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社会契约论 Social contract
  《社会契约论》-名书简介
  
  作者:(法国)卢梭(1712-1788年)
  类型: 政治理论著作
  成书时间:1762年
  《社会契约论》-背景搜索
  
  卢梭出生于瑞士日内瓦一个钟表匠家庭,从小失去母亲,靠别人抚养教育长大。虽然生活条件艰苦,但他发奋图强,自学成才。16岁离家外出流浪,当过学徒、仆役、私人秘书、乐谱抄写员。在巴黎,他展现了自己的才华,1750年,卢梭以征文《论科学与艺术》获头等奖而出名。得到了许多上流社会贵妇人的爱慕。这些拥金百万的贵妇为他供应舒适的生活,给他介绍所需要认识的人,卢梭很快就进入了完全不同的生活圈子。
  
  从 1762年起,卢梭由于写政论文章,与当局发生了严重的纠纷。他的一些同事开始疏远他,大约就在这个时期,他患了明显的偏执狂症。虽然有些人对他表示友好,但他却采取怀疑和敌视的态度,同他们每个人都争吵过。他一生的最后20年基本上是在悲惨痛苦中度过的,1778年他在法国迈农维尔去世。
  
  推荐阅读版本:何兆武译,商务印书馆出版。
  《社会契约论》-内容精要
  
  《社会契约论》全书共分4卷,第一卷主要论述了人类是怎样由自然状态过渡到政治状态的,契约的根本条件是什么;第二卷主要讨论国家的立法问题;第三卷论述的是政治法即政府的形成;第四卷在继续讨论政治法的同时阐述了巩固国家体制的方法,从古罗马历史出发论述了主权者意志实现的某些细节。
  
  “人是生而自由的,但却无往不在枷锁之中,自以为是其他一切的主人,反而比其他一切更是奴隶。”《社会契约论》的开篇第一句话就提出了这个振聋发聩的观点。卢梭的这一论断是在君主专制制度横行欧洲的时代,针对英国王权专制论代表人物费尔玛关于“没有人是生而自由的”这一绝对君主专制制度赖以依存的理论而提出来的。这本书以反对封建专制、倡言民主共和、主张人民主权为其主题和中心内容,提出了富于革命性的宪政理论。
  
  卢梭认为,自由的人们最初生活在自然状态,人们的行为受自然法支配。自然法以理性为基础,赋予人类一系列普遍的、永恒的自然权利,即生存、自由、平等、追求幸福、获得财产和人身、财产不受侵犯的权利。由于自然状态存在种种弊端,自由的人们以平等的资格订立契约,从自然状态下摆脱出来,寻找出一种结合的形式,使它能以全部共同的力量来卫护和保障每个结合者的人身和财富,并且由于这一结合而使每一个与全体相联合的个人又只不过是在服从自己本人,并且仍然像以往一样地自由。这种结合的形式就是国家。由于国家是自由的人们以平等的资格订立契约产生的,人们只是把自然权利转让给整个社会而并不是奉献给任何个人,因此人民在国家中仍是自由的,国家的主权只能属于人民。
  
  然后,卢梭进一步阐述了人民主权的原则:主权是不可转让的,因为国家由主权者构成,只有主权者才能行使主权;主权是不可分割的,因为代表主权的意志是一个整体;主权是不可代表的,因为 “主权在本质上是由公意所构成的,而意志又是绝不可以代表的;它只能是同一个意志,或者是另一个意志,而绝不能有什么中间的东西。因此人民的议员就不是、也不可能是人民的代表,他们只不过是人民的办事员罢了;他们并不能做出任何肯定的决定”。同时,主权是绝对的、至高无上和不可侵犯的,因为主权是公意的体现,是国家的灵魂。基于这样的理论,卢梭反对君主立宪而坚决主张民主共和。
  
  《社会契约论》还论述了一系列法律基本理论,在其中贯穿着以人民主权为中心内容的资产阶级民主主义精神。卢梭指出法律是人民公共意志的体现,是人民自己意志的记录和全体人民为自己所做的规定。法律的特点在于意志的普遍性和对像的普遍性,前者指法律是人民公意的体现,后者指法律考虑的对像是全体的行为而非个别人。
  
  同时,他阐述了法律与自由的关系:首先,法律与自由是一致的,人民服从法律就是服从自己的意志,就意味着自由。其次,法律是自由的保障。一方面,人人遵守法律,才能给人们以享受自由权利的安全保障;另一方面,法律可以强迫人们自由。
  
  此外,卢梭还系统地提出了立法理论。他认为要依法治国就要有理想的法律,在制定法律时必须遵循下列原则:立法必须以谋取人民最大幸福为原则;立法权必须由人民掌握;由贤明者具体承担立法的责任;立法要注意各种自然的社会条件,法律只不过是保障、遵循和矫正自然的关系而已;既要保持法律的稳定性,又要适时修改、废除不好的法律。
  
  “人是生而自由平等的,这是天赋的权利”,《社会契约论》中的这一 理论,开创了欧洲及全世界民主平等思想之先河,它的“人权天赋“,主权在民”的新学说向“君权神授”的传统观念发起了挑战。它所揭示的“人权自由、权利平等”的原则,至今仍作为西方政治的基础。
  《社会契约论》-专家点评
  
  卢梭是18世纪法国启蒙运动杰出的政治思想家、文学家。他的才思文藻风靡了当时的整个欧洲,并为后人留下了一系列划时代的巨著。很少有几个哲学家能带来卢梭著作那样的震撼。他的《艺术与科学谈》获法国第戎奖,使他荣获欧洲哲学大师称号。他的文学名著《新爱洛伊丝》在世界文学史上有着很高地位,使他跻身于启蒙时期著名文学家的行列。《社会契约论》又译作《民约论》是他最为杰出的代表作之一,被誉为“人类解放的第一个呼声,世界大革命的第一个煽动者”。卢梭是欧洲启蒙运动中重要的思想家,与伏尔泰齐名。他的主要作品有《忏悔录》、《爱弥儿》、《社会契约论》、《新爱洛伊丝》。他的主要思想:天赋人权学说,提出“人民主权”的口号。其思想是法国大革命中雅各宾派的旗帜,对欧美各国的资产阶级革命产生了深刻影响。
  
  他的《社会契约论》中的“主权在民”一说,就划分了一个时代。
  
  《社会契约论》卢梭将野花送给喂奶的母亲
  《社会契约论》第一次提出了“天赋人权和主权在民的思想”。它刚一问世就遭到了禁止。卢梭本人也被迫流亡到英国。但《社会契约论》所提倡的民主理论却很快风靡全世界。它引发了震惊世界的法国大革命。法国国家格言“自由、平等、博爱”便来自《社会契约论》。1789年法国国民代表大会通过的《人权宣言》中“社会的目的是为大众谋福利的”、“统治权属于人民”等内容充分体现了《社会契约论》的精神。《社会契约论》还对美国的《独立宣言》产生了重要影响,从罗伯斯庇尔到列宁都曾用《社会契约论》为自己的政权做解释。1978年,在纪念卢梭逝世200周年的活动中,专门召开了国际研讨会,研究卢梭的思想,出版他的新传,推出以他为题材的电视剧。他的遗骸被安放在法国的伟人祠内。卢梭在《社会契约论》中预见的“消费者的各种陷阱,大城市的骚乱以及毁灭性的军费负担”等等,都已成为当代社会的现实问题。目前,单在法国就有150多位学者在专门研究卢梭的思想。
  
  有说卢梭的政治理论深受柏拉图的《理想国》的影响。《理想国》的概念,建立于人性善的理念基础上,柏拉图笔下的苏格拉底说,“只有正直的人才会幸福”,“善的意志”成为他的理想国的基础。卢梭也相信人性善,他提倡宽容理性,坚定地反对任何政治暴力。同是论述理想国的原则,不同于柏拉图,卢梭将其理论框架完全建立在“人生而自由”的基础之上,也就是说“自由意志”。这个基础就实在多了。很早以前,人们有一个更好的但文言的说法:“天赋人权。”由天赋人权作为第一原理,他所构造的不再只是理想,而是现代公民社会的基本原则。公民社会中,公民失去了自由人无所不为的自由,而得到公民的政治权利、政治自由。他的《社会契约论》(又译《民约论》)所要解决的是人权和法律的有机结合。从此,合法性只能来自人民,成了卢梭的继承者和背叛者的共同的理念。前者产生了美国革命和民主的建立,后者以人民之名专权屠杀。卢梭,作为“主权在民”的勾画者,就是在200年后还处于争论的中心:他的理论到底是在提倡民主自由,还是在提倡极权暴政?
  
  《社会契约论》哲学家卢梭大部头著作
  人权是属于个体的,法律是属于国家的。个体约定而成国家的合理性,是法律有效性和政权合法性的终极判断。自由,不是来自法律对个人的保护,而是来自个体对立法的彻底参与。这是切实保障个体自由的先决条件。在这一过程里,个体利益的“交集”而非“并集”(不完全是数学上的那种)形成公民意志——主权者的意志——一般意志,而这种主权者因为个体的不断参与,其内容是常新的,其利益与个体利益共荣的。从这一点出发,多数人说了算的约法三章必然成为主权在民的道德的体现方式。
  
  卢梭把政权明白地分成了立法和行政两个部分,前者属于社会契约的范畴,而后者不是契约的内容(因此是可变可推翻的)。这个理念对后来民主政治的发展有着不可磨灭的贡献。在卢梭之前,孟德斯鸠的《论法的精神》对法律的理解更加深刻,惟缺卢梭的“主权在民”的动力。《社会契约论》自始至终只扬弃了一种体制:专制政府。按卢梭的话,这就是那种蔑视法律把个体的权力高于主权者之上的体制。其他的体制,卢梭仅仅论述了它们合法的自然依据。从直接民主制、贵族代议制到君主立宪制,统治的根据必须是人民主权———其真正表达就是法律。卢梭并进而把任何真正依法而治的政体统称为共和政体。在卢梭看来,他那个时代的政治社会形态是腐朽的,他要到古希腊时代才能找到合理的回归。
  
  《社会契约论》是世界政治法律学说史上最重要的经典之一,是震撼世界的1789年法国大革命的号角和福音书。它阐述的许多原则原理不仅在革命之初被载入法国《人权宣言》等重要文献中,在革命后的长时期里成为资产阶级的政治法律制度的基石。卢梭的思想对后世思想家们理论的形成有重大影响。
  
  卢梭的政治著作中有许多思想独特新颖,引人入胜。但是总体说来就是一种追求平等的强烈欲望和一种同样强烈的感受:现存社会制度的不合理已经达到了令人不能容忍的程度,人生下来本来是自由的,但是无论走到哪里都要戴上枷锁。卢梭自己可能并不喜欢暴力行为,但是他无疑激励了其他人实行暴力革命,逐步改革社会制度。
  
  有人批评卢梭是一个极其神经质的人,是一个大男子主义者,是一个思想不切实际的、糊涂的思想家,这样的批评大体上是正确的。但是远比他的缺点更重要的是他的洞察力和杰出的创造精神所闪现出来的思想火花,两个多世纪以来,不断地影响着现代思想。
  《社会契约论》-妙语佳句
  
  我看到了另一个世界,我的全部激情都被对真理、对自由、对道德的热爱窒息掉了。
  谁第一个把一块土地圈起来并想到这是自己的,而且被头脑简单的人所相信的话,那他就是文明的奠基者。


  Social contract describes a broad class of theories that try to explain the ways in which people form states to maintain social order. The notion of the social contract implies that the people give up sovereignty to a government or other authority in order to receive or maintain social order through the rule of law. It can also be thought of as an agreement by the governed on a set of rules by which they are governed.
  
  Social contract theory formed a central pillar in the historically important notion that legitimate state authority must be derived from the consent of the governed. The starting point for most of these theories is a heuristic examination of the human condition absent from any structured social order, usually termed the “state of nature”. In this condition, an individual’s actions are bound only by his or her personal power, constrained by conscience. From this common starting point, the various proponents of social contract theory attempt to explain, in different ways, why it is in an individual’s rational self-interest to voluntarily give up the freedom one has in the state of nature in order to obtain the benefits of political order.
  
  Thomas Hobbes (1651), John Locke (1689) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) are the most famous philosophers of contractarianism. However, they drew quite different conclusions from this starting-point. Hobbes advocated an authoritarian monarchy, Locke advocated a liberal monarchy, while Rousseau advocated liberal republicanism. Their work provided theoretical groundwork of constitutional monarchy, liberal democracy and republicanism. The Social Contract was used in the Declaration of Independence as a sign of enforcing Democracy, and more recently has been revived by thinkers such as John Rawls.
  
  Overview
  
  According to Thomas Hobbes, human life would be "nasty, brutish, and short" without political authority. In its absence, we would live in a state of nature, where we each have unlimited natural freedoms, including the "right to all things" and thus the freedom to harm all who threaten our own self-preservation; there would be an endless "war of all against all" (Bellum omnium contra omnes). To avoid this, free men establish political community i.e. civil society through a social contract in which each gain civil rights in return for subjecting himself to civil law or to political authority.
  
  Alternatively, some have argued that we gain civil rights in return for accepting the obligation to respect and defend the rights of others, giving up some freedoms to do so; this alternative formulation of the duty arising from the social contract is often identified with arguments about military service.
  Violations of the contract
  
  The social contract and the civil rights it gives us are neither "natural rights" nor permanently fixed. Rather, the contract itself is the means towards an end — the benefit of all — and (according to some philosophers such as Locke or Rousseau), is only legitimate to the extent that it meets the general interest ("general will" in Rousseau). Therefore, when failings are found in the contract, we renegotiate to change the terms, using methods such as elections and legislature. Locke theorized the right of rebellion in case of the contract leading to tyranny.
  
  Since civil rights come from agreeing to the contract, those who choose to violate their contractual obligations, such as by committing crimes, abdicate their rights, and the rest of society can be expected to protect itself against the actions of such outlaws. To be a member of society is to accept responsibility for following its rules, along with the threat of punishment for violating them. In this way, society works by "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" (Hardin 1968).
  History
  Classical thought
  
  Many have argued that Plato's dialog Crito expresses a Greek version of social contract theory. In this dialog, Socrates refuses to escape from jail to avoid being put to death. He argues that since he has willingly remained in Athens all of his life despite opportunities to go elsewhere, he has accepted the social contract i.e. the burden of the local laws, and he cannot violate these laws even when they are against his self-interest.
  
  Epicurus seems to have had a strong sense of social contract, with justice and law being rooted in mutual agreement and advantage, as evidenced by these lines, among others, from his Principal Doctrines:
  
   31. Natural justice is a pledge of reciprocal benefit, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another. 32. Those animals which are incapable of making binding agreements with one another not to inflict nor suffer harm are without either justice or injustice; and likewise for those peoples who either could not or would not form binding agreements not to inflict nor suffer harm. 33. There never was such a thing as absolute justice, but only agreements made in mutual dealings among men in whatever places at various times providing against the infliction or suffering of harm. 34. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which is associated with the apprehension of being discovered by those appointed to punish such actions.
  
  Also see Epicurean ethics
  Renaissance developments
  
  Quentin Skinner has argued that several critical modern innovations in contract theory are found in the writings from French Calvinists and Huguenots, whose work in turn was invoked by writers in the Low Countries who objected to their subjection to Spain and, later still, by Catholics in England. Among these, Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), from the School of Salamanca, might be considered as an early theorist of the social contract, theorizing natural law in an attempt to limit the divine right of absolute monarchy. All of these groups were led to articulate notions of popular sovereignty by means of a social covenant or contract: all of these arguments began with proto-“state of nature” arguments, to the effect that the basis of politics is that everyone is by nature free of subjection to any government.
  
  However, these arguments relied on a corporatist theory found in Roman Law, according to which "a populus" can exist as a distinct legal entity. Therefore these arguments held that a community of people can join a government because they have the capacity to exercise a single will and make decisions with a single voice in the absence of sovereign authority — a notion rejected by Hobbes and later contract theorists.
  Philosophers
  Hugo Grotius
  
  In the early 17th century, Grotius (1583–1645) introduced the modern idea of natural rights of individuals. Grotius says that we each have natural rights which we have in order to preserve ourselves. He uses this idea to try to establish a basis for moral consensus in the face of religious diversity and the rise of natural science and to find a minimal basis for a moral beginning for society, a kind of natural law that everyone could potentially accept. He goes so far as to say even if we were to concede what we cannot concede without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, these laws would still hold. The idea was considered incendiary, since it suggests that power can ultimately go back to the individuals if the political society that they have set up forfeits the purpose for which it was originally established, which is to preserve themselves. In other words, the people i.e. the individual people, are sovereign. Grotius says that the people are sui juris - under their own jurisdiction. People have rights as human beings but there is a delineation of those rights because of what is possible for everyone to accept morally - everyone has to accept that each person is entitled to try to preserve themselves and therefore they shouldn't try to do harm to others or to interfere with them and they should punish any breach of someone else's rights that arises.
  Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan (1651)
  
  The first modern philosopher to articulate a detailed contract theory was Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). According to Hobbes, the lives of individuals in the state of nature were "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short", a state where self-interest and the absence of rights and contracts prevented the 'social', or society. Life was 'anarchic' (without leadership/ the concept of sovereignty). Individuals in the state of nature were apolitical and asocial. This state of nature is followed by the social contract.
  
  The social contract was an 'occurrence' during which individuals came together and ceded some of their individual rights so that others would cede theirs (e.g. person A gives up his/her right to kill person B if person B does the same). This resulted in the establishment of society, and by extension, the state, a sovereign entity (like the individuals, now under its rule, used to be) which was to protect these new rights which were now to regulate societal interactions. Society was thus no longer anarchic.
  
  But the state system, which grew out of the social contract, was anarchic (without leadership). Just as the individuals in the state of nature had been sovereigns and thus guided by self-interest and the absence of rights, so states now acted in their self-interest in competition with each other. Just like the state of nature, states were thus bound to be in conflict because there was no sovereign over and above the state (i.e. more powerful) capable of imposing social-contract laws. Indeed, Hobbes' work helped to serve as a basis for the realism theories of international relations, advanced by E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau.
  John Locke's Second Treatise of Government (1689)
  
  John Locke's conception of the social contract differed from Hobbes' in several ways, but retained the central notion that persons in a state of nature would willingly come together to form a state. Locke believed that individuals in a state of nature would have stronger moral limits on their action than accepted by Hobbes, but recognized that people would still live in fear of one another. Locke argued that individuals would agree to form a state that would provide a "neutral judge", and that could therefore protect the lives, liberty, and property of those who lived within it. While Hobbes argued for near-absolute authority, Locke argued that laws could only be legitimate if they sought to achieve the common good. Locke also believed that people will do the right thing as a group, and that all people have natural rights.
  Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Du contrat social (1762)
  
  Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), in his influential 1762 treatise The Social Contract, outlined a different version of social contract theory, based on popular sovereignty. Although Rousseau wrote that the British were perhaps at the time the freest people on earth, he did not approve of their representative government. Rousseau believed that liberty was possible only where there was direct rule by the people as a whole in lawmaking, where popular sovereignty was indivisible and inalienable. Citizens must, in at least some circumstances, be able to choose together the fundamental rules by which they would live, and be able to revise those rules on later occasions if they choose to do so - something the British people as a whole were unable to do.
  
  Rousseau's political theory has some points in common with Locke's individualism, but departs from it in his development of the "luminous conception" (which he credited to Diderot) of the general will. Rousseau argues a citizen can be an egoist and decide that his personal interest should override the collective interest. However, as part of a collective body, the individual citizen puts aside his egoism to create a "general will", which is popular sovereignty itself. Popular sovereignty (i.e., the rule of law), thus decides what is good for society as a whole, and the individual (including the administrative head of state, who could be a monarch) must bow to it, or be forced to bow to it:
  
   [The social contract] can be reduced to the following terms: Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.
  
  Rousseau's striking phrase that man must "be forced to be free" should be understood this way: since the indivisible and inalienable popular sovereignty decides what is good for the whole, then if an individual lapses back into his ordinary egoism and breaks the law, he will be forced to listen to what they decided as a member of the collectivity (i.e. as citizens). Thus, the law, inasmuch as it is voted by the people's representatives, is not a limitation of individual freedom, but its expression; and enforcement of law, including criminal law, is not a restriction on individual liberty, as the individual, as a citizen, explicitly agreed to be constrained if, as a private individual, he did not respect his own will as formulated in the general will. Because laws represent the restraints of civil freedom, they represent the leap made from humans in the state of nature into civil society. In this sense, the law is a civilizing force, and therefore Rousseau believed that the laws that govern a people helped to mold their character.
  Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's individualist social contract (1851)
  
  While Rousseau's social contract is based on popular sovereignty and not on individual sovereignty, there are other theories espoused by individualists, libertarians and anarchists, which do not involve agreeing to anything more than negative rights and creates only a limited state, if any.
  
  Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865) advocated a conception of social contract which didn't involve an individual surrendering sovereignty to others. According to him, the social contract was not between individuals and the state, but rather between individuals themselves refraining from coercing or governing each other, each one maintaining complete sovereignty upon oneself:
  
   What really is the Social Contract? An agreement of the citizen with the government? No, that would mean but the continuation of [Rousseau’s] idea. The social contract is an agreement of man with man; an agreement from which must result what we call society. In this, the notion of commutative justice, first brought forward by the primitive fact of exchange, …is substituted for that of distributive justice … Translating these words, contract, commutative justice, which are the language of the law, into the language of business, and you have commerce, that is to say, in its highest significance, the act by which man and man declare themselves essentially producers, and abdicate all pretension to govern each other.
   —Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century (1851)
  
  John Rawls' Theory of Justice (1971)
  
  John Rawls (1921–2002) proposed a contractarian approach that has a decidedly Kantian flavour, in A Theory of Justice (1971), whereby rational people in a hypothetical "original position", setting aside their individual preferences and capacities under a "veil of ignorance", would agree to certain general principles of justice. This idea is also used as a game-theoretical formalization of the notion of fairness.
  Philip Pettit's Republicanism (1997)
  
  Philip Pettit (b. 1945) has argued, in Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1997), that the theory of social contract, classically based on the consent of the governed (as it is assumed that the contract is valid as long as the people consent to being governed by its representatives, who exercise sovereignty), should be modified, in order to avoid dispute. Instead of arguing that an explicit consent, which can always be manufactured, should justify the validity of social contract, Philip Pettit argues that the absence of an effective rebellion against the contract is the only legitimacy of it.
  Criticism
  David Hume
  
  An early critic of social contract theory was Rousseau's friend, the philosopher David Hume, who in 1742 published an essay "On Civil Liberty", in whose second part, entitled, "Of the Original Contract ", he stressed that the concept of a "social contract" was a convenient fiction:
  
   AS no party, in the present age can well support itself without a philosophical or speculative system of principles annexed to its political or practical one; we accordingly find that each of the factions into which this nation is divided has reared up a fabric of the former kind, in order to protect and cover that scheme of actions which it pursues. . . . The one party [defenders of the absolute and divine right of kings, or Tories], by tracing up government to the DEITY, endeavor to render it so sacred and inviolate that it must be little less than sacrilege, however tyrannical it may become, to touch or invade it in the smallest article. The other party [the Whigs, or believers in constitutional monarchy], by founding government altogether on the consent of the PEOPLE suppose that there is a kind of original contract by which the subjects have tacitly reserved the power of resisting their sovereign, whenever they find themselves aggrieved by that authority with which they have for certain purposes voluntarily entrusted him. --David Hume, "On Civil Liberty" [II.XII.1]
  
  However, Hume did agree that, no matter how a government is founded, the consent of the governed is the only legitimate foundation on which a government can rest.
  
   My intention here is not to exclude the consent of the people from being one just foundation of government where it has place. It is surely the best and most sacred of any. I only pretend that it has very seldom had place in any degree and never almost in its full extent. And that therefore some other foundation of government must also be admitted. --Ibid II.XII.20
  
  Logic of contracting
  
  According to the will theory of contract, which was dominant in the 19th century and still exerts a strong influence, a contract is not presumed valid unless all parties agree to it voluntarily, either tacitly or explicitly, without coercion. Lysander Spooner, a 19th century lawyer and staunch supporter of a right of contract between individuals, in his essay No Treason, argues that a supposed social contract cannot be used to justify governmental actions such as taxation, because government will initiate force against anyone who does not wish to enter into such a contract. As a result, he maintains that such an agreement is not voluntary and therefore cannot be considered a legitimate contract at all.
  
  Modern Anglo-American law, like European civil law, is based on a will theory of contract, according to which all terms of a contract are binding on the parties because they chose those terms for themselves. This was less true when Hobbes wrote Leviathan; then, more importance was attached to consideration, meaning a mutual exchange of benefits necessary to the formation of a valid contract, and most contracts had implicit terms that arose from the nature of the contractual relationship rather than from the choices made by the parties. Accordingly, it has been argued that social contract theory is more consistent with the contract law of the time of Hobbes and Locke than with the contract law of our time, and that features in the social contract which seem anomalous to us, such as the belief that we are bound by a contract formulated by our distant ancestors, would not have seemed as strange to Hobbes' contemporaries as they do to us.
  Multiple contracts
  
  Legal scholar Randy Barnett has argued, that, while presence in the territory of a society may be necessary for consent, it is not consent to any rules the society might make regardless of their content. A second condition of consent is that the rules be consistent with underlying principles of justice and the protection of natural and social rights, and have procedures for effective protection of those rights (or liberties). This has also been discussed by O.A. Brownson, who argued that there are, in a sense, three "constitutions" involved: The first the constitution of nature that includes all of what the Founders called "natural law". The second would be the constitution of society, an unwritten and commonly understood set of rules for the society formed by a social contract before it establishes a government, by which it does establish the third, a constitution of government. To consent, a necessary condition is that the rules be constitutional in that sense.
  Tacit consent
  
  The theory of an implicit social contract holds that by remaining in the territory controlled by some government, people give consent to be governed. This consent is what gives legitimacy to the government. Philosopher Roderick Long argues that this is a case of question begging, because the argument has to presuppose its conclusion:
  
   I think that the person who makes this argument is already assuming that the government has some legitimate jurisdiction over this territory. And then they say, well, now, anyone who is in the territory is therefore agreeing to the prevailing rules. But they’re assuming the very thing they're trying to prove – namely that this jurisdiction over the territory is legitimate. If it's not, then the government is just one more group of people living in this broad general geographical territory. But I've got my property, and exactly what their arrangements are I don't know, but here I am in my property and they don't own it – at least they haven't given me any argument that they do – and so, the fact that I am living in "this country" means I am living in a certain geographical region that they have certain pretensions over – but the question is whether those pretensions are legitimate. You can’t assume it as a means to proving it.
  
  Criticisms of natural rights
  
  Contractualism is based on the notion that rights are agreed upon in order to further our interests: each individual subject is accorded individual rights, which may or may not be inalienable, and form the basis of civil rights, as in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. It must be underlined, however, as Hannah Arendt did on her book on imperialism, that the 1789 Declarations, in this agreeing with the social contract theory, bases the natural rights of the human-being on the civil rights of the citizen, instead of the reverse as the contractualist theory does. This criticism derives from a long tradition going back to St. Augustine of Hippo, who in The City of God (book) envisioned a unified Christian society presided over by a king who was responsible for the welfare of his subjects. Political Augustinianism with its insistence on divine sovereignty and on the two separate spheres of a heavenly and an earthly community, has indeed been regarded as incompatible with social contract theories. This raises the question of whether social contractarianism, as a central plank of liberal thought, is reconcilable with the Christian religion, and particularly with Catholicism and Catholic social teaching. The individualist and liberal approach has also been criticized since the 19th century by thinkers such as Marx, Nietzsche & Freud, and afterward by structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers, such as Lacan, Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze or Derrida
译者序言
  翻译: 其林
   译者序言
   公认的十八世纪最伟大的、最深远地影响了历史的作品是哪几部?人们可以很轻易地说出亚当·史密斯的《国富论》、孟德斯鸠的《论法的精神》和卢梭的《社会契约论》。
   卢梭(Jean-Jacques Rousseau,1712-1778)的《社会契约论》和《爱弥儿》,一论一论教育,奠定了他的启蒙大师的历史地位。很少有几个哲学家能带来卢梭著作那样的震撼。且不说他的《爱弥儿》在教育学上的成就,就说他的《社会契约论》中的“主权在民”一说,就划分了一个时代。
   有说卢梭的理论深受帕拉图的《理想国》的影响。《理想国》的概念,建立于人性善的理念基础上,帕拉图笔下的苏格拉底说,“只有正直的人才会幸福”,“善的意志”成为他的理想国的基础。卢梭也相信人性善,他提倡宽容理性,坚定地反对任何暴力。同是论述理想国的原则,不同于帕拉图,卢梭将其理论框架完全建立在“人生而自由”的基础之上,也就是说“自由意志”。这个基础就实在多了。很早以前,人们有一个更好的但文言的说法:“天赋”。由天赋作为第一原理,他所构造的不再只是理想,而是现代公民社会的基本原则。公民社会中,公民失去了自由人无所不为的自由,而得到公民的权利-自由。他的《社会契约论》(又译《民约论》)所要解决的是和法律的有机结合。从此,合法性只能来自人民,成了卢梭的继承者和背叛者的共同的理念。-前者产生了美国和的建立,后者以人民之名专权。卢梭,作为“主权在民”的勾画者,就是在二百年后还处于争论的中心:他的理论到底是在提倡自由,还是在提倡极权?
   是属于个体的,法律是属于国家的。个体约定而成国家的合理性,是法律有效性和政权合法性的终极判断。自由,不是来自法律对个人的保护,而是来自个体对立法的彻底参与。这是切实保障个体自由的先决条件。在这一过程里,个体利益的“交集”而非“并集”(不完全是数学上的那种)形成公志-主权者的意志-一般意志,而这种主权者因为个体的不断参与,其内容是常新的,其利益与个体利益共荣的。从这一点出发,多数人说了算的约法三章必然地成为主权在民的道德的体现方式。
   卢梭把政权明白地分成了立法和行政两个部分,前者属于社会契约的范畴,而后者不是契约的内容(因此是可变可推翻的)。这个理念对后来的发展有着不可磨灭的贡献。在卢梭之前,孟德斯鸠的《论法的精神》对法律的理解更加深刻,唯缺卢梭的“主权在民”的动力。《社会契约论》本身是自恰的理论专著。它自始至终只扬弃了一种体制:政府。按卢梭的话,这就是那种蔑视法律把个体的权力高于主权者之上的体制。其他的体制,卢梭仅仅论述了它们合法的自然依据。从直接制、贵族代议制到君主立宪制,统治的根据必须是人权-其真正表达就是法律。卢梭并进而把任何真正依法而治的政体统称为共和政体。
   卢梭的理想并不是人们常说的直接制,而是罗马为代表的精英选举代议制。为了对幅员大国的有效治理,由幅员不大的精英代议制政体合众联邦几乎在《社会契约论》中呼之欲出而与百来年美国的历史相呼应。这一点,多少为中国未来的化道路指明了方向。
   卢梭的起点是一个假想的自给自足的自由人的国度,然后才有社会契约和公民社会的形成。无疑,他的基础隐伏着危机-因为他基于的是假想国而非事实的观察。后一时代的法国历史学者德·托克维尔,从他对美洲的发生发展的观察,著有《制在美洲》的名著,他的起点无疑就更加坚实。两者的著作其实有着一个共通之处,寻找一个合乎人性的道德的社会形态。
   在卢梭看来,他那个时代的社会形态是腐朽的,他要到古希腊时代才能找到合理的回归。他的起点,严格来说,是太过简单了,而他的结论,也太机械了。想一想,从一个假想的自给自足的个体自由人到公民社会的形成,有没有可能跳过商品经济的发展?在卢梭的理论里没有商品的地位,他所处的启蒙时代决定了他成不了亚当·史密斯。尽管如此,今天分析他的思想,采纳他思维的合理成分,是每个有志于中国化进程的知识分子必修的一课。
   《社会契约论》分成四册,大致上,第一册论人民和主权者;第二册论法律和主权者;第三册论政府和主权者;第四册以古罗马历史出述了主权者意志实现的某些细节。
   1985年法学家费孝通在宽松的时期呼吁全社会学习卢梭的《社会契约论》,原因无他,任何明眼人都看得出来,中国还没有一个公民社会,而它是现代法制的基础。
   若干名词的英汉对照sovereign              主权者sovereignty             主权 sovereign power       主权权力sovereign authority   主权权威general will          一般意志prince统治者democracy          (直接)制aristocracy贵族制monarchy           君主(立宪)制despotism政府despot               的君主--------【译注】
   General Will在中文翻译里有其他多种翻法。有人翻成“总意志”和“公共意志”。“公共意志”比较接近原文含义。但是,General在原文中是相对于Particular,故有现在的“一般意志”的翻法;但有时,原文也对应于Individual。有必要指出一般意志和后来黑格尔神化了的国家意志有极大的不同。
   Sovereign翻译为主权者。其他的翻译有用“人权”的。
   Prince本可翻译成王国,但在上下文中把它意译成统治者,以免读者对用词的理解过分生疏。
第一册-1
  第一册
   前言
   这篇小论文原属于我无力完成的一部更大部头的作品,我早放弃了这个大部头作品的写作。在其中可以单独提取出来的各种片断中,这本书是最长的,好象也是最不值得公布于众的一部分。其余的部分已毁去了。
   《社会契约论》第一册
   从人本身出发研究法律的可能形式,我想研究一下在公民社会秩序中是否存在任何合法的和可靠的管理原则。在此研究中,我会尽量地把权利所允许的和私利所期望的结合起来,使得正义和功利不再分割。
   我想直接切入主题而不先证明其重要性。既然我在讲,人们会问我到底是统治者还是立法者;我的回答是我两者都不是,也正因如此,我才要来谈。否则,我就不会浪费时间光说不做了;我要不就付诸实践,要不就保持沉默。
   生为一个自由国家的公民并作为主权者【译注1】的一员,不论我的小小一票对公众事物的影响是多么卑微,这种发言权给我以足够的责任感来研究这些事物。从我对政府政制的思考和研究中,每每我都挖掘出新的理由,让我更爱我自己祖国的政府。--------【译注1】Sovereign(主权者)在卢梭是一个整体的概念,不是世俗意义上的统治权的意思。卢梭自号日内瓦公民,但日内瓦当时并不自由。后来,卢梭本人就因《社会契约论》公民宗教一节而被取消了日内瓦国籍。
   《社会契约论》第一册第一章
   本书的研究主题
   人生而自由,然而他自此处处背负着锁链。任何人都可以认为他是他人的主人,但是他只是比他人更为不自由的奴隶。为什么会是这样?我不知道。是什么使它成为合理?那是我相信可以回答的问题。
   如果我只考虑力量和其产生的后果,我会说“只要人民在强制下真的认了服从了,暴力算达到了目的;一但人民能够砸碎这种锁链并付诸行动,暴力的结果就更妙了,因为,人民凭着暴力夺回了他们因暴力而失去的自由。这里,或者自由的夺回是合理的,或者自由的失去是不合理的。”但社会秩序是一种神圣的权利,它是其他一切权利的根本。这种权利既然不能来自自然,它就必须基于一些约法三章。问题是这种约法的内容。首先,我得进一步阐明我刚说过的一切。
   《社会契约论》第一册第二章
   第一种社会
   所有人类社会中最古老的,也是唯一自然的社会形态,是家庭:即便如此,子女对父亲的依赖只是为了生存。一但这一需求不复存在,子女对父亲的服从和父亲对子女的照顾这双重责任就都解除了,他们从此成为独立的个体。如果他们还要继续生活在一起,就不是出于自然,而是出于自愿的了。家庭从而就成了一种约定。
   人的这种共同的自由来自他的本性。他的第一法则是自己的存活,他的第一要务是自己的利益。人,一旦明白事理,就是自主的;对自身的生存手段,他拥有唯一的决断,他因此成为自己的主人。
   因此,可以说家庭是社会的第一模式:父之于统治者,子女之于百姓草民;他们都是生而自由平等的,但他们为了自己的利益而放弃了自由。其间唯一的差别是,家庭中,父对子的呵护赢得衷心的爱;而在国家,统治者有的只有发号施令的痛快,但没有对百姓的爱。
   葛罗休斯【译注1】以奴隶为例来否认人的权力是为了被统治的草民的利益。他的逻辑的老套是把权利建立于存在的事实之上【原注1】。就算有人用更逻辑的推理方法,其结论都不会对暴君更加有利。
   根据葛罗休斯,到底是人类属于某百来号人,还是这百来号人属于人类,是一个可以讨论的问题。贯穿其全书,他好象是倾向于前一观点,也就是霍布士【译注2】的观点。于是,人类被分成了若干牛群,每群都有一个统治者来看守,并最终宰割吞食他们。
   既然牧人天然优越于牛群,人的牧者-统治者,也就天然优于其治下的人民。如菲罗(Philo)之言,这就是卡里古拉大帝【译注3】的逻辑。如此类推的结论就是,要么王者是神氏,要么百姓是牲口。
   卡里古拉大帝的思维和葛罗休斯霍布士如出一辙。在他们之前,亚里斯多德也说人是天生不平等的,有人生而为奴,有人生而为主。
   亚里斯多德当然是对的,只是他错把结果当成了原因。身处奴隶制中的人理所当然生而为奴。奴隶在其锁链中失去了一切,包括他们向往自由的愿望;他们爱自己的枷锁,就象尤里西斯(Ulysses)的伙伴爱好自己的野蛮【原注2】。如果天生的奴隶还能够存在,就是因为曾几何时有过的奴隶。暴力产生了第一代奴隶;而他们的怯懦成全了奴隶制。
   我还没有说亚当王或诺亚大帝【译注4】,清本还源之下,他算是三大君王国之父,三国象撒旦的子嗣一样瓜分了世界;有些学者还能认出自己和他们的出身渊源。对此我得有所节制,因为我也是这三大君王国的直亲后裔,好象还是那较长的一族,可有谁能用这些名目来立我为人类之合法帝王呢?仅管如此,不能否认亚当曾主宰过世界,诚如鲁宾孙曾主宰过他的小岛,只要他是小岛唯一的居民;如此帝国的好处就是王国在其治下没有反叛、战争、或阴谋。--------【原注1】‘学来的对公共权利的研究往往是过往滥调的历史;对他们的学习太过深入是毫无好处的迷恋。’(《论法国对邻国关系中的利益》,Marquis d’Argenson)。这正是葛罗休斯的做为。【原注2】参看Plutarch的短文《思考的动物》。【译注1】Grotius,公元1583-1645。荷兰哲学家,著有《战争和平之法则》。【译注2】Hobbes,公元1588-1679。英国哲学家,他关于社会契约的学说,引起其他哲人如洛克、斯宾若莎、卢梭的进一步研究。卢梭在此对Hobbes的批判并不符合事实。【译注3】Caligula,公元12-41。罗马皇帝。在位三年,因残暴无度被刺。【译注4】此论是针对某种理论,认为君主之王权可以导自《圣经旧约》中之亚当。
   《社会契约论》第一册第三章
   至强者的权利
   至强者,莫不希望把自己的力量转变成为权利,他人的服从转变成责任,唯此,它才能真正的至强,才能维护它的长治久安。因此,至强者的权利,虽然听来带着反讽,被认为是现实中的一个基本准则。但是此说之真正含义又是如何?在力量中我看不出它如何能导致任何道德。面对暴力而让步不过是一种必需而已,其中没有意愿;至多,那是一种审慎。它又如何能成为责任?
   不妨假设此种所谓“权利”是存在的。我要说从此不能导出任何有意义的东西。如果暴力产生权利,结果就要随着原因而改变:任何比第一个强权更强大的暴力就可接过这种权利。一旦反叛而不会受罚,就得以合法的反叛,既然至强者掌握着真理,人就必须尽力地变得强大起来。一个随着力量而消长的权利,这会是什么东西嘛?如果人是服从的,他没有任何义务这样做。显然,“权利”一词不为力量带来任何新的东西;从此角度上,它毫无意义。
   “服从暴力”。如果这说的是“让步于暴力”,这样的格言虽然肤浅,还可说是放之四海而皆准。一切力量来自于上帝。我承认;但一切病痛也是源自上帝。难道我们就因此不能请医生了吗?如果我在森林里为匪徒所拦,给其以金钱,要是我还能保住这些钱,我是否还有道德义务把钱送给匪人呢?毕竟,枪口之下也是一种暴力。
   因此,我们应该有一个共识,暴力并不带来权利,我们只有义务尊崇合法的力量。我们又回到了我原来提出的问题。
   《社会契约论》第一册第四章
   奴隶制度
   正因为任何人对他人都没有天然的权力,正因为暴力不能产生权利,所以人类社会的任何合理的权威就都应建于人民之间的相互约定。
   葛罗休斯认为,既然个人可以放弃自由而为某一主子的奴隶,为什么整个人民就不能放弃自由而成为某一君主的臣民?这里,有着太多模棱两可的词汇。我们就只来搞清楚“放弃”的含义。在此上下文中,它意味着“给予”或者“出卖”。一个要做别人奴隶的人并不能把自己给予别人;至少是为了自己的生存,他是出卖了自己。但是人民为什么要出卖自己呢?君主可并不能保障臣民的生存,事实上君主的力量来自其臣民,如拉贝莱斯(Rabelais)之言,君王所依者众。难道臣民们是为了君主把自己财产拿走才把自己给予了君主?如果是这样,我可看不出他们何以维生?
   有人会说的君主可以保障臣民的安全。当然了;但是如果君主的个人野心为其带来了战争,如果君主无底的贪欲和他的官僚的骚扰带来的压迫远过于人民自己的纠纷,如果这样的和平成了一种惨状,人民到底是捞取到些什么呢?牢狱中的生活也是和平的,难道说和平就能使得牢狱成为梦寐以求的东西嘛?囚禁在塞克路普斯(Cyclops)洞穴中的希腊人可是活得和平安乐,等待他们的却是任人宰割的命运。
   说人可以把自己给予而不必任何好处,这是荒谬无理的。这样的行为之非法无效,因为此事只有疯子才能做得出来。用此来描述一个人民,就是认为这个人民整个的都疯了,疯狂可带不来权利。
   就算个人可以放弃他自己的自由,他也不能放弃他子女的自由。他们生而为人是自由的;他们的自由只属于他们自己,无人有权将之剥夺。在他们成年前的岁月里,其父可以为了他们的生存以他们的名义来行事,但他不能无条件不可改变的把子女给予他人,如此行为是违反自然超出父权的。因此,任意一个政府如果是合法的,每一代人就必须能够自由地选择接受或拒绝它;可如此一来,政府也就不能是任意的了。
   放弃自由,就是放弃了人性,抛弃了做人的权利和义务。放弃一切的人是得不到任何回赎的。如此的放弃违背人性,当人的意志不再自由,他的行为也就失去了一切道德准则。最后,一个约定如果是以一方的绝对权威和另一方面的绝对服从为条件,它只能流于空洞和自相矛盾。如果彼一方号称拥有主宰一切的权力,任谁又能够对他有听从的义务?其实,仅仅是这种没有互惠的单一条件,就足以使所有约定失效了。既然我的奴隶的一切都属于我,他还有什么权利来反抗我?他的权利都是我的,自己反抗自己的权利当然没有意义。
   葛罗休斯还有其他一些人把战争看成是所谓的蓄奴权的另一个起源。他们认为,既然胜利者有权失败者,后者只有用自由来换取其生命,或说这是一个对双方都有利的更合理的契约。
   但是,明显的,这种失败者的权利在任何角度上都不能来自于战争状态。人原是彼此独立的,相互的关系还不能稳定到出现和平状态或战争状态,他们不会是相互的敌人。是事物之间的关系,而不是人之间的关系,构成了战争;既然战争状态是来自物质关系而非单纯的人际关系,私人战争,或说,人和人之间的战争是不存在的,不论是在还没有稳定财产的自然王国中,还是一切权力属于法律的公民社会中。
   个人争斗,比如决斗等等,不构成国家的行为。至于由法国圣路易习惯法【译注1】授权的,而由上帝之和平【译注2】每年定期禁止的所谓私人战争,那是封建政府的滥权,虽曾一度存在,也是荒唐的。它违背自然权利和政府行政的准则。
   战争是国家之间的关系而非个人之间的关系,其中的个人偶尔彼此为敌,也只是作为兵士和国家卫士而非个人或公民一员【原注1】。归根到底,国家的敌人只能是另一个国家,而不是个人,因为在不同本质的事物间不能有任何真正的关系。
   这一原则是经过了历史考验的,也是所有文明国家的一致实践。宣战的目标与其说是针对君主勿宁说是针对其人民。任何外国人,不论是君王、个人还是人民,如果对统治者不宣战就抢掠关押其子民,他不是敌人,而是强盗。就是在战争中,正直的统治者也只是把敌国的公有财产收为我有,而对个人的生命财产加以尊重;惟有对其尊重他自己也才拥有这种权利。战争的目的是打败敌国,因此此间杀伤的条件必须是该保卫者还没放下武器;一旦他们投降放下了武器,他们也就不是敌人或说是敌国的工具;他们是普普通通的人,而杀人的权利也就不复存在。有时,摧毁一个敌国是可以不伤一草一木一兵一卒的,战争并不给予超出其目标的不必要的任何权利。这些原则不同于葛罗休斯;它们不是基于诗人的权威:而是来自自然,基于理性。
   至于征服者的权利,它和至强者的权利没有什么不同。如果战争并不赋于他权利去屈服了的民众,就更无所谓其蓄奴暴役的权利了。一个人只有在无法把别人变成奴隶的时候才有杀敌的权利;奴役权因此并不来自杀,胜者既无此特权,自由和生命的交换也就绝非公道。这里,生死权要建立于奴役权上,而反之奴役权也要建立于生死权上,难道这不是一种的循环嘛?
   退一步,就算我们认同此种可怕的杀人的特权,我还是要说战争奴隶,或被征服的人民,不过是出于强制,对其主人没有任何服从的义务。胜利者并没饶恕了他们的生命,奴役也是杀人:与其毫无收获地杀,不如有利可图地杀。除了暴力他没有任何其他权威,战争状态也就一如既往;他们的关系就是这种战争状态的结果,而使用战争的权利可不意味着任何和平的条约。当然胜利者和被征服者间还是有条约的,规定的不是战争状态的结束而是战争状态的维持。
   可见,无论我们从哪个角度看这个问题,奴役权都是无效、非法而且荒唐的。“奴役”和“权利”两词互相矛盾不能相容。总之,不论何人,只有失去理性,才会对他人或百姓说“我要和你们结成一纸协议,你们只能付出,我只能获利。只要我愿意,我就可以-你们也只能-保持它。”--------【原注1】比世上任何民族都知道并尊重战争权利的罗马人在这一点上非常顾忌,其公民如果不公开向敌人挑战并指名点姓地挑战某一个敌人,就不被允许做为志愿者。当小Cato第一次参战所在的兵团在Popilius手下重新组建时,老Cato写信给Popilius说,如果他还希望自己的儿子仍然服役,他就必须对他重新进行军事宣誓,因为现在他的第一个誓言作废他已不能再拿起武器对抗敌人了。老Cato又写信给儿子叮嘱他不发新誓就不能上战场。我知道Clusium的陷落还有其他一些孤立事件可以用来反驳我,但我说的是法律和习俗。罗马人比任何其他国家都较少地违反其法律,其他国家也没有如此好的法律。【译注1】原文是Establishments Of Saint Louis。其他版英文翻译写成法国国王路易IX。路易九世(1214-1252),被后人称为最有骑士精神和和平精神的国王,封建时代的名君。在位期间,正是欧洲的教权与王权争夺激烈的时期,路易九世篾视当时的教权至上,教皇是神的代言人的做法,公然宣称,国王除了上帝和国王自己之外谁都不服从。为了使国王制度可以真正独立于皇权(圣罗马帝国皇帝)和教权之外,路易九世大力健全官僚统治机构和中央集权制度,使国家得以在这样的机构下运作,减少国王的明暗对国家的直接影响。这是欧洲各封建领主式的国家向近代的国家过渡的开始。路易九世是相当虔诚的信徒,1297年教会为表彰他的勇气虔诚和公正,追封路易九世为圣人,设8月25日为圣路易日。(小蚂蚁提供)也有一说认为圣路易习惯法是后人假借圣路易之名而作。【译注2】Peace Of God应该是西罗马帝国亡国后,教会提出的。当时地中海世界在民族大移动中相当混乱,而大移动完结后产生的封建领主,也基本上还是蛮族风气,四下争战,虐杀平民是家常便饭。教会于是提出Peace Of God,是将每年的一段时期列为休战期,以上帝之名禁止战事,同时将牧师农民和商人列入不得随意虐杀的对象。这个做法持续了相当长的时期,虽然战火一起,很难不殃及池鱼,但还是有相当的抑制作用。(小蚂蚁提供)
   《社会契约论》第一册第五章
   根本的还是第一约法
   就算我们承认强权的存在,接受我前所拒绝了的所有种种,政府的辩护士还是好不到哪去。治理社会和压榨奴隶还是两个概念。如果个体还要臣服于某个个人,他们之间的关系就是奴隶和主人,而不是人民和统治者的关系。由此产生的是一群聚集的人,而不是人的结合体,公益和政体也就子虚乌有了。即便这个强人征服奴化了半个世界,他也只是一个单一的个体,他的利益也是与民无涉的私利。他的死亡也就是他的帝国的末日,因为这样的帝国是没有凝聚力的个体的乌合之众而不是有机的结合体,就象火后的橡树一样化成了飞灰。
   葛罗休斯说,人民可以为自己找到一个君主。按葛罗休斯的意思,人民在寻找君主之前就已是人民了。这一状况本身就是文明的行为而包含了整体上的协约。因此,在分析人民寻找君主之行为前,还是要先分析一下个人相约为人民的约法三章。它既然在君主之先,它才是社会产生的真正基础。
   假如表决不是全体无异议通过,那为什么少数人要服从多数人的选择?为什么百来号需要主子的人可以代表十几个不要主子的人来表决?如果在此前还从无任何约法三章,这种接受多数人选择的表决方法至少应在一个场合曾经通过了全体无异议的表决。
   《社会契约论》第一册第六章
   社会公约
   我认为在人类发展的某一时期,自然国度中个人之生存不再能由单一个体无力而藐小的力量来维持,原来的自然国度也就不能存在下去了,现状如不改变,人类就要消亡。
   个人的力量是有限的,只有他们团结起来,才是他们保存自己的唯一方式:结成一体,用力量的总和来攻艰克难,群策群力。
   如此集体力量只能由一群人的合作来实现。但既然每个人的力量和自由是其谋生的主要手段,个人如何能够善用此一集体力量,而不伤及自己和自己的利益?这一问题可以这样表达:“设计一种人类的集合体,以用集体力量来保障每一个加盟的个体和他的财产。在这一集体中,个体虽然和整体联系在一起,但依然自由如初,只听从自己的意志。”这就是社会契约要解决的根本问题。
   社会契约的本质决定了上述各项要件不能有一丝更动,否则社会契约就会失去效用,即便这些条件不曾被正式宣布,它也必须是每一时每一地普遍地得到接受。否则,每个个人都失去或放弃了他的契约自由,而重新得回他所原有的天然的权利和自由。
   这些要件,正确的理解之下,都归于一条,就是每个加盟成员都把自己的权利奉献给整个社会。首先,只有当个人把自己整个地投入,每一个人的条件才能平等,他人的负担也就是自己的负担,而为他人增加负荷,对任何人都不再有利。
   进一步,此等奉献既然毫无保留,这样的集体就是最完美的,每一个成员都不会过分地要求:只要有一个人还保有他的某一权利,他就迟早会在某一事例上开始特立独行,在个人和社会等事物上不受任何权威的约束。当最后所有人都开始拿回了他的权利凡事都凭自己的判断,人们就回复到了自然国度,社会必然地变得如非解体,就成。
   最后,每个个体无保留地投身于社会整体,等于个体毫无奉献。每个个体对其他加盟个体的权利都是一样的,因此,他所付出的,为他投身于社会的回馈所弥补,加上更强的保全自身的能力。
   如果,我们撇开社会公约中所有不重要的东西不谈,我们会发现它成为如下的公式:“在一般意志的最高权威下我们每个人都把自己和自己的能力奉献出来,在这一集体中,我们把每个加盟者都接受为不可分割的整体的一部分。”
   协约的结果立刻就产生了加盟的集合体,而代替了参与协约的每个单独的个体,它包含了参加表决的所有个体成员。此一统一独立的实体拥有集体的自我、和自己的生命与意志。这种由其他个体加盟而成的法人实体,我们叫它城市(city)【原注1】,现在的称呼是共和国或政体。在被动的状态,它称为“国家(state)”;在主动的状态,它称为“主权者(sovereign)”;在和其他同类实体相比较时,它又称为“政权(power)”;它的成员从集体的角度称自己为“人民(people)”;从分享主权者权威的个人的角度,称自己为“公民(citizen)”;从服从国家法律的角度,可以称自己为“臣民(subject)”。这些词往往被不加区分地混用;只要知道在使用它们时的确切含义就行了。-------【原注1】这个词的真正含义在现代已完全失去了;大多数人民认为一个城就是一个city,市民就是公民。他们却不知道房屋构成了城,而公民形成了city。很早以前,卡色基人同样的错误使他们所失甚重。我还从不曾读到过哪个王国的臣民有着公民的头衔,就是远古的玛西东人和今天的英国人都不例外,虽然他们相对别人有较多的自由。法国人自己处处使用公民的称谓,因为,如其字典上的写法,他们不懂它的含义;否则他们是有窜改文意的罪嫌的;对他们,公民是表达一种美德而不是权利。当包丁(Bodin)讨民和市民时,他犯了同样的大错,把一个阶级说成了另一个阶级。阿尔兰勃特先生避免了这些错误,在他有关日内瓦的文章中,他清楚地区分了四个等级(如果算外国人,五个等级)存在在城里,而只有其中两个等级构成了共和国。由我认知所限,没有其他的法国作家懂得公民一词的真正含义。
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