nothing to put an end to them; who, esteeming themselves children of Washington and Franklin, sit down with their hands in their pockets, and say that they know not what to do, and do nothing; who even postpone the question of freedom to the question of free-trade, and quietly read the prices-current along with the latest advices from Mexico, after dinner, and, it may be, fall asleep over them both. What is the price-current of an honest man and patriot to-day? They hesitate, and they regret, and sometimes they petition; but they do nothing in earnest and with effect. They will wait, well disposed, for others to remedy the evil, that they may no longer have it to regret. At most, they give only a cheap vote, and a feeble countenance and Godspeed, to the right, as it goes by them. There are nine hundred and ninety-nine patrons of virtue to one virtuous man; but it is easier to deal with the real possessor of a thing than with the temporary guardian of it.
　　
　　All voting is a sort of gaming, like checkers or backgammon, with a slight moral tinge to it, a playing with right and wrong, with moral questions; and betting naturally accompanies it. The character of the voters is not staked. I cast my vote, perchance, as I think right; but I am not vitally concerned that that right should prevail. I am willing to leave it to the majority. Its obligation, therefore, never exceeds that of expediency. Even voting for the right is doing nothing for it. It is only expressing to men feebly your desire that it should prevail. A wise man will not leave the right to the mercy of chance, nor wish it to prevail through the power of the majority. There is but little virtue in the action of masses of men. When the majority shall at length vote for the abolition of slavery, it will be because they are indifferent to slavery, or because there is but little slavery left to be abolished by their vote. They will then be the only slaves. Only his vote can hasten the abolition of slavery who asserts his own freedom by his vote.
　　
　　I hear of a convention to be held at Baltimore, or elsewhere, for the selection of a candidate for the Presidency, made up chiefly of editors, and men who are politicians by profession; but I think, what is it to any independent, intelligent, and respectable man what decision they may come to? Shall we not have the advantage of his wisdom and honesty, nevertheless? Can we not count upon some independent votes? Are there not many individuals in the country who do not attend conventions? But no: I find that the respectable man, so called, has immediately drifted from his position, and despairs of his country, when his country has more reason to despair of him. He forthwith adopts one of the candidates thus selected as the only available one, thus proving that he is himself available for any purposes of the demagogue. His vote is of no more worth than that of any unprincipled foreigner or hireling native, who may have been bought. Oh for a man who is a man, and, as my neighbor says, has a bone in his back which you cannot pass your hand through! Our statistics are at fault: the population has been returned too large. How many men are there to a square thousand miles in this country? Hardly one. Does not America offer any inducement for men to settle here? The American has dwindled into an Odd Fellow -- one who may be known by the development of his organ of gregariousness, and a manifest lack of intellect and cheerful self-reliance; whose first and chief concern, on coming into the world, is to see that the almshouses are in good repair; and, before yet he has lawfully donned the virile garb, to collect a fund for the support of the widows and orphans that may be; who, in short ventures to live only by the aid of the Mutual Insurance company, which has promised to bury him decently.
　　
　　It is not a man's duty, as a matter of course, to devote himself to the eradication of any, even the most enormous wrong; he may still properly have other concerns to engage him; but it is his duty, at least, to wash his hands of it, and, if he gives it no thought longer, not to give it practically his support. If I devote myself to other pursuits and contemplations, I must first see, at least, that I do not pursue them sitting upon another man's shoulders. I must get off him first, that he may pursue his contemplations too. See what gross inconsistency is tolerated. I have heard some of my townsmen say, "I should like to have them order me out to help put down an insurrection of the slaves, or to march to Mexico; -- see if I would go"; and yet these very men have each, directly by their allegiance, and so indirectly, at least, by their money, furnished a substitute. The soldier is applauded who refuses to serve in an unjust war by those who do not refuse to sustain the unjust government which makes the war; is applauded by those whose own act and authority he disregards and sets at naught; as if the state were penitent to that degree that it hired one to scourge it while it sinned, but not to that degree that it left off sinning for a moment. Thus, under the name of Order and Civil Government, we are all made at last to pay homage to and support our own meanness. After the first blush of sin comes its indifference; and from immoral it becomes, as it were, unmoral, and not quite unnecessary to that life which we have made.
　　
　　The broadest and most prevalent error requires the most disinterested virtue to sustain it. The slight reproach to which the virtue of patriotism is commonly liable, the noble are most likely to incur. Those who, while they disapprove of the character and measures of a government, yield to it their allegiance and support are undoubtedly its most conscientious supporters, and so frequently the most serious obstacles to reform. Some are petitioning the State to dissolve the Union, to disregard the requisitions of the President. Why do they not dissolve it themselves -- the union between themselves and the State -- and refuse to pay their quota into its treasury? Do not they stand in the same relation to the State, that the State does to the Union? And have not the same reasons prevented the State from resisting the Union, which have prevented them from resisting the State?
　　
　　How can a man be satisfied to entertain an opinion merely, and enjoy it? Is there any enjoyment in it, if his opinion is that he is aggrieved? If you are cheated out of a single dollar by your neighbor, you do not rest satisfied with knowing that you are cheated, or with saying that you are cheated, or even with petitioning him to pay you your due; but you take effectual steps at once to obtain the full amount, and see that you are never cheated again. Action from principle -- the perception and the performance of right -- changes things and relations; it is essentially revolutionary, and does not consist wholly with anything which was. It not only divides states and churches, it divides families; ay, it divides the individual, separating the diabolical in him from the divine.
　　
　　Unjust laws exist; shall we be content to obey them, or shall we endeavor to amend them, and obey them until we have succeeded, or shall we transgress them at once? Men generally, under such a government as this, think that they ought to wait until they have persuaded the majority to alter them. They think that, if they should resist, the remedy would be worse than the evil. But it is the fault of the government itself that the remedy is worse than the evil. It makes it worse. Why is it not more apt to anticipate and provide for reform? Why does it not cherish its wise minority? Why does it cry and resist before it is hurt? Why does it not encourage its citizens to be on the alert to point out its faults, and do better than it would have them? Why does it always crucify Christ, and excommunicate Copernicus and Luther, and pronounce Washington and Franklin rebels?
　　
　　One would think, that a deliberate and practical denial of its authority was the only offence never contemplated by government; else, why has it not assigned its definite, its suitable and proportionate, penalty? If a man who has no property refuses but once to earn nine shillings for the State, he is put in prison for a period unlimited by any law that I know, and determined only by the discretion of those who placed him there; but if he should steal ninety times nine shillings from the State, he is soon permitted to go at large again.
　　
　　If the injustice is part of the necessary friction of the machine of government, let it go, let it go; perchance it will wear smooth -- certainly the machine will wear out. If the injustice has a spring, or a pulley, or a rope, or a crank, exclusively for itself, then perhaps you may consider whether the remedy will not be worse than the evil; but if it is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then, I say, break the law. Let your life be a counter friction to stop the machine. What I have to do is to see, at any rate, that I do not lend myself to the wrong which I condemn.
　　
　　As for adopting the ways which the State has provided for remedying the evil, I know not of such ways. They take too much time, and a man's life will be gone. I have other affairs to attend to. I came into this world, not chiefly to make this a good place to live in, but to live in it, be it good or bad. A man has not everything to do, but something; and because he cannot do everything, it is not necessary that he should do something wrong. It is not my business to be petitioning the Governor or the Legislature any more than it is theirs to petition me; and if they should not hear my petition, what should I do then? But in this case the State has provided no way; its very Constitution is the evil. This may seem to be harsh and stubborn and unconciliatory; but it is to treat with the utmost kindness and consideration the only spirit that can appreciate or deserves it. So is an change for the better, like birth and death which convulse the body.
　　
　　I do not hesitate to say, that those who call themselves Abolitionists should at once effectually withdraw their support, both in person and property, from the government of Massachusetts, and not wait till they constitute a majority of one, before they suffer the right to prevail through them. I think that it is enough if they have God on their side, without waiting for that other one. Moreover, any man more right than his neighbors constitutes a majority of one already.
　　
　　I meet this American government, or its representative, the State government, directly, and face to face, once a year -- no more -- in the person of its tax-gatherer; this is the only mode in which a man situated as I am necessarily meets it; and it then says distinctly, Recognize me; and the simplest, the most effectual, and, in the present posture of affairs, the indispensablest mode of treating with it on this head, of expressing your little satisfaction with and love for it, is to deny it then. My civil neighbor, the tax-gatherer, is the very man I have to deal with -- for it is, after all, with men and not with parchment that I quarrel -- and he has voluntarily chosen to be an agent of the government. How shall he ever know well what he is and does as an officer of the government, or as a man, until he is obliged to consider whether he shall treat me, his neighbor, for whom he has respect, as a neighbor and well-disposed man, or as a maniac and disturber of the peace, and see if he can get over this obstruction to his neighborliness without a ruder and more impetuous thought or speech corresponding with his action? I know this well, that if one thousand, if one hundred, if ten men whom I could name -- if ten honest men only -- ay, if one HONEST man, in this State of Massachusetts, ceasing to hold slaves, were actually to withdraw from this copartnership, and be locked up in the county jail therefor, it would be the abolition of slavery in America. For it matters not how small the beginning may seem to be: what is once well done is done forever. But we love better to talk about it: that we say is our mission. Reform keeps many scores of newspapers in its service, but not one man. If my esteemed neighbor, the State's ambassador, who will devote his days to the settlement of the question of human rights in the Council Chamber, instead of being threatened with the prisons of Carolina, were to sit down the prisoner of Massachusetts, that State which is so anxious to foist the sin of slavery upon her sister -- though at present she can discover only an act of inhospitality to be the ground of a quarrel with her -- the Legislature would not wholly waive the subject the following winter.
　　
　　Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison. The proper place to-day, the only place which Massachusetts has provided for her freer and less desponding spirits, is in her prisons, to be put out and locked out of the State by her own act, as they have already put themselves out by their principles. It is there that the fugitive slave, and the Mexican prisoner on parole, and the Indian come to plead the wrongs of his race, should find them; on that separate, but more free and honorable ground, where the State places those who are not with her, but against her -- the only house in a slave State in which a free man can abide with honor. If any think that their influence would be lost there, and their voices no longer afflict the ear of the State, that they would not be as an enemy within its walls, they do not know by how much truth is stronger than error, nor how much more eloquently and effectively he can combat injustice who has experienced a little in his own person. Cast your whole vote, not a strip of paper merely, but your whole influence. A minority is powerless while it conforms to the majority; it is not even a minority then; but it is irresistible when it clogs by its whole weight. If the alternative is to keep all just men in prison, or give up war and slavery, the State will not hesitate which to choose. If a thousand men were not to pay their tax-bills this year, that would not be a violent and bloody measure, as it would be to pay them, and enable the State to commit violence and shed innocent blood. This is, in fact, the definition of a peaceable revolution, if any such is possible. If the tax-gatherer, or any other public officer, asks me, as one has done, "But what shall I do?" my answer is, "If you really wish to do anything, resign your office." When the subject has refused allegiance, and the officer has resigned his office, then the revolution is accomplished. But even suppose blood should flow. Is there not a sort of blood shed when the conscience is wounded? Through this wound a man's real manhood and immortality flow out, and he bleeds to an everlasting death. I see this blood flowing now.
　　
　　I have contemplated the imprisonment of the offender, rather than the seizure of his goods -- though both will serve the same purpose -- because they who assert the purest right, and consequently are most dangerous to a corrupt State, commonly have not spent much time in accumulating property. To such the State renders comparatively small service, and a slight tax is wont to appear exorbitant, particularly if they are obliged to earn it by special labor with their hands. If there were one who lived wholly without the use of money, the State itself would hesitate to demand it of him. But the rich man -- not to make any invidious comparison -- is always sold to the institution which makes him rich. Absolutely speaking, the more money, the less virtue; for money comes between a man and his objects, and obtains them for him; and it was certainly no great virtue to obtain it. It puts to rest many questions which he would otherwise be taxed to answer; while the only new question which it puts is the hard but superfluous one, how to spend it. Thus his moral ground is taken from under his feet. The opportunities of living are diminished in proportion as what are called the "means" are increased. The best thing a man can do for his culture when he is rich is to endeavor to carry out those schemes which he entertained when he was poor. Christ answered the Herodians according to their condition. "Show me the tribute-money," said he; -- and one took a penny out of his pocket; -- if you use money which has the image of Caesar on it, and which he has made current and valuable, that is, if you are men of the State, and gladly enjoy the advantages of Caesar's government, then pay him back some of his own when he demands it; "Render therefore to Caesar that which is Caesar's, and to God those things which are God's" -- leaving them no wiser than before as to which was which; for they did not wish to know.
　　
　　When I converse with the freest of my neighbors, I perceive that, whatever they may say about the magnitude and seriousness of the question, and their regard for the public tranquillity, the long and the short of the matter is, that they cannot spare the protection of the existing government, and they dread the consequences to their property and families of disobedience to it. For my own part, I should not like to think that I ever rely on the protection of the State. But, if I deny the authority of the State when it presents its tax-bill, it will soon take and waste all my property, and so harass me and my children without end. This is hard. This makes it impossible for a man to live honestly, and at the same time comfortably in outward respects. It will not be worth the while to accumulate property; that would be sure to go again. You must hire or squat somewhere, and raise but a small crop, and eat that soon. You must live within yourself, and depend upon yourself always tucked up and ready for a start, and not have many affairs. A man may grow rich in Turkey even, if he will be in all respects a good subject of the Turkish government. Confucius said, "If a state is governed by the principles of reason, poverty and misery are subjects of shame; if a state is not governed by the principles of reason, riches and honors are the subjects of shame." No: until I want the protection of Massachusetts to be extended to me in some distant Southern port, where my liberty is endangered, or until I am bent solely on building up an estate at home by peaceful enterprise, I can afford to refuse allegiance to Massachusetts, and her right to my property and life. It costs me less in every sense to incur the penalty of disobedience to the State than it would to obey. I should feel as if I were worth less in that case.
　　
　　Some years ago, the State met me in behalf of the Church, and commanded me to pay a certain sum toward the support of a clergyman whose preaching my father attended, but never I myself. "Pay," it said, "or be locked up in the jail." I declined to pay. But, unfortunately, another man saw fit to pay it. I did not see why the schoolmaster should be taxed to support the priest, and not the priest the schoolmaster: for I was not the State's schoolmaster, but I supported myself by voluntary subscription. I did not see why the lyceum should not present its tax-bill, and have the State to back its demand, as well as the Church. However, at the request of the selectmen, I condescended to make some such statement as this in writing:-- "Know all men by these presents, that I, Henry Thoreau, do not wish to be regarded as a member of any incorporated society which I have not joined." This I gave to the town clerk; and he has it. The State, having thus learned that I did not wish to be regarded as a member of that church, has never made a like demand on me since; though it said that it must adhere to its original presumption that time. If I had known how to name them, I should then have signed off in detail from all the societies which I never signed on to; but I did not know where to find a complete list.
　　
　　I have paid no poll-tax for six years. I was put into a jail once on this account, for one night; and, as I stood considering the walls of solid stone, two or three feet thick, the door of wood and iron, a foot thick, and the iron grating which strained the light, I could not help being struck with the foolishness of that institution which treated me as if I were mere flesh and blood and bones, to be locked up. I wondered that it should have concluded at length that this was the best use it could put me to, and had never thought to avail itself of my services in some way. I saw that, if there was a wall of stone between me and my townsmen, there was a still more difficult one to climb or break through, before they could get to be as free as I was. I did not for a moment feel confined, and the walls seemed a great waste of stone and mortar. I felt as if I alone of all my townsmen had paid my tax. They plainly did not know how to treat me, but behaved like persons who are underbred. In every threat and in every compliment there was a blunder; for they thought that my chief desire was to stand the other side of that stone wall. I could not but smile to see how industriously they locked the door on my meditations, which followed them out again without let or hindrance, and they were really all that was dangerous. As they could not reach me, they had resolved to punish my body; just as boys, if they cannot come at some person against whom they have a spite, will abuse his dog. I saw that the State was half-witted, that it was timid as a lone woman with her silver spoons, and that it did not know its friends from its foes, and I lost all my remaining respect for it, and pitied it.
　　
　　Thus the State never intentionally confronts a man's sense, intellectual or moral, but only his body, his senses. It is not armed with superior wit or honesty, but with superior physical strength. I was not born to be forced. I will breathe after my own fashion. Let us see who is the strongest. What force has a multitude? They only can force me who obey a higher law than I. They force me to become like themselves. I do not hear of men being forced to have this way or that by masses of men. What sort of life were that to live? When I meet a government which says to me, "Your money or your life," why should I be in haste to give it my money? It may be in a great strait, and not know what to do: I cannot help that. It must help itself; do as I do. It is not worth the while to snivel about it. I am not responsible for the successful working of the machinery of society. I am not the son of the engineer. I perceive that, when an acorn and a chestnut fall side by side, the one does not remain inert to make way for the other, but both obey their own laws, and spring and grow and flourish as best they can, till one, perchance, overshadows and destroys the other. If a plant cannot live according to its nature, it dies; and so a man.
　　
　　The night in prison was novel and interesting enough. The prisoners in their shirt-sleeves were enjoying a chat and the evening air in the doorway, when I entered. But the jailer said, "Come, boys, it is time to lock up"; and so they dispersed, and I heard the sound of their steps returning into the hollow apartments. My room-mate was introduced to me by the jailer as "a first-rate fellow and a clever man." When the door was locked, he showed me where to hang my hat, and how he managed matters there. The rooms were whitewashed once a month; and this one, at least, was the whitest, most simply furnished, and probably the neatest apartment in the town. He naturally wanted to know where I came from, and what brought me there; and, when I had told him, I asked him in my turn how he came there, presuming him to be an honest man, of course; and, as the world goes, I believe he was. "Why," said he, "they accuse me of burning a barn; but I never did it." As near as I could discover, he had probably gone to bed in a barn when drunk, and smoked his pipe there; and so a barn was burnt. He had the reputation of being a clever man, had been there some three months waiting for his trial to come on, and would have to wait as much longer; but he was quite domesticated and contented, since he got his board for nothing, and thought that he was well treated.
　　
　　He occupied one window, and I the other; and I saw that if one stayed there long, his principal business would be to look out the window. I had soon read all the tracts that were left there, and examined where former prisoners had broken out, and where a grate had been sawed off, and heard the history of the various occupants of that room; for I found that even here there was a history and a gossip which never circulated beyond the walls of the jail. Probably this is the only house in the town where verses are composed, which are afterward printed in a circular form, but not published. I was shown quite a long list of verses which were composed by some young men who had been detected in an attempt to escape, who avenged themselves by singing them.
　　
　　I pumped my fellow-prisoner as dry as I could, for fear I should never see him again; but at length he showed me which was my bed, and left me to blow out the lamp.
　　
　　It was like travelling into a far country, such as I had never expected to behold, to lie there for one night. It seemed to me that I never had heard the town-clock strike before, nor the evening sounds of the village; for we slept with the windows open, which were inside the grating. It was to see my native village in the light of the Middle Ages, and our Concord was turned into a Rhine stream, and visions of knights and castles passed before me. They were the voices of old burghers that I heard in the streets. I was an involuntary spectator and auditor of whatever was done and said in the kitchen of the adjacent village-inn -- a wholly new and rare experience to me. It was a closer view of my native town. I was fairly inside of it. I never had seen its institutions before. This is one of its peculiar institutions; for it is a shire town. I began to comprehend what its inhabitants were about.
　　
　　In the morning, our breakfasts were put through the hole in the door, in small oblong-square tin pans, made to fit, and holding a pint of chocolate, with brown bread, and an iron spoon. When they called for the vessels again, I was green enough to return what bread I had left; but my comrade seized it, and said that I should lay that up for lunch or dinner. Soon after he was let out to work at haying in a neighboring field, whither he went every day, and would not be back till noon; so he bade me good-day, saying that he doubted if he should see me again.
　　
　　When I came out of prison -- for some one interfered, and paid that tax -- I did not perceive that great changes had taken place on the common, such as he observed who went in a youth and emerged a tottering and gray-headed man; and yet a change had to my eyes come over the scene -- the town, and State, and country -- greater than any that mere time could effect. I saw yet more distinctly the State in which I lived. I saw to what extent the people among whom I lived could be trusted as good neighbors and friends; that their friendship was for summer weather only; that they did not greatly propose to do right; that they were a distinct race from me by their prejudices and superstitions, as the Chinamen and Malays are; that in their sacrifices to humanity, they ran no risks, not even to their property; that after all they were not so noble but they treated the thief as he had treated them, and hoped, by a certain outward observance and a few prayers, and by walking in a particular straight though useless path from time to time, to save their souls. This may be to judge my neighbors harshly; for I believe that many of them are not aware that they have such an institution as the jail in their village.
　　
　　It was formerly the custom in our village, when a poor debtor came out of jail, for his acquaintances to salute him, looking through their fingers, which were crossed to represent the grating of a jail window, "How do ye do?" My neighbors did not thus salute me, but first looked at me, and then at one another, as if I had returned from a long journey. I was put into jail as I was going to the shoemaker's to get a shoe which was mended. When I was let out the next morning, I proceeded to finish my errand, and, having put on my mended shoe, joined a huckleberry party, who were impatient to put themselves under my conduct; and in half an hour -- for the horse was soon tackled -- was in the midst of a huckleberry field, on one of our highest hills, two miles off, and then the State was nowhere to be seen.
　　
　　This is the whole history of "My Prisons."
　　
　　I have never declined paying the highway tax, because I am as desirous of being a good neighbor as I am of being a bad subject; and as for supporting schools, I am doing my part to educate my fellow-countrymen now. It is for no particular item in the tax-bill that I refuse to pay it. I simply wish to refuse allegiance to the State, to withdraw and stand aloof from it effectually. I do not care to trace the course of my dollar, if I could, till it buys a man or a musket to shoot one with -- the dollar is innocent -- but I am concerned to trace the effects of my allegiance. In fact, I quietly declare war with the State, after my fashion, though I will still make what use and get what advantage of her I can, as is usual in such cases.
　　
　　If others pay the tax which is demanded of me, from a sympathy with the State, they do but what they have already done in their own case, or rather they abet injustice to a greater extent than the State requires. If they pay the tax from a mistaken interest in the individual taxed, to save his property, or prevent his going to jail, it is because they have not considered wisely how far they let their private feelings interfere with the public good.
　　
　　This, then, is my position at present. But one cannot be too much on his guard in such a case, lest his action be biased by obstinacy or an undue regard for the opinions of men. Let him see that he does only what belongs to himself and to the hour.
　　
　　I think sometimes, Why, this people mean well; they are only ignorant; they would do better if they knew how: why give your neighbors this pain to treat you as they are not inclined to? But I think, again, This is no reason why I should do as they do, or permit others to suffer much greater pain of a different kind. Again, I sometimes say to myself, When many millions of men, without heat, without ill-will, without personal feeling of any kind, demand of you a few shillings only, without the possibility, such is their constitution, of retracting or altering their present demand, and without the possibility, on your side, of appeal to any other millions, why expose yourself to this overwhelming brute force? You do not resist cold and hunger, the winds and the waves, thus obstinately; you quietly submit to a thousand similar necessities. You do not put your head into the fire. But just in proportion as I regard this as not wholly a brute force, but partly a human force, and consider that I have relations to those millions as to so many millions of men, and not of mere brute or inanimate things, I see that appeal is possible, first and instantaneously, from them to the Maker of them, and, secondly, from them to themselves. But, if I put my head deliberately into the fire, there is no appeal to fire or to the Maker of fire, and I have only myself to blame. If I could convince myself that I have any right to be satisfied with men as they are, and to treat them accordingly, and not according, in some respects, to my requisitions and expectations of what they and I ought to be, then, like a good Mussulman and fatalist, I should endeavor to be satisfied with things as they are, and say it is the will of God. And, above all, there is this difference between resisting this and a purely brute or natural force, that I can resist this with some effect; but I cannot expect, like Orpheus, to change the nature of the rocks and trees and beasts.
　　
　　I do not wish to quarrel with any man or nation. I do not wish to split hairs, to make fine distinctions, or set myself up as better than my neighbors. I seek rather, I may say, even an excuse for conforming to the laws of the land. I am but too ready to conform to them. Indeed, I have reason to suspect myself on this head; and each year, as the tax-gatherer comes round, I find myself disposed to review the acts and position of the general and State governments, and the spirit of the people, to discover a pretext for conformity.
　　
　　"We must affect our country as our parents,
　　
　　And if at any time we alienate
　　
　　Our love or industry from doing it honor,
　　
　　We must respect effects and teach the soul
　　
　　Matter of conscience and religion,
　　
　　And not desire of rule or benefit."
　　
　　I believe that the State will soon be able to take all my work of this sort out of my hands, and then I shall be no better a patriot than my fellow-countrymen. Seen from a lower point of view, the Constitution, with all its faults, is very good; the law and the courts are very respectable; even this State and this American government are, in many respects, very admirable and rare things, to be thankful for, such as a great many have described them; but seen from a point of view a little higher, they are what I have described them; seen from a higher still, and the highest, who shall say what they are, or that they are worth looking at or thinking of at all?
　　
　　However, the government does not concern me much, and I shall bestow the fewest possible thoughts on it. It is not many moments that I live under a government, even in this world. If a man is thought-free, fancy-free, imagination-free, that which is not never for a long time appearing to be to him, unwise rulers or reformers cannot fatally interrupt him.
　　
　　I know that most men think differently from myself; but those whose lives are by profession devoted to the study of these or kindred subjects, content me as little as any. Statesmen and legislators, standing so completely within the institution, never distinctly and nakedly behold it. They speak of moving society, but have no resting-place without it. They may be men of a certain experience and discrimination, and have no doubt invented ingenious and even useful systems, for which we sincerely thank them; but all their wit and usefulness lie within certain not very wide limits. They are wont to forget that the world is not governed by policy and expediency. Webster never goes behind government, and so cannot speak with authority about it. His words are wisdom to those legislators who contemplate no essential reform in the existing government; but for thinkers, and those who legislate for all time, he never once glances at the subject. I know of those whose serene and wise speculations on this theme would soon reveal the limits of his mind's range and hospitality. Yet, compared with the cheap professions of most reformers, and the still cheaper wisdom and eloquence of politicians in general, his are almost the only sensible and valuable words, and we thank Heaven for him. Comparatively, he is always strong, original, and, above all, practical. Still, his quality is not wisdom, but prudence. The lawyer's truth is not truth, but consistency or a consistent expediency. Truth is always in harmony with herself, and is not concerned chiefly to reveal the justice that may consist with wrong-doing. He well deserves to be called, as he has been called, the Defender of the Constitution. There are really no blows to be given by him but defensive ones. He is not a leader, but a follower. His leaders are the men of '87. "I have never made an effort," he says, "and never propose to make an effort; I have never countenanced an effort, and never mean to countenance an effort, to disturb the arrangement as originally made, by which the various States came into the Union." Still thinking of the sanction which the Constitution gives to slavery, he says, "Because it was a part of the original compact -- let it stand." Notwithstanding his special acuteness and ability, he is unable to take a fact out of its merely political relations, and behold it as it lies absolutely to be disposed of by the intellect -- what, for instance, it behooves a man to do here in America to-day with regard to slavery, but ventures, or is driven, to make some such desperate answer as the following, while professing to speak absolutely, and as a private man -- from which what new and singular code of social duties might be inferred? "The manner," says he, "in which the governments of those States where slavery exists are to regulate it is for their own consideration, under their responsibility to their constituents, to the general laws of propriety, humanity, and justice, and to God. Associations formed elsewhere, springing from a feeling of humanity, or any other cause, have nothing whatever to do with it. They have never received any encouragement from me, and they never will."
　　
　　They who know of no purer sources of truth, who have traced up its stream no higher, stand, and wisely stand, by the Bible and the Constitution, and drink at it there with reverence and humility; but they who behold where it comes trickling into this lake or that pool, gird up their loins once more, and continue their pilgrimage toward its fountain-head.
　　
　　No man with a genius for legislation has appeared in America. They are rare in the history of the world. There are orators, politicians, and eloquent men, by the thousand; but the speaker has not yet opened his mouth to speak who is capable of settling the much-vexed questions of the day. We love eloquence for its own sake, and not for any truth which it may utter, or any heroism it may inspire. Our legislators have not yet learned the comparative value of free-trade and of freedom, of union, and of rectitude, to a nation. They have no genius or talent for comparatively humble questions of taxation and finance, commerce and manufacturers and agriculture. If we were left solely to the wordy wit of legislators in Congress for our guidance, uncorrected by the seasonable experience and the effectual complaints of the people, America would not long retain her rank among the nations. For eighteen hundred years, though perchance I have no right to say it, the New Testament has been written; yet where is the legislator who has wisdom and practical talent enough to avail himself of the light which it sheds on the science of legislation?
　　
　　The authority of government, even such as I am willing to submit to -- for I will cheerfully obey those who know and can do better than I, and in many things even those who neither know nor can do so well -- is still an impure one: to be strictly just, it must have the sanction and consent of the governed. It can have no pure right over my person and property but what I concede to it. The progress from an absolute to a limited monarchy, from a limited monarchy to a democracy, is a progress toward a true respect for the individual. Even the Chinese philosopher was wise enough to regard the individual as the basis of the empire. Is a democracy, such as we know it, the last improvement possible in government? Is it not possible to take a step further towards recognizing and organizing the rights of man? There will never be a really free and enlightened State until the State comes to recognize the individual as a higher and independent power, from which all its own power and authority are derived, and treats him accordingly. I please myself with imagining a State at least which can afford to be just to all men, and to treat the individual with respect as a neighbor; which even would not think it inconsistent with its own repose if a few were to live aloof from it, not meddling with it, nor embraced by it, who fulfilled all the duties of neighbors and fellow-men. A State which bore this kind of fruit, and suffered it to drop off as fast as it ripened, would prepare the way for a still more perfect and glorious State, which also I have imagined, but not yet anywhere seen.

　　本书为你描绘了从信息社会转变到梦想社会的成功蓝图，并指出工作场所、市场环境以及休闲娱乐等方面将发生的变化。本书谨献给每一位有志从商的人——第一个希望了解未来市场走向的人；当市场、消费者和员工们都跃入梦想社会时，每一个不想独自滞留在信息社会的人。这本书适合每一位心系未来、憧憬21世纪生活的人阅读。
　　本书第1章介绍了梦想社会的逻辑。公司如果不采用这种新型逻辑就会坐失即将出现的巨大市场增长机会。事实上，梦想社会已经像冰山一样悄然来临，虽沉着徐缓，却势不可挡。如果不顺势而为，恐怕要被冰山碾平。第2章探讨了市场轮廓、讲述故事以及六种已经初具雏形的情感市场，提出了一种有助于启发战略性思维的全新逻辑，并佐以丰富生动的事例，希望诸来如饮甘泉。第3章论述的是公司及其员工——未来的公司，其使命、远景和战略。公司被看做一个部落，充满形形色色的仪式，有自己的传奇逸闻。第4章涉及消费者和公司员工的家居休闲时光。在这一部分，我们想像未来的人们怎样打发休闲时光，并探讨工作和业余时间的关系。第5章放眼全球，探讨了发达国家之间的关系、逐渐成型的全球中产阶级以及发展中国家的情况，还描述了占10亿多人口的富裕消费者以及另外40亿暂时处于落后水平的人们。
　　
　　哥本哈根未来研究院是享誉全球的未来学研究圣殿，一直以犀利敏锐、振聋发聩的预测而独树一帜，本书所描述的“梦想社会”则是其中最具有震撼性的杰出预言之一。
　　在信息社会端倪初现之后不久，天才的未来学家就在思考按踵而来的社会形态。作者宣称：信息时代已经日薄西山，人类的发展在历经渔猎文明、农业文明、工业文明和目前以计算机为标志的信息时代之后，即将跨入第五种社会形态：梦想社会。
　　即将来临的梦想社会，是一种完全新型的社会，其中的企业、社团和个人都凭借自己的故事扬名立业，而不再仅仅依赖于数据和信息。梦想社会并非痴人狂想，它在许多企业己初露峥嵘——未来产品必须打动人们的心灵，而不仅仅是说服人们的头脑。当前正是为产品和服务赋予情感价值的大好时机。本书提供了一套启发战略性思维的全新逻辑，有助于理解未来的企业和市场，是未来社会不可或缺的向导。
　　前言
　　1.未来主义与梦想社会的实现 2.故事和故事讲述者的市场（一）
　　2.故事和故事讲述者的市场(二） 3.从苦不堪言到乐趣十足
　　4.爱意融融的家庭公司和新型休闲时光 5.全球商业故事
　　致谢

　　一个由于疯狂而被纪念的时代．
　　一个染满最单纯的年轻人的血的时代．
　　一个毛泽东思想红旗插满全世界的时代．
　　六十年代，世界上不仅仅有我们，还有法国红卫兵，日本学生联合会和垮掉的一代．
　　记忆的死亡远比时间的流逝更可怕．在父辈的阴影下成长的我们，终于会有一天去仰视或俯视这无法替代的十年．
　　beatles去了u.s.s.r，我们回到六十年代．

　　一鸣惊人
　　作者：赖洪毅
　　
　　前言
　　上篇 人的名声与成名
　　一 人为何要追求名声.
　　（一）名声――种人生观；（二）追求名声有何好处；（三）为什么
　　要追求名声
　　二 一个人如何成名
　　（一）成名的三阶段；（二）如何立志和树立崇拜偶象；（三）如何
　　模仿崇拜偶像；（四）如何赶超名人和成名；（五）导致成名的一
　　些因素
　　三 论各大领域的成名方法
　　（一）政治；（二）宗教创立和改革；（三）思想和社会科学；（四）
　　自然科学；（五）发明；（六）军事；（七）文学；（八）音乐；（九）绘
　　画；（十）电影；（十一）富翁和企业家；（十二）宇航和探险；（十
　　三）体育；（十四）通俗文学；（十五）流行音乐；（十六）名人配偶
　　或情侣；（十七）猎奇。
　　四 人的名声的大小、好坏
　　（一）名声的实质；（二）名气大小的衡量；（三）什么样的人最有
　　名气；（四）决定名气大小的十个因素；（五）影响名声好坏的因
　　素；（六）名人的等级
　　五 扩大和传播名声的方法
　　（一）按自己的特点塑造出独特的形象；（二）起名须知；（三）大
　　办慈善事业，设奖或基金会，设立组织机构、兴建学校，并以自
　　己名字命名；（四）争取以自己的名字命名一种理论，观点、思
　　想、发现、发明、计量单位、自然景物、自然现象和事物、节日、
　　机构、学校、组织、团体、派别等；（五）写一本深受欢迎的自传；
　　（六）建立纪念性建筑；（七）制造各种神奇有趣的传说、轶事，
　　在民间广泛流传，以提高自己的名望；（八）以专制或强埠手段
　　传播名声；（九）功成身退；（十）永不自满，不断创新，不断取得
　　新成就
　　六 人应当如何生活
　　（一）时间与事业；（二）注意健康；（三）对待金钱；（四）如何择
　　偶；（五（如何应酬社交活动；（六）家庭关系
　　七 女性与成名
　　（一）女性的才能；（二）女性成名要克服的障碍；（三）女性成名
　　应具备的素质；（四）女性成名可选取的办法
　　八 名人产主的历史趋势
　　九 有关成名名声的誓言、警句
　　下篇 各大文明、民族和国家的名人
　　一 令人惊叹的犹太民族
　　（一）犹太伟人与名人；（二）犹太人追求成功的动力；（三）犹太
　　人在精神文化领域伟人辈出的原因；（四）犹太人在商业上的
　　成功
　　二 亘古绵延的中华文明
　　（一）在世界上最负盛名的十位中国人：（二）其它负有国际盛
　　名的中国人；（三）几位大政治家的未来地位；（四）中国文明的
　　衰落，面临的难题，中国将来的伟人
　　三 崇尚永恒与非暴力的印度人
　　（一）文明、哲学与社会；（二）伟大政治家的摇篮；（三）大宗教
　　祖师爷哲学家的故乡；（四）东方文学艺术的王国；（五）科学界
　　四 团结灵巧的日本人
　　（一）日本人――勇于变革与善于学习的民族；（二）集体主义
　　的日本人；（三）无能为力的单个日本人；（四）日本近现代化成
　　功的原因；（五）著名的日本人
　　五 中世纪最幸运的阿拉伯人
　　（一）政教人物；（二）阿拉伯文化的黄金时代出现的原因；
　　（三）文学成功的原因与杰出的文豪；（四）科学与学术的新纪
　　元
　　六 辉煌的希腊文明和希腊化文明
　　（一）希腊文明；（二）希腊化文明
　　七 金戈铁马的罗马文明
　　八 欧洲中世纪的经院文化
　　（一）中世纪早期的西欧文明；（二）拜占庭文明及其名人
　　九 欧具近现代文明的先驱英国人
　　（一）英国的中世纪政治家和社会活动家；（二）英国文化、民族
　　性格与近现代政治家；（三）英国对人类的伟大贡献与科学文
　　化名人
　　十 欧洲文化的老大哥法国人
　　（一）法国人的文化自负情结；（二）著名的政治活动家和法国
　　兴衰史；（三）法国的科技伟人；（四）法国的思想家、社会科学
　　家；（五）文学、艺术家
　　十一 令人敬畏的德国人
　　（一）德意志的民族政治文化和政治宗教名人；（二）德国民
　　族性格与经济成就；（三）德国民族性格与文化学术名人
　　十二 文艺复兴的摇篮意大利
　　（一）意大利的历史和民族性格；（二）中世纪的意大利人；
　　（三）文艺复兴时代；（四）文艺复兴后意大利的兴衰史；
　　（五）文艺复兴后意大利著名的科技文化人物
　　十三 特珠的欧洲大国俄苏
　　（一）俄苏的突出特点；（二）俄苏的政治名人录；（三）俄苏的
　　科技界名人；（四）俄苏的思想哲学成就；（五）俄苏的科学
　　家；（六）俄苏的文学艺术
　　十四 全能霸主美国人
　　（一）历史最独特的国家与全能的霸主；（二）历史与政治活
　　动家、军事家；（三）美利坚民族性格；（四）美国人在科学与
　　研究上取得成功的原因；（五）美国的思想界与人文科学界；
　　（六）自然科学界名人榜；（七）文艺界巨匠
　　十五 其它文明、民族和地区

　　富人并不光荣，穷人并不可耻。现代人不完全以物质标准去评判一个人的价值，而且人的生活方式丰富多彩，并非富人就是快乐的，穷人就很痛苦，人生的幸福很多时候与穷富无关。
　　 多穷才是穷人？多富才是富人？有没有一个具体的量化标准？
　　 探讨穷富问题，很多时候只是一种心理分析，在同样的社会环境中，你，为什么是穷人呢？或者，为什么感觉自己是个穷人？谁都可以问问自己。我？为什么是穷人？谁还在为食物操心，谁就是穷人。生活对富人来说才是生活，对穷人来说只是生存。
　　 你是富人吗？你是穷人吗？你不是穷人吗？
　　 你可知道，你为什么是穷人？是什么造成了你的穷？穷给你和你身边的人带来了什么？穷人的前途在哪里？穷人怎样才能变成富人？富到什么程度才算够？人生怎样才算幸福？
　　 不用再苦苦的追问自己，该畅销新作由学者古古撰写，关注并分析了这些问题。文字简练、优美，笔锋犀利，可读性强。

　　本书是孙中山关于三民主义的论著。
　　
　　三民主义包括民族主义、民权主义和民生主义。民族主义要求中国民族解放，各民族平等，反对帝国主义的殖民政策；民权主义要求主权在民，建立法制国家，人民拥有政权，政府只拥有治权，实行立法、司法、行政、考试、监察五权分立；民生主义要求平均地权，耕者有其田，节制资本，让普通民众都吃得饱穿得暖有事做，“民生主义就是社会主义，就是共产主义，就是大同世界”。

　　经济与社会:在制度约束和个人利益之间博弈
　　
　　《经济与社会》全书两卷。1921～1922年出版。英文本由多位韦伯研究专家合作翻译，并加有长篇导言和注释，于1968年出版。韦伯在书中全面而系统地表述了他的社会学观点和对现代文明本质的见解。首先对社会学的定义、对象、方法以及一些基本范畴和概念作了详细阐释，统称为社会学的基础。然后分别又互有交叉地阐发了他的经济社会学、法律社会学、政治社会学和宗教社会学思想。韦伯在书中广泛地援引世界历史资料，把发生在不同时代、不同文明和不同社会中的经济形式、法律形式、统治形式和宗教形式纳入他独特的概念体系，分门别类地作出类型化比较研究和系统化因果分析。

　　入世修行——马克斯·伟伯脱魔世界理性集
　　
　　1918年，刚刚逃离人祸的欧洲人，又摊上了天灾：一场史无前例的流行性感冒席卷了大陆。死于这场瘟疫的人数，据说超过了前4年战争中死亡人数的总和。我们不幸的作者赶上了这场瘟疫的余威，1920年夏初，韦伯病倒了，持续高烧不退，一周后，转为肺炎，医生束手无策，如同今天面对一位癌症晚期病人一样。6月14日，星期一，黄昏，经过痛苦地挣扎，韦伯溘然长逝了。那间房子在慕尼黑英国公园旁边的湖街3号，今天改成了16号。他去时，外面下着雷雨，道道闪电划破昏暗，照亮了他的归程。亲人把他送回海德堡，让他安息在心爱的山水之间。慕尼黑大学的学生们，永远失去了一位睿智的良师。他原来答应下学期为他们开社会主义课，却匆匆去了……

　　在《新教伦理与资本主义精神》一书中，韦伯主要考察了１６世纪宗教改革以后的基督教新教的宗教伦理与现代资本主义的亲和关系。在韦伯看来，“资本主义”不仅仅是一个经济学和政治学的范畴，而且还是一个社会学和文化学的范畴。他把“资本主义”当作一种整体性的文明来理解，认为它是１８世纪以来在欧洲科学、技术、政治、经济、法律、艺术、宗教中占主导地位的理性主义精神发展的结果，是现代西方文明的本质体现。在这样一种文明中，依靠勤勉、刻苦、利用健全的会计制度和精心盘算，把资本投入生产和流通过程，从而获取预期的利润，所有这一切构成了一个经济合理性的观念。这种合理性观念还表现在社会的其它领域，形成为一种带有普遍性的社会精神气质或社会心态，弥漫于近代欧洲，这就是韦伯所说的“资本主义精神”。它作为近代欧洲所独具的价值体系，驱动着人们按照合理化原则进行社会行动，最终导致了资本主义的产生。
　　
　　在韦伯看来，资本主义精神的产生是与新教伦理分不开的。新教加尔文教派所信奉的“预定论”认为，上帝所要救赎的并非全部世人，而只是其中的“选民”。谁将要成为“选民”而得到救赎或谁将被弃绝，都是上帝预先确定了的，个人的行为对于解救自己无能为力。从表面上看，“预定论”的逻辑结果必然导致宿命论。但在韦伯看来，“预定论”认为个人对于改变自己的命运无能为力，这就在新教徒的内心深处产生了强烈的紧张和焦虑，教徒只能以世俗职业上的成就来确定上帝对自己的恩宠并以此证明上帝的存在。于是创造出自成了一种神圣的天职，世俗经济行为的成功不是为了创造可供于享受和挥霍的财富，而是为了证实上帝对自己的恩宠。从而，“预定论”的宗教伦理就导致了勤勉刻苦，把创造财富视为一桩严肃事业的资本主义精神。这就是韦伯在本书中的主要论点。
　　
　　韦伯这种以精神、思想的因素来解释历史进程的方法，固然视角新颖而富于启发性，但在根本上是他的唯心史观的反映。
　　
　　【作者简介】马克斯·韦伯(1846-1920)，德国著名社会学家，本世纪西方最有影响的社会科学家之一，现代文化比较研究的先驱人物。他一生致力于考察“世界各宗教的经济伦理”，亦即试图从比较的角度，去探讨世界各主要民族的精神文化气质与该民族的社会经济发展之间的内在关系。1920年正式出版的《新教伦理与资本主义精神》是韦伯最负盛名的代表作，三联书店1987年出版了于晓等人的中译本。
　　
　　导论
　　
　　上篇 问题
　　
　　第一章 宗教派别和社会分层
　　
　　第二章 资本主义精神
　　
　　第三章 路德的“职业”概念（本书的研究任务）
　　
　　下篇 禁欲主义新教诸分支的实践伦理观
　　
　　第四章 世俗禁欲主义的宗教基础
　　
　　第五章 禁欲主义与资本主义精神

　　实际权力=正式权力+隐权力
　　
　　隐权力的独特视野下，诠释权力体系的玄机
　　
　　《隐权力》是吴钩先生率先提出“隐权力”概念并进行系统阐述的著作，文章多取材于明清笔记与官场小说，以生动的文字与故事，探讨一种隐藏在历史灰暗处却又非常强大的博弈力量。