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社會契約論 Social contract
  《社會契約論》-名書簡介
  
  作者:(法國)盧梭(1712-1788年)
  類型: 政治理論著作
  成書時間:1762年
  《社會契約論》-背景搜索
  
  盧梭出生於瑞士日內瓦一個鐘錶匠家庭,從小失去母親,靠別人撫養教育長大。雖然生活條件艱苦,但他發奮圖強,自學成纔。16歲離傢外出流浪,當過學徒、僕役、私人秘書、樂譜抄寫員。在巴黎,他展現了自己的才華,1750年,盧梭以徵文《論科學與藝術》獲頭等奬而出名。得到了許多上流社會貴婦人的愛慕。這些擁金百萬的貴婦為他供應舒適的生活,給他介紹所需要認識的人,盧梭很快就進入了完全不同的生活圈子。
  
  從 1762年起,盧梭由於寫政論文章,與當局發生了嚴重的糾紛。他的一些同事開始疏遠他,大約就在這個時期,他患了明顯的偏執狂癥。雖然有些人對他表示友好,但他卻采取懷疑和敵視的態度,同他們每個人都爭吵過。他一生的最後20年基本上是在悲慘痛苦中度過的,1778年他在法國邁農維爾去世。
  
  推薦閱讀版本:何兆武譯,商務印書館出版。
  《社會契約論》-內容精要
  
  《社會契約論》全書共分4捲,第一捲主要論述了人類是怎樣由自然狀態過渡到政治狀態的,契約的根本條件是什麽;第二捲主要討論國傢的立法問題;第三捲論述的是政治法即政府的形成;第四捲在繼續討論政治法的同時闡述了鞏固國傢體製的方法,從古羅馬歷史出發論述了主權者意志實現的某些細節。
  
  “人是生而自由的,但卻無往不在枷鎖之中,自以為是其他一切的主人,反而比其他一切更是奴隸。”《社會契約論》的開篇第一句話就提出了這個振聾發聵的觀點。盧梭的這一論斷是在君主專製制度橫行歐洲的時代,針對英國王權專製論代表人物費爾瑪關於“沒有人是生而自由的”這一絶對君主專製制度賴以依存的理論而提出來的。這本書以反對封建專製、倡言民主共和、主張人民主權為其主題和中心內容,提出了富於革命性的憲政理論。
  
  盧梭認為,自由的人們最初生活在自然狀態,人們的行為受自然法支配。自然法以理性為基礎,賦予人類一係列普遍的、永恆的自然權利,即生存、自由、平等、追求幸福、獲得財産和人身、財産不受侵犯的權利。由於自然狀態存在種種弊端,自由的人們以平等的資格訂立契約,從自然狀態下襬脫出來,尋找出一種結合的形式,使它能以全部共同的力量來衛護和保障每個結合者的人身和財富,並且由於這一結合而使每一個與全體相聯合的個人又衹不過是在服從自己本人,並且仍然像以往一樣地自由。這種結合的形式就是國傢。由於國傢是自由的人們以平等的資格訂立契約産生的,人們衹是把自然權利轉讓給整個社會而並不是奉獻給任何個人,因此人民在國傢中仍是自由的,國傢的主權衹能屬於人民。
  
  然後,盧梭進一步闡述了人民主權的原則:主權是不可轉讓的,因為國傢由主權者構成,衹有主權者才能行使主權;主權是不可分割的,因為代表主權的意志是一個整體;主權是不可代表的,因為 “主權在本質上是由公意所構成的,而意志又是絶不可以代表的;它衹能是同一個意志,或者是另一個意志,而絶不能有什麽中間的東西。因此人民的議員就不是、也不可能是人民的代表,他們衹不過是人民的辦事員罷了;他們並不能做出任何肯定的决定”。同時,主權是絶對的、至高無上和不可侵犯的,因為主權是公意的體現,是國傢的靈魂。基於這樣的理論,盧梭反對君主立憲而堅决主張民主共和。
  
  《社會契約論》還論述了一係列法律基本理論,在其中貫穿着以人民主權為中心內容的資産階級民主主義精神。盧梭指出法律是人民公共意志的體現,是人民自己意志的記錄和全體人民為自己所做的規定。法律的特點在於意志的普遍性和對像的普遍性,前者指法律是人民公意的體現,後者指法律考慮的對像是全體的行為而非個別人。
  
  同時,他闡述了法律與自由的關係:首先,法律與自由是一致的,人民服從法律就是服從自己的意志,就意味着自由。其次,法律是自由的保障。一方面,人人遵守法律,才能給人們以享受自由權利的安全保障;另一方面,法律可以強迫人們自由。
  
  此外,盧梭還係統地提出了立法理論。他認為要依法治國就要有理想的法律,在製定法律時必須遵循下列原則:立法必須以謀取人民最大幸福為原則;立法權必須由人民掌握;由賢明者具體承擔立法的責任;立法要註意各種自然的社會條件,法律衹不過是保障、遵循和矯正自然的關係而已;既要保持法律的穩定性,又要適時修改、廢除不好的法律。
  
  “人是生而自由平等的,這是天賦的權利”,《社會契約論》中的這一 理論,開創了歐洲及全世界民主平等思想之先河,它的“人權天賦“,主權在民”的新學說嚮“君權神授”的傳統觀念發起了挑戰。它所揭示的“人權自由、權利平等”的原則,至今仍作為西方政治的基礎。
  《社會契約論》-專傢點評
  
  盧梭是18世紀法國啓蒙運動傑出的政治思想傢、文學家。他的才思文藻風靡了當時的整個歐洲,並為後人留下了一係列劃時代的巨著。很少有幾個哲學家能帶來盧梭著作那樣的震撼。他的《藝術與科學談》獲法國第戎奬,使他榮獲歐洲哲學大師稱號。他的文學名著《新愛洛伊絲》在世界文學史上有着很高地位,使他躋身於啓蒙時期著名文學家的行列。《社會契約論》又譯作《民約論》是他最為傑出的代表作之一,被譽為“人類解放的第一個呼聲,世界大革命的第一個煽動者”。盧梭是歐洲啓蒙運動中重要的思想傢,與伏爾泰齊名。他的主要作品有《懺悔錄》、《愛彌兒》、《社會契約論》、《新愛洛伊絲》。他的主要思想:天賦人權學說,提出“人民主權”的口號。其思想是法國大革命中雅各賓派的旗幟,對歐美各國的資産階級革命産生了深刻影響。
  
  他的《社會契約論》中的“主權在民”一說,就劃分了一個時代。
  
  《社會契約論》盧梭將野花送給喂奶的母親
  《社會契約論》第一次提出了“天賦人權和主權在民的思想”。它剛一問世就遭到了禁止。盧梭本人也被迫流亡到英國。但《社會契約論》所提倡的民主理論卻很快風靡全世界。它引發了震驚世界的法國大革命。法國國傢格言“自由、平等、博愛”便來自《社會契約論》。1789年法國國民代表大會通過的《人權宣言》中“社會的目的是為大衆謀福利的”、“統治權屬於人民”等內容充分體現了《社會契約論》的精神。《社會契約論》還對美國的《獨立宣言》産生了重要影響,從羅伯斯庇爾到列寧都曾用《社會契約論》為自己的政權做解釋。1978年,在紀念盧梭逝世200周年的活動中,專門召開了國際研討會,研究盧梭的思想,出版他的新傳,推出以他為題材的電視劇。他的遺骸被安放在法國的偉人祠內。盧梭在《社會契約論》中預見的“消費者的各種陷阱,大城市的騷亂以及毀滅性的軍費負擔”等等,都已成為當代社會的現實問題。目前,單在法國就有150多位學者在專門研究盧梭的思想。
  
  有說盧梭的政治理論深受柏拉圖的《理想國》的影響。《理想國》的概念,建立於人性善的理念基礎上,柏拉圖筆下的蘇格拉底說,“衹有正直的人才會幸福”,“善的意志”成為他的理想國的基礎。盧梭也相信人性善,他提倡寬容理性,堅定地反對任何政治暴力。同是論述理想國的原則,不同於柏拉圖,盧梭將其理論框架完全建立在“人生而自由”的基礎之上,也就是說“自由意志”。這個基礎就實在多了。很早以前,人們有一個更好的但文言的說法:“天賦人權。”由天賦人權作為第一原理,他所構造的不再衹是理想,而是現代公民社會的基本原則。公民社會中,公民失去了自由人無所不為的自由,而得到公民的政治權利、政治自由。他的《社會契約論》(又譯《民約論》)所要解决的是人權和法律的有機結合。從此,合法性衹能來自人民,成了盧梭的繼承者和背叛者的共同的理念。前者産生了美國革命和民主的建立,後者以人民之名專權屠殺。盧梭,作為“主權在民”的勾畫者,就是在200年後還處於爭論的中心:他的理論到底是在提倡民主自由,還是在提倡極權暴政?
  
  《社會契約論》哲學家盧梭大部頭著作
  人權是屬於個體的,法律是屬於國傢的。個體約定而成國傢的合理性,是法律有效性和政權合法性的終極判斷。自由,不是來自法律對個人的保護,而是來自個體對立法的徹底參與。這是切實保障個體自由的先决條件。在這一過程裏,個體利益的“交集”而非“並集”(不完全是數學上的那種)形成公民意志——主權者的意志——一般意志,而這種主權者因為個體的不斷參與,其內容是常新的,其利益與個體利益共榮的。從這一點出發,多數人說了算的約法三章必然成為主權在民的道德的體現方式。
  
  盧梭把政權明白地分成了立法和行政兩個部分,前者屬於社會契約的範疇,而後者不是契約的內容(因此是可變可推翻的)。這個理念對後來民主政治的發展有着不可磨滅的貢獻。在盧梭之前,孟德斯鳩的《論法的精神》對法律的理解更加深刻,惟缺盧梭的“主權在民”的動力。《社會契約論》自始至終衹揚棄了一種體製:專製政府。按盧梭的話,這就是那種蔑視法律把個體的權力高於主權者之上的體製。其他的體製,盧梭僅僅論述了它們合法的自然依據。從直接民主製、貴族代議製到君主立憲製,統治的根據必須是人民主權———其真正表達就是法律。盧梭並進而把任何真正依法而治的政體統稱為共和政體。在盧梭看來,他那個時代的政治社會形態是腐朽的,他要到古希臘時代才能找到合理的回歸。
  
  《社會契約論》是世界政治法律學說史上最重要的經典之一,是震撼世界的1789年法國大革命的號角和福音書。它闡述的許多原則原理不僅在革命之初被載入法國《人權宣言》等重要文獻中,在革命後的長時期裏成為資産階級的政治法律制度的基石。盧梭的思想對後世思想傢們理論的形成有重大影響。
  
  盧梭的政治著作中有許多思想獨特新穎,引人入勝。但是總體說來就是一種追求平等的強烈欲望和一種同樣強烈的感受:現存社會制度的不合理已經達到了令人不能容忍的程度,人生下來本來是自由的,但是無論走到哪裏都要戴上枷鎖。盧梭自己可能並不喜歡暴力行為,但是他無疑激勵了其他人實行暴力革命,逐步改革社會制度。
  
  有人批評盧梭是一個極其神經質的人,是一個大男子主義者,是一個思想不切實際的、糊塗的思想傢,這樣的批評大體上是正確的。但是遠比他的缺點更重要的是他的洞察力和傑出的創造精神所閃現出來的思想火花,兩個多世紀以來,不斷地影響着現代思想。
  《社會契約論》-妙語佳句
  
  我看到了另一個世界,我的全部激情都被對真理、對自由、對道德的熱愛窒息掉了。
  誰第一個把一塊土地圈起來並想到這是自己的,而且被頭腦簡單的人所相信的話,那他就是文明的奠基者。


  Social contract describes a broad class of theories that try to explain the ways in which people form states to maintain social order. The notion of the social contract implies that the people give up sovereignty to a government or other authority in order to receive or maintain social order through the rule of law. It can also be thought of as an agreement by the governed on a set of rules by which they are governed.
  
  Social contract theory formed a central pillar in the historically important notion that legitimate state authority must be derived from the consent of the governed. The starting point for most of these theories is a heuristic examination of the human condition absent from any structured social order, usually termed the “state of nature”. In this condition, an individual’s actions are bound only by his or her personal power, constrained by conscience. From this common starting point, the various proponents of social contract theory attempt to explain, in different ways, why it is in an individual’s rational self-interest to voluntarily give up the freedom one has in the state of nature in order to obtain the benefits of political order.
  
  Thomas Hobbes (1651), John Locke (1689) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) are the most famous philosophers of contractarianism. However, they drew quite different conclusions from this starting-point. Hobbes advocated an authoritarian monarchy, Locke advocated a liberal monarchy, while Rousseau advocated liberal republicanism. Their work provided theoretical groundwork of constitutional monarchy, liberal democracy and republicanism. The Social Contract was used in the Declaration of Independence as a sign of enforcing Democracy, and more recently has been revived by thinkers such as John Rawls.
  
  Overview
  
  According to Thomas Hobbes, human life would be "nasty, brutish, and short" without political authority. In its absence, we would live in a state of nature, where we each have unlimited natural freedoms, including the "right to all things" and thus the freedom to harm all who threaten our own self-preservation; there would be an endless "war of all against all" (Bellum omnium contra omnes). To avoid this, free men establish political community i.e. civil society through a social contract in which each gain civil rights in return for subjecting himself to civil law or to political authority.
  
  Alternatively, some have argued that we gain civil rights in return for accepting the obligation to respect and defend the rights of others, giving up some freedoms to do so; this alternative formulation of the duty arising from the social contract is often identified with arguments about military service.
  Violations of the contract
  
  The social contract and the civil rights it gives us are neither "natural rights" nor permanently fixed. Rather, the contract itself is the means towards an end — the benefit of all — and (according to some philosophers such as Locke or Rousseau), is only legitimate to the extent that it meets the general interest ("general will" in Rousseau). Therefore, when failings are found in the contract, we renegotiate to change the terms, using methods such as elections and legislature. Locke theorized the right of rebellion in case of the contract leading to tyranny.
  
  Since civil rights come from agreeing to the contract, those who choose to violate their contractual obligations, such as by committing crimes, abdicate their rights, and the rest of society can be expected to protect itself against the actions of such outlaws. To be a member of society is to accept responsibility for following its rules, along with the threat of punishment for violating them. In this way, society works by "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" (Hardin 1968).
  History
  Classical thought
  
  Many have argued that Plato's dialog Crito expresses a Greek version of social contract theory. In this dialog, Socrates refuses to escape from jail to avoid being put to death. He argues that since he has willingly remained in Athens all of his life despite opportunities to go elsewhere, he has accepted the social contract i.e. the burden of the local laws, and he cannot violate these laws even when they are against his self-interest.
  
  Epicurus seems to have had a strong sense of social contract, with justice and law being rooted in mutual agreement and advantage, as evidenced by these lines, among others, from his Principal Doctrines:
  
   31. Natural justice is a pledge of reciprocal benefit, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another. 32. Those animals which are incapable of making binding agreements with one another not to inflict nor suffer harm are without either justice or injustice; and likewise for those peoples who either could not or would not form binding agreements not to inflict nor suffer harm. 33. There never was such a thing as absolute justice, but only agreements made in mutual dealings among men in whatever places at various times providing against the infliction or suffering of harm. 34. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which is associated with the apprehension of being discovered by those appointed to punish such actions.
  
  Also see Epicurean ethics
  Renaissance developments
  
  Quentin Skinner has argued that several critical modern innovations in contract theory are found in the writings from French Calvinists and Huguenots, whose work in turn was invoked by writers in the Low Countries who objected to their subjection to Spain and, later still, by Catholics in England. Among these, Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), from the School of Salamanca, might be considered as an early theorist of the social contract, theorizing natural law in an attempt to limit the divine right of absolute monarchy. All of these groups were led to articulate notions of popular sovereignty by means of a social covenant or contract: all of these arguments began with proto-“state of nature” arguments, to the effect that the basis of politics is that everyone is by nature free of subjection to any government.
  
  However, these arguments relied on a corporatist theory found in Roman Law, according to which "a populus" can exist as a distinct legal entity. Therefore these arguments held that a community of people can join a government because they have the capacity to exercise a single will and make decisions with a single voice in the absence of sovereign authority — a notion rejected by Hobbes and later contract theorists.
  Philosophers
  Hugo Grotius
  
  In the early 17th century, Grotius (1583–1645) introduced the modern idea of natural rights of individuals. Grotius says that we each have natural rights which we have in order to preserve ourselves. He uses this idea to try to establish a basis for moral consensus in the face of religious diversity and the rise of natural science and to find a minimal basis for a moral beginning for society, a kind of natural law that everyone could potentially accept. He goes so far as to say even if we were to concede what we cannot concede without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, these laws would still hold. The idea was considered incendiary, since it suggests that power can ultimately go back to the individuals if the political society that they have set up forfeits the purpose for which it was originally established, which is to preserve themselves. In other words, the people i.e. the individual people, are sovereign. Grotius says that the people are sui juris - under their own jurisdiction. People have rights as human beings but there is a delineation of those rights because of what is possible for everyone to accept morally - everyone has to accept that each person is entitled to try to preserve themselves and therefore they shouldn't try to do harm to others or to interfere with them and they should punish any breach of someone else's rights that arises.
  Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan (1651)
  
  The first modern philosopher to articulate a detailed contract theory was Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). According to Hobbes, the lives of individuals in the state of nature were "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short", a state where self-interest and the absence of rights and contracts prevented the 'social', or society. Life was 'anarchic' (without leadership/ the concept of sovereignty). Individuals in the state of nature were apolitical and asocial. This state of nature is followed by the social contract.
  
  The social contract was an 'occurrence' during which individuals came together and ceded some of their individual rights so that others would cede theirs (e.g. person A gives up his/her right to kill person B if person B does the same). This resulted in the establishment of society, and by extension, the state, a sovereign entity (like the individuals, now under its rule, used to be) which was to protect these new rights which were now to regulate societal interactions. Society was thus no longer anarchic.
  
  But the state system, which grew out of the social contract, was anarchic (without leadership). Just as the individuals in the state of nature had been sovereigns and thus guided by self-interest and the absence of rights, so states now acted in their self-interest in competition with each other. Just like the state of nature, states were thus bound to be in conflict because there was no sovereign over and above the state (i.e. more powerful) capable of imposing social-contract laws. Indeed, Hobbes' work helped to serve as a basis for the realism theories of international relations, advanced by E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau.
  John Locke's Second Treatise of Government (1689)
  
  John Locke's conception of the social contract differed from Hobbes' in several ways, but retained the central notion that persons in a state of nature would willingly come together to form a state. Locke believed that individuals in a state of nature would have stronger moral limits on their action than accepted by Hobbes, but recognized that people would still live in fear of one another. Locke argued that individuals would agree to form a state that would provide a "neutral judge", and that could therefore protect the lives, liberty, and property of those who lived within it. While Hobbes argued for near-absolute authority, Locke argued that laws could only be legitimate if they sought to achieve the common good. Locke also believed that people will do the right thing as a group, and that all people have natural rights.
  Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Du contrat social (1762)
  
  Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), in his influential 1762 treatise The Social Contract, outlined a different version of social contract theory, based on popular sovereignty. Although Rousseau wrote that the British were perhaps at the time the freest people on earth, he did not approve of their representative government. Rousseau believed that liberty was possible only where there was direct rule by the people as a whole in lawmaking, where popular sovereignty was indivisible and inalienable. Citizens must, in at least some circumstances, be able to choose together the fundamental rules by which they would live, and be able to revise those rules on later occasions if they choose to do so - something the British people as a whole were unable to do.
  
  Rousseau's political theory has some points in common with Locke's individualism, but departs from it in his development of the "luminous conception" (which he credited to Diderot) of the general will. Rousseau argues a citizen can be an egoist and decide that his personal interest should override the collective interest. However, as part of a collective body, the individual citizen puts aside his egoism to create a "general will", which is popular sovereignty itself. Popular sovereignty (i.e., the rule of law), thus decides what is good for society as a whole, and the individual (including the administrative head of state, who could be a monarch) must bow to it, or be forced to bow to it:
  
   [The social contract] can be reduced to the following terms: Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.
  
  Rousseau's striking phrase that man must "be forced to be free" should be understood this way: since the indivisible and inalienable popular sovereignty decides what is good for the whole, then if an individual lapses back into his ordinary egoism and breaks the law, he will be forced to listen to what they decided as a member of the collectivity (i.e. as citizens). Thus, the law, inasmuch as it is voted by the people's representatives, is not a limitation of individual freedom, but its expression; and enforcement of law, including criminal law, is not a restriction on individual liberty, as the individual, as a citizen, explicitly agreed to be constrained if, as a private individual, he did not respect his own will as formulated in the general will. Because laws represent the restraints of civil freedom, they represent the leap made from humans in the state of nature into civil society. In this sense, the law is a civilizing force, and therefore Rousseau believed that the laws that govern a people helped to mold their character.
  Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's individualist social contract (1851)
  
  While Rousseau's social contract is based on popular sovereignty and not on individual sovereignty, there are other theories espoused by individualists, libertarians and anarchists, which do not involve agreeing to anything more than negative rights and creates only a limited state, if any.
  
  Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865) advocated a conception of social contract which didn't involve an individual surrendering sovereignty to others. According to him, the social contract was not between individuals and the state, but rather between individuals themselves refraining from coercing or governing each other, each one maintaining complete sovereignty upon oneself:
  
   What really is the Social Contract? An agreement of the citizen with the government? No, that would mean but the continuation of [Rousseau’s] idea. The social contract is an agreement of man with man; an agreement from which must result what we call society. In this, the notion of commutative justice, first brought forward by the primitive fact of exchange, …is substituted for that of distributive justice … Translating these words, contract, commutative justice, which are the language of the law, into the language of business, and you have commerce, that is to say, in its highest significance, the act by which man and man declare themselves essentially producers, and abdicate all pretension to govern each other.
   —Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century (1851)
  
  John Rawls' Theory of Justice (1971)
  
  John Rawls (1921–2002) proposed a contractarian approach that has a decidedly Kantian flavour, in A Theory of Justice (1971), whereby rational people in a hypothetical "original position", setting aside their individual preferences and capacities under a "veil of ignorance", would agree to certain general principles of justice. This idea is also used as a game-theoretical formalization of the notion of fairness.
  Philip Pettit's Republicanism (1997)
  
  Philip Pettit (b. 1945) has argued, in Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1997), that the theory of social contract, classically based on the consent of the governed (as it is assumed that the contract is valid as long as the people consent to being governed by its representatives, who exercise sovereignty), should be modified, in order to avoid dispute. Instead of arguing that an explicit consent, which can always be manufactured, should justify the validity of social contract, Philip Pettit argues that the absence of an effective rebellion against the contract is the only legitimacy of it.
  Criticism
  David Hume
  
  An early critic of social contract theory was Rousseau's friend, the philosopher David Hume, who in 1742 published an essay "On Civil Liberty", in whose second part, entitled, "Of the Original Contract ", he stressed that the concept of a "social contract" was a convenient fiction:
  
   AS no party, in the present age can well support itself without a philosophical or speculative system of principles annexed to its political or practical one; we accordingly find that each of the factions into which this nation is divided has reared up a fabric of the former kind, in order to protect and cover that scheme of actions which it pursues. . . . The one party [defenders of the absolute and divine right of kings, or Tories], by tracing up government to the DEITY, endeavor to render it so sacred and inviolate that it must be little less than sacrilege, however tyrannical it may become, to touch or invade it in the smallest article. The other party [the Whigs, or believers in constitutional monarchy], by founding government altogether on the consent of the PEOPLE suppose that there is a kind of original contract by which the subjects have tacitly reserved the power of resisting their sovereign, whenever they find themselves aggrieved by that authority with which they have for certain purposes voluntarily entrusted him. --David Hume, "On Civil Liberty" [II.XII.1]
  
  However, Hume did agree that, no matter how a government is founded, the consent of the governed is the only legitimate foundation on which a government can rest.
  
   My intention here is not to exclude the consent of the people from being one just foundation of government where it has place. It is surely the best and most sacred of any. I only pretend that it has very seldom had place in any degree and never almost in its full extent. And that therefore some other foundation of government must also be admitted. --Ibid II.XII.20
  
  Logic of contracting
  
  According to the will theory of contract, which was dominant in the 19th century and still exerts a strong influence, a contract is not presumed valid unless all parties agree to it voluntarily, either tacitly or explicitly, without coercion. Lysander Spooner, a 19th century lawyer and staunch supporter of a right of contract between individuals, in his essay No Treason, argues that a supposed social contract cannot be used to justify governmental actions such as taxation, because government will initiate force against anyone who does not wish to enter into such a contract. As a result, he maintains that such an agreement is not voluntary and therefore cannot be considered a legitimate contract at all.
  
  Modern Anglo-American law, like European civil law, is based on a will theory of contract, according to which all terms of a contract are binding on the parties because they chose those terms for themselves. This was less true when Hobbes wrote Leviathan; then, more importance was attached to consideration, meaning a mutual exchange of benefits necessary to the formation of a valid contract, and most contracts had implicit terms that arose from the nature of the contractual relationship rather than from the choices made by the parties. Accordingly, it has been argued that social contract theory is more consistent with the contract law of the time of Hobbes and Locke than with the contract law of our time, and that features in the social contract which seem anomalous to us, such as the belief that we are bound by a contract formulated by our distant ancestors, would not have seemed as strange to Hobbes' contemporaries as they do to us.
  Multiple contracts
  
  Legal scholar Randy Barnett has argued, that, while presence in the territory of a society may be necessary for consent, it is not consent to any rules the society might make regardless of their content. A second condition of consent is that the rules be consistent with underlying principles of justice and the protection of natural and social rights, and have procedures for effective protection of those rights (or liberties). This has also been discussed by O.A. Brownson, who argued that there are, in a sense, three "constitutions" involved: The first the constitution of nature that includes all of what the Founders called "natural law". The second would be the constitution of society, an unwritten and commonly understood set of rules for the society formed by a social contract before it establishes a government, by which it does establish the third, a constitution of government. To consent, a necessary condition is that the rules be constitutional in that sense.
  Tacit consent
  
  The theory of an implicit social contract holds that by remaining in the territory controlled by some government, people give consent to be governed. This consent is what gives legitimacy to the government. Philosopher Roderick Long argues that this is a case of question begging, because the argument has to presuppose its conclusion:
  
   I think that the person who makes this argument is already assuming that the government has some legitimate jurisdiction over this territory. And then they say, well, now, anyone who is in the territory is therefore agreeing to the prevailing rules. But they’re assuming the very thing they're trying to prove – namely that this jurisdiction over the territory is legitimate. If it's not, then the government is just one more group of people living in this broad general geographical territory. But I've got my property, and exactly what their arrangements are I don't know, but here I am in my property and they don't own it – at least they haven't given me any argument that they do – and so, the fact that I am living in "this country" means I am living in a certain geographical region that they have certain pretensions over – but the question is whether those pretensions are legitimate. You can’t assume it as a means to proving it.
  
  Criticisms of natural rights
  
  Contractualism is based on the notion that rights are agreed upon in order to further our interests: each individual subject is accorded individual rights, which may or may not be inalienable, and form the basis of civil rights, as in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. It must be underlined, however, as Hannah Arendt did on her book on imperialism, that the 1789 Declarations, in this agreeing with the social contract theory, bases the natural rights of the human-being on the civil rights of the citizen, instead of the reverse as the contractualist theory does. This criticism derives from a long tradition going back to St. Augustine of Hippo, who in The City of God (book) envisioned a unified Christian society presided over by a king who was responsible for the welfare of his subjects. Political Augustinianism with its insistence on divine sovereignty and on the two separate spheres of a heavenly and an earthly community, has indeed been regarded as incompatible with social contract theories. This raises the question of whether social contractarianism, as a central plank of liberal thought, is reconcilable with the Christian religion, and particularly with Catholicism and Catholic social teaching. The individualist and liberal approach has also been criticized since the 19th century by thinkers such as Marx, Nietzsche & Freud, and afterward by structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers, such as Lacan, Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze or Derrida
譯者序言
  翻譯: 其林
   譯者序言
   公認的十八世紀最偉大的、最深遠地影響了歷史的作品是哪幾部?人們可以很輕易地說出亞當·史密斯的《國富論》、孟德斯鳩的《論法的精神》和盧梭的《社會契約論》。
   盧梭(Jean-Jacques Rousseau,1712-1778)的《社會契約論》和《愛彌兒》,一論一論教育,奠定了他的啓蒙大師的歷史地位。很少有幾個哲學家能帶來盧梭著作那樣的震撼。且不說他的《愛彌兒》在教育學上的成就,就說他的《社會契約論》中的“主權在民”一說,就劃分了一個時代。
   有說盧梭的理論深受帕拉圖的《理想國》的影響。《理想國》的概念,建立於人性善的理念基礎上,帕拉圖筆下的蘇格拉底說,“衹有正直的人才會幸福”,“善的意志”成為他的理想國的基礎。盧梭也相信人性善,他提倡寬容理性,堅定地反對任何暴力。同是論述理想國的原則,不同於帕拉圖,盧梭將其理論框架完全建立在“人生而自由”的基礎之上,也就是說“自由意志”。這個基礎就實在多了。很早以前,人們有一個更好的但文言的說法:“天賦”。由天賦作為第一原理,他所構造的不再衹是理想,而是現代公民社會的基本原則。公民社會中,公民失去了自由人無所不為的自由,而得到公民的權利-自由。他的《社會契約論》(又譯《民約論》)所要解决的是和法律的有機結合。從此,合法性衹能來自人民,成了盧梭的繼承者和背叛者的共同的理念。-前者産生了美國和的建立,後者以人民之名專權。盧梭,作為“主權在民”的勾畫者,就是在二百年後還處於爭論的中心:他的理論到底是在提倡自由,還是在提倡極權?
   是屬於個體的,法律是屬於國傢的。個體約定而成國傢的合理性,是法律有效性和政權合法性的終極判斷。自由,不是來自法律對個人的保護,而是來自個體對立法的徹底參與。這是切實保障個體自由的先决條件。在這一過程裏,個體利益的“交集”而非“並集”(不完全是數學上的那種)形成公志-主權者的意志-一般意志,而這種主權者因為個體的不斷參與,其內容是常新的,其利益與個體利益共榮的。從這一點出發,多數人說了算的約法三章必然地成為主權在民的道德的體現方式。
   盧梭把政權明白地分成了立法和行政兩個部分,前者屬於社會契約的範疇,而後者不是契約的內容(因此是可變可推翻的)。這個理念對後來的發展有着不可磨滅的貢獻。在盧梭之前,孟德斯鳩的《論法的精神》對法律的理解更加深刻,唯缺盧梭的“主權在民”的動力。《社會契約論》本身是自恰的理論專著。它自始至終衹揚棄了一種體製:政府。按盧梭的話,這就是那種蔑視法律把個體的權力高於主權者之上的體製。其他的體製,盧梭僅僅論述了它們合法的自然依據。從直接製、貴族代議製到君主立憲製,統治的根據必須是人權-其真正表達就是法律。盧梭並進而把任何真正依法而治的政體統稱為共和政體。
   盧梭的理想並不是人們常說的直接製,而是羅馬為代表的精英選舉代議製。為了對幅員大國的有效治理,由幅員不大的精英代議製政體合衆聯邦幾乎在《社會契約論》中呼之欲出而與百來年美國的歷史相呼應。這一點,多少為中國未來的化道路指明了方向。
   盧梭的起點是一個假想的自給自足的自由人的國度,然後纔有社會契約和公民社會的形成。無疑,他的基礎隱伏着危機-因為他基於的是假想國而非事實的觀察。後一時代的法國歷史學者德·托剋維爾,從他對美洲的發生發展的觀察,著有《製在美洲》的名著,他的起點無疑就更加堅實。兩者的著作其實有着一個共通之處,尋找一個合乎人性的道德的社會形態。
   在盧梭看來,他那個時代的社會形態是腐朽的,他要到古希臘時代才能找到合理的回歸。他的起點,嚴格來說,是太過簡單了,而他的結論,也太機械了。想一想,從一個假想的自給自足的個體自由人到公民社會的形成,有沒有可能跳過商品經濟的發展?在盧梭的理論裏沒有商品的地位,他所處的啓蒙時代决定了他成不了亞當·史密斯。儘管如此,今天分析他的思想,采納他思維的合理成分,是每個有志於中國化進程的知識分子必修的一課。
   《社會契約論》分成四册,大致上,第一册論人民和主權者;第二册論法律和主權者;第三册論政府和主權者;第四册以古羅馬歷史出述了主權者意志實現的某些細節。
   1985年法學家費孝通在寬鬆的時期呼籲全社會學習盧梭的《社會契約論》,原因無他,任何明眼人都看得出來,中國還沒有一個公民社會,而它是現代法製的基礎。
   若幹名詞的英漢對照sovereign              主權者sovereignty             主權 sovereign power       主權權力sovereign authority   主權權威general will          一般意志prince統治者democracy          (直接)製aristocracy貴族製monarchy           君主(立憲)製despotism政府despot               的君主--------【譯註】
   General Will在中文翻譯裏有其他多種翻法。有人翻成“總意志”和“公共意志”。“公共意志”比較接近原文含義。但是,General在原文中是相對於Particular,故有現在的“一般意志”的翻法;但有時,原文也對應於Individual。有必要指出一般意志和後來黑格爾神化了的國傢意志有極大的不同。
   Sovereign翻譯為主權者。其他的翻譯有用“人權”的。
   Prince本可翻譯成王國,但在上下文中把它意譯成統治者,以免讀者對用詞的理解過分生疏。
第一册-1
  第一册
   前言
   這篇小論文原屬於我無力完成的一部更大部頭的作品,我早放棄了這個大部頭作品的寫作。在其中可以單獨提取出來的各種片斷中,這本書是最長的,好象也是最不值得公佈於衆的一部分。其餘的部分已毀去了。
   《社會契約論》第一册
   從人本身出發研究法律的可能形式,我想研究一下在公民社會秩序中是否存在任何合法的和可靠的管理原則。在此研究中,我會盡量地把權利所允許的和私利所期望的結合起來,使得正義和功利不再分割。
   我想直接切入主題而不先證明其重要性。既然我在講,人們會問我到底是統治者還是立法者;我的回答是我兩者都不是,也正因如此,我纔要來談。否則,我就不會浪費時間光說不做了;我要不就付諸實踐,要不就保持沉默。
   生為一個自由國傢的公民並作為主權者【譯註1】的一員,不論我的小小一票對公衆事物的影響是多麽卑微,這種發言權給我以足夠的責任感來研究這些事物。從我對政府政製的思考和研究中,每每我都挖掘出新的理由,讓我更愛我自己祖國的政府。--------【譯註1】Sovereign(主權者)在盧梭是一個整體的概念,不是世俗意義上的統治權的意思。盧梭自號日內瓦公民,但日內瓦當時並不自由。後來,盧梭本人就因《社會契約論》公民宗教一節而被取消了日內瓦國籍。
   《社會契約論》第一册第一章
   本書的研究主題
   人生而自由,然而他自此處處背負着鎖鏈。任何人都可以認為他是他人的主人,但是他衹是比他人更為不自由的奴隸。為什麽會是這樣?我不知道。是什麽使它成為合理?那是我相信可以回答的問題。
   如果我衹考慮力量和其産生的後果,我會說“衹要人民在強製下真的認了服從了,暴力算達到了目的;一但人民能夠砸碎這種鎖鏈並付諸行動,暴力的結果就更妙了,因為,人民憑着暴力奪回了他們因暴力而失去的自由。這裏,或者自由的奪回是合理的,或者自由的失去是不合理的。”但社會秩序是一種神聖的權利,它是其他一切權利的根本。這種權利既然不能來自自然,它就必須基於一些約法三章。問題是這種約法的內容。首先,我得進一步闡明我剛說過的一切。
   《社會契約論》第一册第二章
   第一種社會
   所有人類社會中最古老的,也是唯一自然的社會形態,是家庭:即便如此,子女對父親的依賴衹是為了生存。一但這一需求不復存在,子女對父親的服從和父親對子女的照顧這雙重責任就都解除了,他們從此成為獨立的個體。如果他們還要繼續生活在一起,就不是出於自然,而是出於自願的了。家庭從而就成了一種約定。
   人的這種共同的自由來自他的本性。他的第一法則是自己的存活,他的第一要務是自己的利益。人,一旦明白事理,就是自主的;對自身的生存手段,他擁有唯一的决斷,他因此成為自己的主人。
   因此,可以說家庭是社會的第一模式:父之於統治者,子女之於百姓草民;他們都是生而自由平等的,但他們為了自己的利益而放棄了自由。其間唯一的差別是,家庭中,父對子的呵護贏得衷心的愛;而在國傢,統治者有的衹有發號施令的痛快,但沒有對百姓的愛。
   葛羅休斯【譯註1】以奴隸為例來否認人的權力是為了被統治的草民的利益。他的邏輯的老套是把權利建立於存在的事實之上【原註1】。就算有人用更邏輯的推理方法,其結論都不會對暴君更加有利。
   根據葛羅休斯,到底是人類屬於某百來號人,還是這百來號人屬於人類,是一個可以討論的問題。貫穿其全書,他好象是傾嚮於前一觀點,也就是霍布士【譯註2】的觀點。於是,人類被分成了若幹牛群,每群都有一個統治者來看守,並最終宰割吞食他們。
   既然牧人天然優越於牛群,人的牧者-統治者,也就天然優於其治下的人民。如菲羅(Philo)之言,這就是卡裏古拉大帝【譯註3】的邏輯。如此類推的結論就是,要麽王者是神氏,要麽百姓是牲口。
   卡裏古拉大帝的思維和葛羅休斯霍布士如出一轍。在他們之前,亞裏斯多德也說人是天生不平等的,有人生而為奴,有人生而為主。
   亞裏斯多德當然是對的,衹是他錯把結果當成了原因。身處奴隸製中的人理所當然生而為奴。奴隸在其鎖鏈中失去了一切,包括他們嚮往自由的願望;他們愛自己的枷鎖,就象尤裏西斯(Ulysses)的夥伴愛好自己的野蠻【原註2】。如果天生的奴隸還能夠存在,就是因為曾幾何時有過的奴隸。暴力産生了第一代奴隸;而他們的怯懦成全了奴隸製。
   我還沒有說亞當王或諾亞大帝【譯註4】,清本還源之下,他算是三大君王國之父,三國象撒旦的子嗣一樣瓜分了世界;有些學者還能認出自己和他們的出身淵源。對此我得有所節制,因為我也是這三大君王國的直親後裔,好象還是那較長的一族,可有誰能用這些名目來立我為人類之合法帝王呢?僅管如此,不能否認亞當曾主宰過世界,誠如魯賓孫曾主宰過他的小島,衹要他是小島唯一的居民;如此帝國的好處就是王國在其治下沒有反叛、戰爭、或陰謀。--------【原註1】‘學來的對公共權利的研究往往是過往濫調的歷史;對他們的學習太過深入是毫無好處的迷戀。’(《論法國對鄰國關係中的利益》,Marquis d’Argenson)。這正是葛羅休斯的做為。【原註2】參看Plutarch的短文《思考的動物》。【譯註1】Grotius,公元1583-1645。荷蘭哲學家,著有《戰爭和平之法則》。【譯註2】Hobbes,公元1588-1679。英國哲學家,他關於社會契約的學說,引起其他哲人如洛剋、斯賓若莎、盧梭的進一步研究。盧梭在此對Hobbes的批判並不符合事實。【譯註3】Caligula,公元12-41。羅馬皇帝。在位三年,因殘暴無度被刺。【譯註4】此論是針對某種理論,認為君主之王權可以導自《聖經舊約》中之亞當。
   《社會契約論》第一册第三章
   至強者的權利
   至強者,莫不希望把自己的力量轉變成為權利,他人的服從轉變成責任,唯此,它才能真正的至強,才能維護它的長治久安。因此,至強者的權利,雖然聽來帶着反諷,被認為是現實中的一個基本準則。但是此說之真正含義又是如何?在力量中我看不出它如何能導致任何道德。面對暴力而讓步不過是一種必需而已,其中沒有意願;至多,那是一種審慎。它又如何能成為責任?
   不妨假設此種所謂“權利”是存在的。我要說從此不能導出任何有意義的東西。如果暴力産生權利,結果就要隨着原因而改變:任何比第一個強權更強大的暴力就可接過這種權利。一旦反叛而不會受罰,就得以合法的反叛,既然至強者掌握着真理,人就必須盡力地變得強大起來。一個隨着力量而消長的權利,這會是什麽東西嘛?如果人是服從的,他沒有任何義務這樣做。顯然,“權利”一詞不為力量帶來任何新的東西;從此角度上,它毫無意義。
   “服從暴力”。如果這說的是“讓步於暴力”,這樣的格言雖然膚淺,還可說是放之四海而皆準。一切力量來自於上帝。我承認;但一切病痛也是源自上帝。難道我們就因此不能請醫生了嗎?如果我在森林裏為匪徒所攔,給其以金錢,要是我還能保住這些錢,我是否還有道德義務把錢送給匪人呢?畢竟,槍口之下也是一種暴力。
   因此,我們應該有一個共識,暴力並不帶來權利,我們衹有義務尊崇合法的力量。我們又回到了我原來提出的問題。
   《社會契約論》第一册第四章
   奴隸制度
   正因為任何人對他人都沒有天然的權力,正因為暴力不能産生權利,所以人類社會的任何合理的權威就都應建於人民之間的相互約定。
   葛羅休斯認為,既然個人可以放棄自由而為某一主子的奴隸,為什麽整個人民就不能放棄自由而成為某一君主的臣民?這裏,有着太多模棱兩可的詞彙。我們就衹來搞清楚“放棄”的含義。在此上下文中,它意味着“給予”或者“出賣”。一個要做別人奴隸的人並不能把自己給予別人;至少是為了自己的生存,他是出賣了自己。但是人民為什麽要出賣自己呢?君主可並不能保障臣民的生存,事實上君主的力量來自其臣民,如拉貝萊斯(Rabelais)之言,君王所依者衆。難道臣民們是為了君主把自己財産拿走纔把自己給予了君主?如果是這樣,我可看不出他們何以維生?
   有人會說的君主可以保障臣民的安全。當然了;但是如果君主的個人野心為其帶來了戰爭,如果君主無底的貪欲和他的官僚的騷擾帶來的壓迫遠過於人民自己的糾紛,如果這樣的和平成了一種慘狀,人民到底是撈取到些什麽呢?牢獄中的生活也是和平的,難道說和平就能使得牢獄成為夢寐以求的東西嘛?囚禁在塞剋路普斯(Cyclops)洞穴中的希臘人可是活得和平安樂,等待他們的卻是任人宰割的命運。
   說人可以把自己給予而不必任何好處,這是荒謬無理的。這樣的行為之非法無效,因為此事衹有瘋子才能做得出來。用此來描述一個人民,就是認為這個人民整個的都瘋了,瘋狂可帶不來權利。
   就算個人可以放棄他自己的自由,他也不能放棄他子女的自由。他們生而為人是自由的;他們的自由衹屬於他們自己,無人有權將之剝奪。在他們成年前的歲月裏,其父可以為了他們的生存以他們的名義來行事,但他不能無條件不可改變的把子女給予他人,如此行為是違反自然超出父權的。因此,任意一個政府如果是合法的,每一代人就必須能夠自由地選擇接受或拒絶它;可如此一來,政府也就不能是任意的了。
   放棄自由,就是放棄了人性,拋棄了做人的權利和義務。放棄一切的人是得不到任何回贖的。如此的放棄違背人性,當人的意志不再自由,他的行為也就失去了一切道德準則。最後,一個約定如果是以一方的絶對權威和另一方面的絶對服從為條件,它衹能流於空洞和自相矛盾。如果彼一方號稱擁有主宰一切的權力,任誰又能夠對他有聽從的義務?其實,僅僅是這種沒有互惠的單一條件,就足以使所有約定失效了。既然我的奴隸的一切都屬於我,他還有什麽權利來反抗我?他的權利都是我的,自己反抗自己的權利當然沒有意義。
   葛羅休斯還有其他一些人把戰爭看成是所謂的蓄奴權的另一個起源。他們認為,既然勝利者有權失敗者,後者衹有用自由來換取其生命,或說這是一個對雙方都有利的更合理的契約。
   但是,明顯的,這種失敗者的權利在任何角度上都不能來自於戰爭狀態。人原是彼此獨立的,相互的關係還不能穩定到出現和平狀態或戰爭狀態,他們不會是相互的敵人。是事物之間的關係,而不是人之間的關係,構成了戰爭;既然戰爭狀態是來自物質關係而非單純的人際關係,私人戰爭,或說,人和人之間的戰爭是不存在的,不論是在還沒有穩定財産的自然王國中,還是一切權力屬於法律的公民社會中。
   個人爭鬥,比如决鬥等等,不構成國傢的行為。至於由法國聖路易習慣法【譯註1】授權的,而由上帝之和平【譯註2】每年定期禁止的所謂私人戰爭,那是封建政府的濫權,雖曾一度存在,也是荒唐的。它違背自然權利和政府行政的準則。
   戰爭是國傢之間的關係而非個人之間的關係,其中的個人偶爾彼此為敵,也衹是作為兵士和國傢衛士而非個人或公民一員【原註1】。歸根到底,國傢的敵人衹能是另一個國傢,而不是個人,因為在不同本質的事物間不能有任何真正的關係。
   這一原則是經過了歷史考驗的,也是所有文明國傢的一致實踐。宣戰的目標與其說是針對君主勿寧說是針對其人民。任何外國人,不論是君王、個人還是人民,如果對統治者不宣戰就搶掠關押其子民,他不是敵人,而是強盜。就是在戰爭中,正直的統治者也衹是把敵國的公有財産收為我有,而對個人的生命財産加以尊重;惟有對其尊重他自己也纔擁有這種權利。戰爭的目的是打敗敵國,因此此間殺傷的條件必須是該保衛者還沒放下武器;一旦他們投降放下了武器,他們也就不是敵人或說是敵國的工具;他們是普普通通的人,而殺人的權利也就不復存在。有時,摧毀一個敵國是可以不傷一草一木一兵一卒的,戰爭並不給予超出其目標的不必要的任何權利。這些原則不同於葛羅休斯;它們不是基於詩人的權威:而是來自自然,基於理性。
   至於徵服者的權利,它和至強者的權利沒有什麽不同。如果戰爭並不賦於他權利去屈服了的民衆,就更無所謂其蓄奴暴役的權利了。一個人衹有在無法把別人變成奴隸的時候纔有殺敵的權利;奴役權因此並不來自殺,勝者既無此特權,自由和生命的交換也就絶非公道。這裏,生死權要建立於奴役權上,而反之奴役權也要建立於生死權上,難道這不是一種的循環嘛?
   退一步,就算我們認同此種可怕的殺人的特權,我還是要說戰爭奴隸,或被徵服的人民,不過是出於強製,對其主人沒有任何服從的義務。勝利者並沒饒恕了他們的生命,奴役也是殺人:與其毫無收穫地殺,不如有利可圖地殺。除了暴力他沒有任何其他權威,戰爭狀態也就一如既往;他們的關係就是這種戰爭狀態的結果,而使用戰爭的權利可不意味着任何和平的條約。當然勝利者和被徵服者間還是有條約的,規定的不是戰爭狀態的結束而是戰爭狀態的維持。
   可見,無論我們從哪個角度看這個問題,奴役權都是無效、非法而且荒唐的。“奴役”和“權利”兩詞互相矛盾不能相容。總之,不論何人,衹有失去理性,纔會對他人或百姓說“我要和你們結成一紙協議,你們衹能付出,我衹能獲利。衹要我願意,我就可以-你們也衹能-保持它。”--------【原註1】比世上任何民族都知道並尊重戰爭權利的羅馬人在這一點上非常顧忌,其公民如果不公開嚮敵人挑戰並指名點姓地挑戰某一個敵人,就不被允許做為志願者。當小Cato第一次參戰所在的兵團在Popilius手下重新組建時,老Cato寫信給Popilius說,如果他還希望自己的兒子仍然服役,他就必須對他重新進行軍事宣誓,因為現在他的第一個誓言作廢他已不能再拿起武器對抗敵人了。老Cato又寫信給兒子叮囑他不發新誓就不能上戰場。我知道Clusium的陷落還有其他一些孤立事件可以用來反駁我,但我說的是法律和習俗。羅馬人比任何其他國傢都較少地違反其法律,其他國傢也沒有如此好的法律。【譯註1】原文是Establishments Of Saint Louis。其他版英文翻譯寫成法國國王路易IX。路易九世(1214-1252),被後人稱為最有騎士精神和和平精神的國王,封建時代的名君。在位期間,正是歐洲的教權與王權爭奪激烈的時期,路易九世篾視當時的教權至上,教皇是神的代言人的做法,公然宣稱,國王除了上帝和國王自己之外誰都不服從。為了使國王制度可以真正獨立於皇權(聖羅馬帝國皇帝)和教權之外,路易九世大力健全官僚統治機構和中央集權制度,使國傢得以在這樣的機構下運作,減少國王的明暗對國傢的直接影響。這是歐洲各封建領主式的國傢嚮近代的國傢過渡的開始。路易九世是相當虔誠的信徒,1297年教會為表彰他的勇氣虔誠和公正,追封路易九世為聖人,設8月25日為聖路易日。(小螞蟻提供)也有一說認為聖路易習慣法是後人假藉聖路易之名而作。【譯註2】Peace Of God應該是西羅馬帝國亡國後,教會提出的。當時地中海世界在民族大移動中相當混亂,而大移動完結後産生的封建領主,也基本上還是蠻族風氣,四下爭戰,虐殺平民是傢常便飯。教會於是提出Peace Of God,是將每年的一段時期列為休戰期,以上帝之名禁止戰事,同時將牧師農民和商人列入不得隨意虐殺的對象。這個做法持續了相當長的時期,雖然戰火一起,很難不殃及池魚,但還是有相當的抑製作用。(小螞蟻提供)
   《社會契約論》第一册第五章
   根本的還是第一約法
   就算我們承認強權的存在,接受我前所拒絶了的所有種種,政府的辯護士還是好不到哪去。治理社會和壓榨奴隸還是兩個概念。如果個體還要臣服於某個個人,他們之間的關係就是奴隸和主人,而不是人民和統治者的關係。由此産生的是一群聚集的人,而不是人的結合體,公益和政體也就子虛烏有了。即便這個強人徵服奴化了半個世界,他也衹是一個單一的個體,他的利益也是與民無涉的私利。他的死亡也就是他的帝國的末日,因為這樣的帝國是沒有凝聚力的個體的烏合之衆而不是有機的結合體,就象火後的橡樹一樣化成了飛灰。
   葛羅休斯說,人民可以為自己找到一個君主。按葛羅休斯的意思,人民在尋找君主之前就已是人民了。這一狀況本身就是文明的行為而包含了整體上的協約。因此,在分析人民尋找君主之行為前,還是要先分析一下個人相約為人民的約法三章。它既然在君主之先,它纔是社會産生的真正基礎。
   假如表决不是全體無異議通過,那為什麽少數人要服從多數人的選擇?為什麽百來號需要主子的人可以代表十幾個不要主子的人來表决?如果在此前還從無任何約法三章,這種接受多數人選擇的表决方法至少應在一個場合曾經通過了全體無異議的表决。
   《社會契約論》第一册第六章
   社會公約
   我認為在人類發展的某一時期,自然國度中個人之生存不再能由單一個體無力而藐小的力量來維持,原來的自然國度也就不能存在下去了,現狀如不改變,人類就要消亡。
   個人的力量是有限的,衹有他們團结起來,纔是他們保存自己的唯一方式:結成一體,用力量的總和來攻艱剋難,群策群力。
   如此集體力量衹能由一群人的合作來實現。但既然每個人的力量和自由是其謀生的主要手段,個人如何能夠善用此一集體力量,而不傷及自己和自己的利益?這一問題可以這樣表達:“設計一種人類的集合體,以用集體力量來保障每一個加盟的個體和他的財産。在這一集體中,個體雖然和整體聯繫在一起,但依然自由如初,衹聽從自己的意志。”這就是社會契約要解决的根本問題。
   社會契約的本質决定了上述各項要件不能有一絲更動,否則社會契約就會失去效用,即便這些條件不曾被正式宣佈,它也必須是每一時每一地普遍地得到接受。否則,每個個人都失去或放棄了他的契約自由,而重新得回他所原有的天然的權利和自由。
   這些要件,正確的理解之下,都歸於一條,就是每個加盟成員都把自己的權利奉獻給整個社會。首先,衹有當個人把自己整個地投入,每一個人的條件才能平等,他人的負擔也就是自己的負擔,而為他人增加負荷,對任何人都不再有利。
   進一步,此等奉獻既然毫無保留,這樣的集體就是最完美的,每一個成員都不會過分地要求:衹要有一個人還保有他的某一權利,他就遲早會在某一事例上開始特立獨行,在個人和社會等事物上不受任何權威的約束。當最後所有人都開始拿回了他的權利凡事都憑自己的判斷,人們就回覆到了自然國度,社會必然地變得如非解體,就成。
   最後,每個個體無保留地投身於社會整體,等於個體毫無奉獻。每個個體對其他加盟個體的權利都是一樣的,因此,他所付出的,為他投身於社會的回饋所彌補,加上更強的保全自身的能力。
   如果,我們撇開社會公約中所有不重要的東西不談,我們會發現它成為如下的公式:“在一般意志的最高權威下我們每個人都把自己和自己的能力奉獻出來,在這一集體中,我們把每個加盟者都接受為不可分割的整體的一部分。”
   協約的結果立刻就産生了加盟的集合體,而代替了參與協約的每個單獨的個體,它包含了參加表决的所有個體成員。此一統一獨立的實體擁有集體的自我、和自己的生命與意志。這種由其他個體加盟而成的法人實體,我們叫它城市(city)【原註1】,現在的稱呼是共和國或政體。在被動的狀態,它稱為“國傢(state)”;在主動的狀態,它稱為“主權者(sovereign)”;在和其他同類實體相比較時,它又稱為“政權(power)”;它的成員從集體的角度稱自己為“人民(people)”;從分享主權者權威的個人的角度,稱自己為“公民(citizen)”;從服從國傢法律的角度,可以稱自己為“臣民(subject)”。這些詞往往被不加區分地混用;衹要知道在使用它們時的確切含義就行了。-------【原註1】這個詞的真正含義在現代已完全失去了;大多數人民認為一個城就是一個city,市民就是公民。他們卻不知道房屋構成了城,而公民形成了city。很早以前,卡色基人同樣的錯誤使他們所失甚重。我還從不曾讀到過哪個王國的臣民有着公民的頭銜,就是遠古的瑪西東人和今天的英國人都不例外,雖然他們相對別人有較多的自由。法國人自己處處使用公民的稱謂,因為,如其字典上的寫法,他們不懂它的含義;否則他們是有竄改文意的罪嫌的;對他們,公民是表達一種美德而不是權利。當包丁(Bodin)討民和市民時,他犯了同樣的大錯,把一個階級說成了另一個階級。阿爾蘭勃特先生避免了這些錯誤,在他有關日內瓦的文章中,他清楚地區分了四個等級(如果算外國人,五個等級)存在在城裏,而衹有其中兩個等級構成了共和國。由我認知所限,沒有其他的法國作傢懂得公民一詞的真正含義。
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