《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 - míng shū jiǎn jiè
　　
　　 zuò zhě：（ fǎ guó） lú suō（ 1712-1788 nián）
　　 lèi xíng： zhèng zhì lǐ lùn zhù zuò
　　 chéng shū shí jiān： 1762 nián
　　《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 - bèi jǐng sōu suǒ
　　
　　 lú suō chū shēng yú ruì shì rì nèi wǎ yī gè zhōng biǎo jiàng jiā tíng， cóng xiǎo shī qù mǔ qīn， kào bié rén fǔ yǎng jiào yù zhǎngdà。 suī rán shēng huó tiáo jiàn jiān kǔ， dàn tā fā fèn tú qiáng， zì xué chéng cái。 16 suì lí jiā wài chū liú làng， dāng guò xué tú、 pú yì、 sī rén mì shū、 yuèpǔ chāo xiě yuán。 zài bā lí， tā zhǎn xiàn liǎo zì jǐ de cái huá， 1750 nián， lú suō yǐ zhēng wén《 lùn kē xué yǔ yì shù》 huò tóu děng jiǎng 'ér chū míng。 dé dào liǎo xǔ duō shàng liú shè huì guì fù rén de 'ài mù。 zhè xiē yōng jīn bǎi wàn de guì fù wèitā gōng yìng shū shì de shēng huó， gěi tā jiè shào suǒ xū yào rèn shí de rén， lú suō hěn kuài jiù jìn rù liǎo wán quán bù tóng de shēng huó juàn zǐ。
　　
　　 cóng 1762 nián qǐ， lú suō yóu yú xiě zhèng lùn wén zhāng， yǔ dāng jú fā shēng liǎo yán zhòng de jiū fēn。 tā de yī xiē tóng shì kāi shǐ shū yuǎn tā， dà yuē jiù zài zhè gè shí qī， tā huàn liǎo míng xiǎn de piān zhí kuáng zhèng。 suī rán yòu xiē rén duì tā biǎo shì yǒu hǎo， dàn tā què cǎi qǔ huái yí hé dí shì de tài dù， tóng tā men měi gè réndōu zhēng chǎo guò。 tā yī shēng de zuì hòu 20 nián jī běn shàng shì zài bēi cǎn tòng kǔ zhōng dù guò de， 1778 nián tā zài fǎ guó mài nóng wéi 'ěr qù shì。
　　
　　 tuī jiàn yuè dú bǎn běn： hé zhào wǔ yì， shāng wù yìn shū guǎn chū bǎn。
　　《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 - nèi róng jīng yào
　　
　　《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 quán shū gòng fēn 4 juàn， dì yī juàn zhù yào lùn shù liǎo rén lèi shì zěn yàng yóu zì rán zhuàng tài guò dù dào zhèng zhì zhuàng tài de， qì yuē de gēn běn tiáo jiàn shì shénme； dì 'èr juàn zhù yào tǎo lùn guó jiā de lì fǎ wèn tí； dì sān juàn lùn shù de shì zhèng zhì fǎ jí zhèng fǔ de xíng chéng； dì sì juàn zài jì xù tǎo lùn zhèng zhì fǎ de tóng shí chǎn shù liǎo gǒng gù guó jiā tǐ zhì de fāng fǎ， cóng gǔ luó mǎ lì shǐ chū fā lùn shù liǎo zhù quán zhě yì zhì shí xiàn de mǒu xiē xì jié。
　　
　　 “ rén shì shēng 'ér zì yóu de， dàn què wú wǎng bù zài jiā suǒ zhī zhōng， zì yǐ wéi shì qí tā yī qiē de zhù rén， fǎn 'ér bǐ qí tā yī qiē gèng shì nú lì。 ”《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 de kāi piān dì yī jù huà jiù tí chū liǎo zhè gè zhèn lóng fā kuì de guān diǎn。 lú suō de zhè yī lùn duàn shì zài jūn zhù zhuān zhì zhì dù héng xíng 'ōu zhōu de shí dài， zhēn duì yīng guó wáng quán zhuān zhì lùn dài biǎo rén wù fèi 'ěr mǎ guān yú“ méi yòu rén shì shēng 'ér zì yóu de” zhè yī jué duì jūn zhù zhuān zhì zhì dù lài yǐ yǐ cún de lǐ lùn 'ér tí chū lái de。 zhè běn shū yǐ fǎn duì fēng jiàn zhuān zhì、 chàng yán mín zhù gòng hé、 zhù zhāng rén mín zhù quán wéi qí zhù tí hé zhōng xīn nèi róng， tí chū liǎo fù yú gé mìng xìng de xiàn zhèng lǐ lùn。
　　
　　 lú suō rèn wéi， zì yóu de rén men zuì chū shēng huó zài zì rán zhuàng tài， rén men de xíng wéi shòu zì rán fǎ zhī pèi。 zì rán fǎ yǐ lǐ xìng wéi jī chǔ， fù yú rén lèi yī xì liè pǔ biàn de、 yǒng héng de zì rán quán lì， jí shēng cún、 zì yóu、 píng děng、 zhuī qiú xìng fú、 huò dé cái chǎn hé rén shēn、 cái chǎn bù shòu qīn fàn de quán lì。 yóu yú zì rán zhuàng tài cún zài zhǒng zhǒng bì duān， zì yóu de rén men yǐ píng děng de zī gé dìng lì qì yuē， cóng zì rán zhuàng tài xià bǎi tuō chū lái， xún zhǎo chū yī zhǒng jié hé de xíng shì， shǐ tā néng yǐ quán bù gòng tóng de lì liàng lái wèi hù hé bǎo zhàng měi gè jié hé zhě de rén shēn hé cái fù， bìng qiě yóu yú zhè yī jié hé 'ér shǐ měi yī gè yǔ quán tǐxiàng lián hé de gè rén yòu zhǐ bù guò shì zài fú cóng zì jǐ běn rén， bìng qiě réng rán xiàng yǐ wǎng yī yàng dì zì yóu。 zhè zhǒng jié hé de xíng shì jiù shì guó jiā。 yóu yú guó jiā shì zì yóu de rén men yǐ píng děng de zī gé dìng lì qì yuē chǎn shēng de， rén men zhǐ shì bǎ zì rán quán lì zhuǎn ràng gěi zhěng gè shè huì 'ér bìng bù shì fèng xiàn gěi rèn hé gè rén， yīn cǐ rén mín zài guó jiā zhōng réng shì zì yóu de， guó jiā de zhù quán zhǐ néng shǔ yú rén mín。
　　
　　 rán hòu， lú suō jìn yī bù chǎn shù liǎo rén mín zhù quán de yuán zé： zhù quán shì bù kě zhuǎn ràng de， yīn wéi guó jiā yóu zhù quán zhě gòu chéng， zhǐ yòu zhù quán zhě cái néng xíng shǐ zhù quán； zhù quán shì bù kě fēn gē de， yīn wéi dài biǎo zhù quán de yì zhì shì yī gè zhěng tǐ； zhù quán shì bù kě dài biǎo de， yīn wéi“ zhù quán zài běn zhì shàng shì yóu gōng yì suǒ gòu chéng de， ér yì zhì yòu shì jué bù kě yǐ dài biǎo de； tā zhǐ néng shì tóng yī gè yì zhì， huò zhě shì lìng yī gè yì zhì， ér jué bù néng yòu shénme zhōng jiān de dōng xī。 yīn cǐ rén mín de yì yuán jiù bù shì、 yě bù kě néng shì rén mín de dài biǎo， tā men zhǐ bù guò shì rén mín de bàn shì yuán bà liǎo； tā men bìng bù néng zuò chū rèn hé kěn dìng de jué dìng”。 tóng shí， zhù quán shì jué duì de、 zhì gāo wú shàng hé bù kě qīn fàn de， yīn wéi zhù quán shì gōng yì de tǐ xiàn， shì guó jiā de líng hún。 jī yú zhè yàng de lǐ lùn， lú suō fǎn duì jūn zhù lì xiàn 'ér jiān jué zhù zhāng mín zhù gòng hé。
　　
　　《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 hái lùn shù liǎo yī xì liè fǎ lǜ jī běn lǐ lùn， zài qí zhōng guàn chuānzhuó yǐ rén mín zhù quán wéi zhōng xīn nèi róng de zī chǎn jiē jí mín zhù zhù yì jīng shén。 lú suō zhǐ chū fǎ lǜ shì rén mín gōng gòng yì zhì de tǐ xiàn， shì rén mín zì jǐ yì zhì de jì lù hé quán tǐ rén mín wéi zì jǐ suǒ zuò de guī dìng。 fǎ lǜ de tè diǎn zài yú yì zhì de pǔ biàn xìng hé duì xiàng de pǔ biàn xìng， qián zhě zhǐ fǎ lǜ shì rén mín gōng yì de tǐ xiàn， hòu zhě zhǐ fǎ lǜ kǎo lǜ de duì xiàng shì quán tǐ de xíng wéi 'ér fēi gè bié rén。
　　
　　 tóng shí， tā chǎn shù liǎo fǎ lǜ yǔ zì yóu de guān xì： shǒu xiān， fǎ lǜ yǔ zì yóu shì yī zhì de， rén mín fú cóng fǎ lǜ jiù shì fú cóng zì jǐ de yì zhì， jiù yì wèi zhe zì yóu。 qí cì， fǎ lǜ shì zì yóu de bǎo zhàng。 yī fāng miàn， rén rén zūn shǒu fǎ lǜ， cái néng gěi rén men yǐ xiǎng shòu zì yóu quán lì de 'ān quán bǎo zhàng； lìng yī fāng miàn， fǎ lǜ kě yǐ qiǎngpò rén men zì yóu。
　　
　　 cǐ wài， lú suō hái xì tǒng dì tí chū liǎo lì fǎ lǐ lùn。 tā rèn wéi yào yǐ fǎ zhì guó jiù yào yòu lǐ xiǎng de fǎ lǜ， zài zhì dìng fǎ lǜ shí bì xū zūn xún xià liè yuán zé： lì fǎ bì xū yǐ móu qǔ rén mín zuì dà xìng fú wéi yuán zé； lì fǎ quán bì xū yóu rén mín zhǎng wò； yóu xián míng zhě jù tǐ chéng dān lì fǎ de zé rèn； lì fǎ yào zhù yì gè zhǒng zì rán de shè huì tiáo jiàn， fǎ lǜ zhǐ bù guò shì bǎo zhàng、 zūn xún hé jiáo zhèng zì rán de guān xì 'ér yǐ； jì yào bǎo chí fǎ lǜ de wěn dìng xìng， yòu yào shì shí xiū gǎi、 fèi chú bù hǎo de fǎ lǜ。
　　
　　“ rén shì shēng 'ér zì yóu píng děng de， zhè shì tiān fù de quán lì”，《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 zhōng de zhè yī lǐ lùn， kāi chuàng liǎo 'ōu zhōu jí quán shì jiè mín zhù píng děng sī xiǎng zhī xiān hé， tā de“ rén quán tiān fù“， zhù quán zài mín” de xīn xué shuō xiàng“ jūn quán shén shòu” de chuán tǒng guān niàn fā qǐ liǎo tiǎo zhàn。 tā suǒ jiē shì de“ rén quán zì yóu、 quán lì píng děng” de yuán zé， zhì jīn réng zuò wéi xī fāng zhèng zhì de jī chǔ。
　　《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 - zhuān jiā diǎn píng
　　
　　 lú suō shì 18 shì jì fǎ guó qǐ méng yùn dòng jié chū de zhèng zhì sī xiǎng jiā、 wén xué jiā。 tā de cái sī wén zǎo fēngmǐ liǎo dāng shí de zhěng gè 'ōu zhōu， bìng wéi hòu rén liú xià liǎo yī xì liè huàshídài de jù zhù。 hěn shǎo yòu jǐ gè zhé xué jiā néng dài lái lú suō zhù zuò nà yàng de zhèn hàn。 tā de《 yì shù yǔ kē xué tán》 huò fǎ guó dì róng jiǎng， shǐ tā róng huò 'ōu zhōu zhé xué dà shī chēng hào。 tā de wén xué míng zhù《 xīn 'ài luò yī sī》 zài shì jiè wén xué shǐ shàng yòu zhe hěn gāo dì wèi， shǐ tā jī shēn yú qǐ méng shí qī zhù míng wén xué jiā de hángliè。《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 yòu yì zuò《 mín yuē lùn》 shì tā zuì wéi jié chū de dài biǎo zuò zhī yī， bèi yù wéi“ rén lèi jiě fàng de dì yī gè hū shēng， shì jiè dà gé mìng de dì yī gè shān dòng zhě”。 lú suō shì 'ōu zhōu qǐ méng yùn dòng zhōng zhòng yào de sī xiǎng jiā， yǔ fú 'ěr tài qí míng。 tā de zhù yào zuò pǐn yòu《 chàn huǐ lù》、《 ài mí 'ér》、《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》、《 xīn 'ài luò yī sī》。 tā de zhù yào sī xiǎng： tiān fù rén quán xué shuō， tí chū“ rén mín zhù quán” de kǒu hào。 qí sī xiǎng shì fǎ guó dà gé mìng zhōng yǎ gè bīn pài de qí zhì， duì 'ōu měi gè guó de zī chǎn jiē jí gé mìng chǎn shēng liǎo shēn kè yǐng xiǎng。
　　
　　 tā de《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 zhōng de“ zhù quán zài mín” yī shuō， jiù huàfēn liǎo yī gè shí dài。
　　
　　《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 lú suō jiāng yě huā sòng gěi wèi nǎi de mǔ qīn
　　《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 dì yī cì tí chū liǎo“ tiān fù rén quán hé zhù quán zài mín de sī xiǎng”。 tā gāng yī wèn shì jiù zāo dào liǎo jìn zhǐ。 lú suō běn rén yě bèi pò liú wáng dào yīng guó。 dàn《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 suǒ tí chàng de mín zhù lǐ lùn què hěn kuài fēngmǐ quán shì jiè。 tā yǐn fā liǎo zhèn jīng shì jiè de fǎ guó dà gé mìng。 fǎ guó guó jiā gé yán“ zì yóu、 píng děng、 bó 'ài” biàn lái zì《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》。 1789 nián fǎ guó guó mín dài biǎo dà huì tōng guò de《 rén quán xuān yán》 zhōng“ shè huì de mùdì shì wéi dà zhòng móu fú lì de”、“ tǒng zhì quán shǔ yú rén mín” děng nèi róng chōng fēn tǐ xiàn liǎo《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 de jīng shén。《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 hái duì měi guó de《 dú lì xuān yán》 chǎn shēng liǎo zhòng yào yǐng xiǎng， cóng luó bó sī bì 'ěr dào liè níng dū céng yòng《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 wéi zì jǐ de zhèng quán zuò jiě shì。 1978 nián， zài jì niàn lú suō shì shì 200 zhōu nián de huó dòng zhōng， zhuān mén zhào kāi liǎo guó jì yán tǎo huì， yán jiū lú suō de sī xiǎng， chū bǎn tā de xīn chuán， tuī chū yǐ tā wéi tí cái de diàn shì jù。 tā de yí hái bèi 'ān fàng zài fǎ guó de wěi rén cí nèi。 lú suō zài《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 zhōng yù jiàn de“ xiāo fèi zhě de gè zhǒng xiàn jǐng， dà chéng shì de sāo luàn yǐ jí huǐ miè xìng de jūn fèi fù dān” děng děng， dōuyǐ chéng wéi dāng dài shè huì de xiàn shí wèn tí。 mù qián， dān zài fǎ guó jiù yòu 150 duō wèi xué zhě zài zhuān mén yán jiū lú suō de sī xiǎng。
　　
　　 yòu shuō lú suō de zhèng zhì lǐ lùn shēn shòu bólātú de《 lǐ xiǎng guó》 de yǐng xiǎng。《 lǐ xiǎng guó》 de gài niàn， jiàn lì yú rén xìng shàn de lǐ niàn jī chǔ shàng， bólātú bǐ xià de sū gé lā dǐ shuō，“ zhǐ yòu zhèng zhí de rén cái huì xìng fú”，“ shàn de yì zhì” chéng wéi tā de lǐ xiǎng guó de jī chǔ。 lú suō yě xiāng xìn rén xìng shàn， tā tí chàng kuān róng lǐ xìng， jiān dìng dì fǎn duì rèn hé zhèng zhì bào lì。 tóng shì lùn shù lǐ xiǎng guó de yuán zé， bù tóng yú bólātú， lú suō jiāng qí lǐ lùn kuàng jià wán quán jiàn lì zài“ rén shēng 'ér zì yóu” de jī chǔ zhī shàng， yě jiù shì shuō“ zì yóu yì zhì”。 zhè gè jī chǔ jiù shí zài duō liǎo。 hěn zǎo yǐ qián， rén men yòu yī gè gèng hǎo de dàn wén yán de shuō fǎ：“ tiān fù rén quán。” yóu tiān fù rén quán zuò wéi dì yī yuán lǐ， tā suǒ gòu zào de bù zài zhǐ shì lǐ xiǎng， ér shì xiàn dài gōng mín shè huì de jī běn yuán zé。 gōng mín shè huì zhōng， gōng mín shī qù liǎo zì yóu rén wú suǒ bùwèi de zì yóu， ér dé dào gōng mín de zhèng zhì quán lì、 zhèng zhì zì yóu。 tā de《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》（ yòu yì《 mín yuē lùn》） suǒ yào jiě jué de shì rén quán hé fǎ lǜ de yòu jī jié hé。 cóng cǐ， hé fǎ xìng zhǐ néng lái zì rén mín， chéng liǎo lú suō de jì chéng zhě hé bèi pàn zhě de gòng tóng de lǐ niàn。 qián zhě chǎn shēng liǎo měi guó gé mìng hé mín zhù de jiàn lì， hòu zhě yǐ rén mín zhī míng zhuān quán tú shā。 lú suō， zuò wéi“ zhù quán zài mín” de gòu huà zhě， jiù shì zài 200 nián hòu hái chǔyú zhēng lùn de zhōng xīn： tā de lǐ lùn dào dǐ shì zài tí chàng mín zhù zì yóu， hái shì zài tí chàng jí quán bào zhèng？
　　
　　《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 zhé xué jiā lú suō dà bù tóu zhù zuò
　　 rén quán shì shǔ yú gè tǐ de， fǎ lǜ shì shǔ yú guó jiā de。 gè tǐ yuē dìng 'ér chéng guó jiā de hé lǐ xìng， shì fǎ lǜ yòu xiào xìng hé zhèng quán hé fǎ xìng de zhōng jí pàn duàn。 zì yóu， bù shì lái zì fǎ lǜ duì gè rén de bǎo hù， ér shì lái zì gè tǐ duì lì fǎ de chè dǐ cānyù。 zhè shì qièshí bǎo zhàng gè tǐ zì yóu de xiān jué tiáo jiàn。 zài zhè yī guò chéng lǐ， gè tǐ lì yì de“ jiāo jí” ér fēi“ bìng jí”（ bù wán quán shì shù xué shàng de nà zhǒng） xíng chéng gōng mín yì zhì héng héng zhù quán zhě de yì zhì héng héng yī bān yì zhì， ér zhè zhǒng zhù quán zhě yīn wéi gè tǐ de bù duàn cānyù， qí nèi róng shì cháng xīn de， qí lì yì yǔ gè tǐ lì yì gòng róng de。 cóng zhè yī diǎn chū fā， duō shù rén shuō liǎo suàn de yuē fǎ sān zhāng bì rán chéng wéi zhù quán zài mín de dào dé de tǐ xiàn fāng shì。
　　
　　 lú suō bǎ zhèng quán míng bái dì fēn chéng liǎo lì fǎ hé xíng zhèng liǎng gè bù fēn， qián zhě shǔ yú shè huì qì yuē de fàn chóu， ér hòu zhě bù shì qì yuē de nèi róng（ yīn cǐ shì kě biàn kě tuī fān de）。 zhè gè lǐ niàn duì hòu lái mín zhù zhèng zhì de fā zhǎn yòu zhe bù kě mó miè de gòng xiàn。 zài lú suō zhī qián， mèng dé sī jiū de《 lùn fǎ de jīng shén》 duì fǎ lǜ de lǐ jiě gèng jiā shēn kè， wéi quē lú suō de“ zhù quán zài mín” de dòng lì。《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 zì shǐ zhì zhōng zhǐ yáng qì liǎo yī zhǒng tǐ zhì： zhuān zhì zhèng fǔ。 àn lú suō de huà， zhè jiù shì nà zhǒng miè shì fǎ lǜ bǎ gè tǐ de quán lì gāo yú zhù quán zhě zhī shàng de tǐ zhì。 qí tā de tǐ zhì， lú suō jǐn jǐn lùn shù liǎo tā men hé fǎ de zì rán yǐ jù。 cóng zhí jiē mín zhù zhì、 guì zú dài yì zhì dào jūn zhù lì xiàn zhì， tǒng zhì de gēn jù bì xū shì rén mín zhù quán héng héng héng qí zhēn zhèng biǎo dá jiù shì fǎ lǜ。 lú suō bìng jìn 'ér bǎ rèn hé zhēn zhèng yǐ fǎ 'ér zhì de zhèng tǐ tǒng chēng wéi gòng hé zhèng tǐ。 zài lú suō kàn lái， tā nà gè shí dài de zhèng zhì shè huì xíng tài shì fǔ xiǔ de， tā yào dào gǔ xī là shí dài cái néng zhǎo dào hé lǐ de huí guī。
　　
　　《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 shì shì jiè zhèng zhì fǎ lǜ xué shuō shǐ shàng zuì zhòng yào de jīng diǎn zhī yī， shì zhèn hàn shì jiè de 1789 nián fǎ guó dà gé mìng de hào jiǎo hé fú yīn shū。 tā chǎn shù de xǔ duō yuán zé yuán lǐ bù jǐn zài gé mìng zhī chū bèi zài rù fǎ guó《 rén quán xuān yán》 děng zhòng yào wén xiàn zhōng， zài gé mìng hòu de cháng shí qī lǐ chéng wéi zī chǎn jiē jí de zhèng zhì fǎ lǜ zhì dù de jī shí。 lú suō de sī xiǎng duì hòu shì sī xiǎng jiā men lǐ lùn de xíng chéng yòu zhòng dà yǐng xiǎng。
　　
　　 lú suō de zhèng zhì zhù zuò zhōng yòu xǔ duō sī xiǎng dú tè xīn yíng， yǐn rén rù shèng。 dàn shì zǒng tǐ shuō lái jiù shì yī zhǒng zhuī qiú píng děng de qiáng liè yù wàng hé yī zhǒng tóng yàng qiáng liè de gǎn shòu： xiàn cún shè huì zhì dù de bù hé lǐ yǐ jīng dá dào liǎo lìng rén bù néng róng rěn de chéng dù， rén shēng xià lái běn lái shì zì yóu de， dàn shì wú lùn zǒu dào nǎ lǐ dōuyào dài shàng jiā suǒ。 lú suō zì jǐ kě néng bìng bù xǐ huān bào lì xíng wéi， dàn shì tā wú yí jī lì liǎo qí tā rén shí xíng bào lì gé mìng， zhú bù gǎi gé shè huì zhì dù。
　　
　　 yòu rén pī píng lú suō shì yī gè jí qí shén jīng zhì de rén， shì yī gè dà nán zǐ zhù yì zhě， shì yī gè sī xiǎng bùqiè shí jì de、 hú tú de sī xiǎng jiā， zhè yàng de pī píng dà tǐ shàng shì zhèng què de。 dàn shì yuǎn bǐ tā de quē diǎn gèng zhòng yào de shì tā de dòng chá lì hé jié chū de chuàng zào jīng shén suǒ shǎn xiàn chū lái de sī xiǎng huǒ huā， liǎng gè duō shì jì yǐ lái， bù duàn dì yǐng xiǎng zhe xiàn dài sī xiǎng。
　　《 shè huì qì yuē lùn》 - miào yǔ jiā jù
　　
　　 wǒ kàn dào liǎo lìng yī gè shì jiè， wǒ de quán bù jī qíng dōubèi duì zhēn lǐ、 duì zì yóu、 duì dào dé de rè 'ài zhì xī diào liǎo。
　　 shuí dì yī gè bǎ yī kuài tǔ dì juàn qǐ lái bìng xiǎng dào zhè shì zì jǐ de， ér qiě bèi tóu nǎo jiǎn dān de rén suǒ xiāng xìn de huà， nà tā jiù shì wén míng de diàn jī zhě。

　　Social contract describes a broad class of theories that try to explain the ways in which people form states to maintain social order. The notion of the social contract implies that the people give up sovereignty to a government or other authority in order to receive or maintain social order through the rule of law. It can also be thought of as an agreement by the governed on a set of rules by which they are governed.
　　
　　Social contract theory formed a central pillar in the historically important notion that legitimate state authority must be derived from the consent of the governed. The starting point for most of these theories is a heuristic examination of the human condition absent from any structured social order, usually termed the “state of nature”. In this condition, an individual’s actions are bound only by his or her personal power, constrained by conscience. From this common starting point, the various proponents of social contract theory attempt to explain, in different ways, why it is in an individual’s rational self-interest to voluntarily give up the freedom one has in the state of nature in order to obtain the benefits of political order.
　　
　　Thomas Hobbes (1651), John Locke (1689) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) are the most famous philosophers of contractarianism. However, they drew quite different conclusions from this starting-point. Hobbes advocated an authoritarian monarchy, Locke advocated a liberal monarchy, while Rousseau advocated liberal republicanism. Their work provided theoretical groundwork of constitutional monarchy, liberal democracy and republicanism. The Social Contract was used in the Declaration of Independence as a sign of enforcing Democracy, and more recently has been revived by thinkers such as John Rawls.
　　
　　Overview
　　
　　According to Thomas Hobbes, human life would be "nasty, brutish, and short" without political authority. In its absence, we would live in a state of nature, where we each have unlimited natural freedoms, including the "right to all things" and thus the freedom to harm all who threaten our own self-preservation; there would be an endless "war of all against all" (Bellum omnium contra omnes). To avoid this, free men establish political community i.e. civil society through a social contract in which each gain civil rights in return for subjecting himself to civil law or to political authority.
　　
　　Alternatively, some have argued that we gain civil rights in return for accepting the obligation to respect and defend the rights of others, giving up some freedoms to do so; this alternative formulation of the duty arising from the social contract is often identified with arguments about military service.
　　Violations of the contract
　　
　　The social contract and the civil rights it gives us are neither "natural rights" nor permanently fixed. Rather, the contract itself is the means towards an end — the benefit of all — and (according to some philosophers such as Locke or Rousseau), is only legitimate to the extent that it meets the general interest ("general will" in Rousseau). Therefore, when failings are found in the contract, we renegotiate to change the terms, using methods such as elections and legislature. Locke theorized the right of rebellion in case of the contract leading to tyranny.
　　
　　Since civil rights come from agreeing to the contract, those who choose to violate their contractual obligations, such as by committing crimes, abdicate their rights, and the rest of society can be expected to protect itself against the actions of such outlaws. To be a member of society is to accept responsibility for following its rules, along with the threat of punishment for violating them. In this way, society works by "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" (Hardin 1968).
　　History
　　Classical thought
　　
　　Many have argued that Plato's dialog Crito expresses a Greek version of social contract theory. In this dialog, Socrates refuses to escape from jail to avoid being put to death. He argues that since he has willingly remained in Athens all of his life despite opportunities to go elsewhere, he has accepted the social contract i.e. the burden of the local laws, and he cannot violate these laws even when they are against his self-interest.
　　
　　Epicurus seems to have had a strong sense of social contract, with justice and law being rooted in mutual agreement and advantage, as evidenced by these lines, among others, from his Principal Doctrines:
　　
　　 31. Natural justice is a pledge of reciprocal benefit, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another. 32. Those animals which are incapable of making binding agreements with one another not to inflict nor suffer harm are without either justice or injustice; and likewise for those peoples who either could not or would not form binding agreements not to inflict nor suffer harm. 33. There never was such a thing as absolute justice, but only agreements made in mutual dealings among men in whatever places at various times providing against the infliction or suffering of harm. 34. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which is associated with the apprehension of being discovered by those appointed to punish such actions.
　　
　　Also see Epicurean ethics
　　Renaissance developments
　　
　　Quentin Skinner has argued that several critical modern innovations in contract theory are found in the writings from French Calvinists and Huguenots, whose work in turn was invoked by writers in the Low Countries who objected to their subjection to Spain and, later still, by Catholics in England. Among these, Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), from the School of Salamanca, might be considered as an early theorist of the social contract, theorizing natural law in an attempt to limit the divine right of absolute monarchy. All of these groups were led to articulate notions of popular sovereignty by means of a social covenant or contract: all of these arguments began with proto-“state of nature” arguments, to the effect that the basis of politics is that everyone is by nature free of subjection to any government.
　　
　　However, these arguments relied on a corporatist theory found in Roman Law, according to which "a populus" can exist as a distinct legal entity. Therefore these arguments held that a community of people can join a government because they have the capacity to exercise a single will and make decisions with a single voice in the absence of sovereign authority — a notion rejected by Hobbes and later contract theorists.
　　Philosophers
　　Hugo Grotius
　　
　　In the early 17th century, Grotius (1583–1645) introduced the modern idea of natural rights of individuals. Grotius says that we each have natural rights which we have in order to preserve ourselves. He uses this idea to try to establish a basis for moral consensus in the face of religious diversity and the rise of natural science and to find a minimal basis for a moral beginning for society, a kind of natural law that everyone could potentially accept. He goes so far as to say even if we were to concede what we cannot concede without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, these laws would still hold. The idea was considered incendiary, since it suggests that power can ultimately go back to the individuals if the political society that they have set up forfeits the purpose for which it was originally established, which is to preserve themselves. In other words, the people i.e. the individual people, are sovereign. Grotius says that the people are sui juris - under their own jurisdiction. People have rights as human beings but there is a delineation of those rights because of what is possible for everyone to accept morally - everyone has to accept that each person is entitled to try to preserve themselves and therefore they shouldn't try to do harm to others or to interfere with them and they should punish any breach of someone else's rights that arises.
　　Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan (1651)
　　
　　The first modern philosopher to articulate a detailed contract theory was Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). According to Hobbes, the lives of individuals in the state of nature were "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short", a state where self-interest and the absence of rights and contracts prevented the 'social', or society. Life was 'anarchic' (without leadership/ the concept of sovereignty). Individuals in the state of nature were apolitical and asocial. This state of nature is followed by the social contract.
　　
　　The social contract was an 'occurrence' during which individuals came together and ceded some of their individual rights so that others would cede theirs (e.g. person A gives up his/her right to kill person B if person B does the same). This resulted in the establishment of society, and by extension, the state, a sovereign entity (like the individuals, now under its rule, used to be) which was to protect these new rights which were now to regulate societal interactions. Society was thus no longer anarchic.
　　
　　But the state system, which grew out of the social contract, was anarchic (without leadership). Just as the individuals in the state of nature had been sovereigns and thus guided by self-interest and the absence of rights, so states now acted in their self-interest in competition with each other. Just like the state of nature, states were thus bound to be in conflict because there was no sovereign over and above the state (i.e. more powerful) capable of imposing social-contract laws. Indeed, Hobbes' work helped to serve as a basis for the realism theories of international relations, advanced by E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau.
　　John Locke's Second Treatise of Government (1689)
　　
　　John Locke's conception of the social contract differed from Hobbes' in several ways, but retained the central notion that persons in a state of nature would willingly come together to form a state. Locke believed that individuals in a state of nature would have stronger moral limits on their action than accepted by Hobbes, but recognized that people would still live in fear of one another. Locke argued that individuals would agree to form a state that would provide a "neutral judge", and that could therefore protect the lives, liberty, and property of those who lived within it. While Hobbes argued for near-absolute authority, Locke argued that laws could only be legitimate if they sought to achieve the common good. Locke also believed that people will do the right thing as a group, and that all people have natural rights.
　　Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Du contrat social (1762)
　　
　　Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), in his influential 1762 treatise The Social Contract, outlined a different version of social contract theory, based on popular sovereignty. Although Rousseau wrote that the British were perhaps at the time the freest people on earth, he did not approve of their representative government. Rousseau believed that liberty was possible only where there was direct rule by the people as a whole in lawmaking, where popular sovereignty was indivisible and inalienable. Citizens must, in at least some circumstances, be able to choose together the fundamental rules by which they would live, and be able to revise those rules on later occasions if they choose to do so - something the British people as a whole were unable to do.
　　
　　Rousseau's political theory has some points in common with Locke's individualism, but departs from it in his development of the "luminous conception" (which he credited to Diderot) of the general will. Rousseau argues a citizen can be an egoist and decide that his personal interest should override the collective interest. However, as part of a collective body, the individual citizen puts aside his egoism to create a "general will", which is popular sovereignty itself. Popular sovereignty (i.e., the rule of law), thus decides what is good for society as a whole, and the individual (including the administrative head of state, who could be a monarch) must bow to it, or be forced to bow to it:
　　
　　 [The social contract] can be reduced to the following terms: Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.
　　
　　Rousseau's striking phrase that man must "be forced to be free" should be understood this way: since the indivisible and inalienable popular sovereignty decides what is good for the whole, then if an individual lapses back into his ordinary egoism and breaks the law, he will be forced to listen to what they decided as a member of the collectivity (i.e. as citizens). Thus, the law, inasmuch as it is voted by the people's representatives, is not a limitation of individual freedom, but its expression; and enforcement of law, including criminal law, is not a restriction on individual liberty, as the individual, as a citizen, explicitly agreed to be constrained if, as a private individual, he did not respect his own will as formulated in the general will. Because laws represent the restraints of civil freedom, they represent the leap made from humans in the state of nature into civil society. In this sense, the law is a civilizing force, and therefore Rousseau believed that the laws that govern a people helped to mold their character.
　　Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's individualist social contract (1851)
　　
　　While Rousseau's social contract is based on popular sovereignty and not on individual sovereignty, there are other theories espoused by individualists, libertarians and anarchists, which do not involve agreeing to anything more than negative rights and creates only a limited state, if any.
　　
　　Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865) advocated a conception of social contract which didn't involve an individual surrendering sovereignty to others. According to him, the social contract was not between individuals and the state, but rather between individuals themselves refraining from coercing or governing each other, each one maintaining complete sovereignty upon oneself:
　　
　　 What really is the Social Contract? An agreement of the citizen with the government? No, that would mean but the continuation of [Rousseau’s] idea. The social contract is an agreement of man with man; an agreement from which must result what we call society. In this, the notion of commutative justice, first brought forward by the primitive fact of exchange, …is substituted for that of distributive justice … Translating these words, contract, commutative justice, which are the language of the law, into the language of business, and you have commerce, that is to say, in its highest significance, the act by which man and man declare themselves essentially producers, and abdicate all pretension to govern each other.
　　 —Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century (1851)
　　
　　John Rawls' Theory of Justice (1971)
　　
　　John Rawls (1921–2002) proposed a contractarian approach that has a decidedly Kantian flavour, in A Theory of Justice (1971), whereby rational people in a hypothetical "original position", setting aside their individual preferences and capacities under a "veil of ignorance", would agree to certain general principles of justice. This idea is also used as a game-theoretical formalization of the notion of fairness.
　　Philip Pettit's Republicanism (1997)
　　
　　Philip Pettit (b. 1945) has argued, in Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1997), that the theory of social contract, classically based on the consent of the governed (as it is assumed that the contract is valid as long as the people consent to being governed by its representatives, who exercise sovereignty), should be modified, in order to avoid dispute. Instead of arguing that an explicit consent, which can always be manufactured, should justify the validity of social contract, Philip Pettit argues that the absence of an effective rebellion against the contract is the only legitimacy of it.
　　Criticism
　　David Hume
　　
　　An early critic of social contract theory was Rousseau's friend, the philosopher David Hume, who in 1742 published an essay "On Civil Liberty", in whose second part, entitled, "Of the Original Contract ", he stressed that the concept of a "social contract" was a convenient fiction:
　　
　　 AS no party, in the present age can well support itself without a philosophical or speculative system of principles annexed to its political or practical one; we accordingly find that each of the factions into which this nation is divided has reared up a fabric of the former kind, in order to protect and cover that scheme of actions which it pursues. . . . The one party [defenders of the absolute and divine right of kings, or Tories], by tracing up government to the DEITY, endeavor to render it so sacred and inviolate that it must be little less than sacrilege, however tyrannical it may become, to touch or invade it in the smallest article. The other party [the Whigs, or believers in constitutional monarchy], by founding government altogether on the consent of the PEOPLE suppose that there is a kind of original contract by which the subjects have tacitly reserved the power of resisting their sovereign, whenever they find themselves aggrieved by that authority with which they have for certain purposes voluntarily entrusted him. --David Hume, "On Civil Liberty" [II.XII.1]
　　
　　However, Hume did agree that, no matter how a government is founded, the consent of the governed is the only legitimate foundation on which a government can rest.
　　
　　 My intention here is not to exclude the consent of the people from being one just foundation of government where it has place. It is surely the best and most sacred of any. I only pretend that it has very seldom had place in any degree and never almost in its full extent. And that therefore some other foundation of government must also be admitted. --Ibid II.XII.20
　　
　　Logic of contracting
　　
　　According to the will theory of contract, which was dominant in the 19th century and still exerts a strong influence, a contract is not presumed valid unless all parties agree to it voluntarily, either tacitly or explicitly, without coercion. Lysander Spooner, a 19th century lawyer and staunch supporter of a right of contract between individuals, in his essay No Treason, argues that a supposed social contract cannot be used to justify governmental actions such as taxation, because government will initiate force against anyone who does not wish to enter into such a contract. As a result, he maintains that such an agreement is not voluntary and therefore cannot be considered a legitimate contract at all.
　　
　　Modern Anglo-American law, like European civil law, is based on a will theory of contract, according to which all terms of a contract are binding on the parties because they chose those terms for themselves. This was less true when Hobbes wrote Leviathan; then, more importance was attached to consideration, meaning a mutual exchange of benefits necessary to the formation of a valid contract, and most contracts had implicit terms that arose from the nature of the contractual relationship rather than from the choices made by the parties. Accordingly, it has been argued that social contract theory is more consistent with the contract law of the time of Hobbes and Locke than with the contract law of our time, and that features in the social contract which seem anomalous to us, such as the belief that we are bound by a contract formulated by our distant ancestors, would not have seemed as strange to Hobbes' contemporaries as they do to us.
　　Multiple contracts
　　
　　Legal scholar Randy Barnett has argued, that, while presence in the territory of a society may be necessary for consent, it is not consent to any rules the society might make regardless of their content. A second condition of consent is that the rules be consistent with underlying principles of justice and the protection of natural and social rights, and have procedures for effective protection of those rights (or liberties). This has also been discussed by O.A. Brownson, who argued that there are, in a sense, three "constitutions" involved: The first the constitution of nature that includes all of what the Founders called "natural law". The second would be the constitution of society, an unwritten and commonly understood set of rules for the society formed by a social contract before it establishes a government, by which it does establish the third, a constitution of government. To consent, a necessary condition is that the rules be constitutional in that sense.
　　Tacit consent
　　
　　The theory of an implicit social contract holds that by remaining in the territory controlled by some government, people give consent to be governed. This consent is what gives legitimacy to the government. Philosopher Roderick Long argues that this is a case of question begging, because the argument has to presuppose its conclusion:
　　
　　 I think that the person who makes this argument is already assuming that the government has some legitimate jurisdiction over this territory. And then they say, well, now, anyone who is in the territory is therefore agreeing to the prevailing rules. But they’re assuming the very thing they're trying to prove – namely that this jurisdiction over the territory is legitimate. If it's not, then the government is just one more group of people living in this broad general geographical territory. But I've got my property, and exactly what their arrangements are I don't know, but here I am in my property and they don't own it – at least they haven't given me any argument that they do – and so, the fact that I am living in "this country" means I am living in a certain geographical region that they have certain pretensions over – but the question is whether those pretensions are legitimate. You can’t assume it as a means to proving it.
　　
　　Criticisms of natural rights
　　
　　Contractualism is based on the notion that rights are agreed upon in order to further our interests: each individual subject is accorded individual rights, which may or may not be inalienable, and form the basis of civil rights, as in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. It must be underlined, however, as Hannah Arendt did on her book on imperialism, that the 1789 Declarations, in this agreeing with the social contract theory, bases the natural rights of the human-being on the civil rights of the citizen, instead of the reverse as the contractualist theory does. This criticism derives from a long tradition going back to St. Augustine of Hippo, who in The City of God (book) envisioned a unified Christian society presided over by a king who was responsible for the welfare of his subjects. Political Augustinianism with its insistence on divine sovereignty and on the two separate spheres of a heavenly and an earthly community, has indeed been regarded as incompatible with social contract theories. This raises the question of whether social contractarianism, as a central plank of liberal thought, is reconcilable with the Christian religion, and particularly with Catholicism and Catholic social teaching. The individualist and liberal approach has also been criticized since the 19th century by thinkers such as Marx, Nietzsche & Freud, and afterward by structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers, such as Lacan, Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze or Derrida